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1 JOHN CH1PMAN GRAY,THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAw 170 (2d ed. 1927, from the
author's notes by Roland Gray, LLB) ("[S]tatutes do not interpret themselves; their meaning is declared by the courts, and it is with the meaning declared by the courts, and with no
other meaning, that they are imposed upon the community as Law.") (emphasis in original);

see also JAMES WILLARD

HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES

17, 33 (1982) (agreeing that "stat-

utes do not execute themselves ....[but rather,] [tiheir practical impact is determined by
the ways in which affected private persons or groups, lawyers in private practice and government lawyers, executive or administrative officers, and judges interpret them," and that
"[sitatutory texts are rarely self-executing, but derive much of their impact from the uses
others than legislators make of them," but suggesting that Professor Gray "exaggerates the
role of judges" when he argues that all law is judge made law).
2 Anthony D'Amato, Can LegislaturesConstrain JudicialInterpretationof Statutes?,
75 VA. L. REV. 561, 562 (1989) (using Professor Stanley Fish's proposition as a starting
point); see also id. at 561 n.1, 562 n.8 (citing works by Professor Fish).
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INTRODUCTION: INTERPRETIVE CONFLICT AND THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE

The Supreme Court has issued forty-eight bankruptcy decisions in the two decades since the Bankruptcy Code3 became law.4
3 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994).
The Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978 and became effective on October 1, 1979.
See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402, 92 Stat. 2549, 2682 (1978).
It has been amended numerous times since its enactment. See The Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 (Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984); Bankruptcy Judges,
United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554,
100 Stat. 3114 (1986); Retiree Benefits Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100334, 102 Stat. 610 (1988); Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789
(1990); Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992); Rail Safety
Enforcement and Review Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-365, 106 Stat. 972 (1992); Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796
(1994); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994); ICC
Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803 (1995), and other minor
amendments.
The Bankruptcy Code superseded the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898. See Bankruptcy
Act of 1898 (act July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544), as amended by the Chandler Act of
1938 (ch. 575, 52 stat. 840) (repealed 1979) (hereinafter, the "Bankruptcy Act").
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In at least thirty of these cases, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to mediate conflicts among the circuit courts of appeal.'
Although the Court resolved the specific questions presented
in each, or at least most, 6 of these cases, critics have long complained that the Court has not consistently applied a coherent interpretive method in Bankruptcy Code cases.7 Bankruptcy
experts contend that the Court's use of divergent, and/or inappropriate, interpretive methods undermines predictability and stability, increases costs, ignores congressional intent, impairs
4 See Appendix I: The Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Code Decisions (Listed by Term
1981-1998) [hereinafter, "Appendix I], post.
After the Bankruptcy Code was enacted, the Court issued opinions in three Bankruptcy Act cases. See Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982);
Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979); United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268 (1978).
This article does not discuss these cases.
This article omits decisions that arose from Bankruptcy Code cases that did not involve questions of bankruptcy law, see, e.g., Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470
(1998) (clarifying the removal issues raised in Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452
U.S. 394 (1981)), and cases in which the Court simply vacated and remanded or dismissed
as moot a Bankruptcy Code decision, see, e.g., Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free
Church, 521 U.S. 1114 (1997) (vacating judgment and remanding for reconsideration in
light of City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)); In re Bonner Mall Partnership, 513
U.S. 18 (1994) (denying vacatur and dismissing the appeal as moot).
5 See Appendix II: Bankruptcy Code Circuit Court Splits Resolved by the Supreme
Court [hereinafter, "Appendix II"], post. A study of the circuit court bankruptcy opinions
underlying the Supreme Court bankruptcy decisions would be a useful means of enhancing
interpreters' understanding of bankruptcy interpretation because it would reveal the extent to which splits among the circuits arose from the use of divergent interpretive methods. Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992), is a classic example of a case in which
divergent methods (plain text versus legislative history) led to splits in the lower courts. It
would also be particularly interesting to consider the extent to which the Supreme Court
resolved such splits through a unanimous opinion. A study of the circuit court splits is,
however, well beyond the scope of this article.
Studies examining the effectiveness of competing interpretive models are also critical.
For example, in a recent study, Professor Daniel Bussel concluded that textualist decisions
were overruled by legislative action more often than non-textualist decisions. See Daniel J.
Bussel, Textualism's Failures:A Study of Overruled Bankruptcy Decisions, 53 VAND. L.
REV. - (forthcoming April 2000).
6 In Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership,
Ltd-, 526 U.S. 434, 119 S. Ct. 1411 (1999), and Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485
U.S. 197 (1988), for example, the Court held that the debtors' proposed contributions to
their plans of reorganization did not constitute "new value." The Court declined, however,
to determine whether the judicially-developed "new value" exception to the "absolute priority" rule had survived the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code. See infra notes 236-48, 52053 and accompanying text.
7 See, e.g., Thomas G. Kelch, An Apology for Plain-Meaning Interpretation of the
Bankruptcy Code, 10 BANKR. DEV. J. 289, 301-38 (1994); Kenneth N. Klee & Frank A. Merola, Ignoring CongressionalIntent: Eight Years of JudicialLegislation, 62 AM. BANxR. L.J.
1 (1988); Robert M. Lawless, Legisprudence Through a Bankruptcy Lens: A Study in the
Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Cases, 47 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1, 6, 109-11 (1996); Bruce A. Markell, Conspiracy,Literalism, and Ennui at the Supreme Court: An Examination of Bankruptcy Cases Decided From 1990 to 1993, 41 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 174, 181-83 (1994);
Charles Jordan Tabb & Robert M. Lawless, Of Commas, Gerunds, and Conjunctions:The
Bankruptcy Code Jurisprudenceof the Rehnquist Court, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 823, 879-85
(1991); Charles Jordan Tabb, The Bankruptcy Reform Act in the Supreme Court, 49 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 477, 570-75 (1988); Adam J. Weinsch, The Supreme Court, Textualism, and the
Treatment of Pre-Bankruptcy Code Law, 79 GEo. L.J. 1831, 1854-62 (1991).
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bankruptcy law by preventing the Court from developing a coherent bankruptcy policy and jurisprudence, leaves the lower courts
with inadequate guidance concerning how to interpret the Bankruptcy Code, and contributes to confusion and- split decisions
among the lower courts.'
These problems are particularly troubling in the bankruptcy
context because the Bankruptcy Code's commercial and remedial
provisions affect society in pervasive and important ways.
As a commercial statute, the Bankruptcy Code serves as the
backdrop for planning and negotiation in a wide variety of nonbankruptcy commercial transactions involving both businesses
and consumers. These transactions, which include financing, corporate restructuring, consumer credit, acquisitions, mergers,
workouts, sales, investments, and many other types of transactions, involve incalculable amounts of money, goods, and services.'
Uncertainty increases the risks and costs of commercial transactions for borrowers and lenders, buyers and sellers, creditors and
debtors, businesses and consumers.
The Bankruptcy Code is also an important remedial statute. 10
The Bankruptcy Code's broad relief chapters apply to a wide variety of debtors, from impoverished individuals, to multi-million
and -billion dollar businesses, to municipalities." For example, in
8 See generally Peter H. Carroll, III, Literalism: The United States Supreme Court's
Methodology for Statutory Construction in Bankruptcy Cases, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 143, 21215 (1993); Carlos J. Cuevas, Public Values and the Bankruptcy Code, 12 BANER. DEV. J. 645
(1996); Kelch, supra note 7, at 291, 301-38; Klee & Merola, supra note 7; Eric W. Lam, The
Limit and Inconsistency of Application of the Plain Meaning Rule to Selected Provisionsof
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 20 HAMLINE L. REV. 111 (1996); Lawless, supra note 7,
at 100-07; Markell, supra note 7, at 181-83; Tabb & Lawless, supranote 7, at 881-85; Tabb,
supra note 7, at 570-75.
See also Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone III Joint Venture (In re Greystone
III Joint Venture), 995 F.2d 1274, 1285 (5th Cir. 1991) (Jones, J., dissenting on rehearing)
(quoted infra text accompanying note 761).
9 See, e.g., E. WARREN & J. WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 7
(1993).
lo Concerns over the proper scope of the Bankruptcy Code's remedial provisions have
spurred recent amendments, see, e.g., the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994), comprehensive congressionally-mandated study of the Bankruptcy Code, see Report of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission (October 20,
1997), and recent, hotly contested bankruptcy reform legislation, see Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1999, S. 625, 106th Cong. (1999); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, 105th
Cong. (1998).
For an overview of the debate concerning the continued viability of chapter 11, see
Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter11, 101 YALE L.J.
1043 (1992) (discussing the debate concerning the continued viability of chapter 11); G.
Eric Brunstead, Jr., et al. , Review of the Proposals of the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission Pertaining to Business Bankruptcies: Part One, 53 Bus. LAw. 1381 (1998);
Kenneth Klee, Adjusting Chapter11: Fine Tuning the Plan Process, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 551
(1995); Lynn M. LoPucki, Chapter 11: An Agenda for Basic Reform, 69 Am BANR. L.J. 573
(1995); Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable Case ForRepeal of Chapter11, 102 YALE L.J. 437
(1992).
ii Chapter 7 relief (liquidation) is available to individuals and businesses; chapter 9
relief (adjustment of debts of a municipality) is available to certain insolvent municipali-
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each of the past three years, over one million debtors have filed for
bankruptcy protection. 2 Each year, bankruptcy filings also affect
tens of millions of non-debtors. 3 These non-debtors include not
only individuals, businesses, and governmental entities that hold
claims against individual and business debtors, but also the employees, retirees, customers, and stockholders of business debtors.
Bankruptcy also affects society in less direct ways. For example, the failure of a major employer may significantly impair a
community's social services and tax base. Similarly, large numbers of financially distressed individuals may severely strain social services. When interpretive disputes lead to litigation in
bankruptcy cases, everyone suffers. The cost of litigation may
spell the difference between liquidation and reorganization.
Every dollar spent litigating is a dollar removed14 from an asset
base that is already inadequate to satisfy claims.
Although the costs of uncertainty may be particularly high in
bankruptcy cases, interpretive uncertainty is by no means unique
to bankruptcy. For the past twenty years, a virulent debate over
ties; chapter 11 relief (reorganization) is available to individuals and businesses but is used
primarily by businesses; chapter 12 relief (adjustment of debts of a family farmer with
regular annual income) is available only to family farmers; and chapter 13 relief (adjustment of debts of an individual with regular income) is available only to individuals who
earn a regular income and whose debts fall within specific limits. See 11 U.S.C. § 109
(1994).
For empirical data concerning individuals who have filed for bankruptcy relief, see
Karen Gross, Re-Vision of the Bankruptcy System: New Images of Individual Debtors, 88
MICH. L. REV. 1505 (1990); TERESA SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA (1989); Teresa A. Sullivan, et al., The Use of
EmpiricalData in FormulatingBankruptcy Policy, 50 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 195 (1987);
Teresa Sullivan, et al., Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later: A FinancialComparisonof Consumer Bankrupts, 1981-1991, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 121 (1994); Teresa Sullivan, et al., The
Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Experience from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 801 (1994). For select empirical data concerning
business bankruptcy filings, see Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice
and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Publicly Held Companies, 1991
Wis. L. REV. 11 (1991). For a discussion of bankruptcy's impact on the community, see
KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRU'rcY SYSTEM (1997).
12 See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, In June, Total Bankruptcies
Filed Decline Again, Personal Bankruptcies Fall for First Time in 5 Years (Aug. 6 1999)
<http://www.uscourts.gov/new.html>. For example, in the year ended June 30, 1999,
1,352,030 individuals and 39,934 businesses filed bankruptcy cases. The 1,391,964 aggregate filings represent a 2.6 % decrease over the aggregate 1998 filings (1,429,451 filings)
and a 62.2 % increase over the aggregate 1995 filings (858,104 filings). Non-business filings rose dramatically between 1995 and 1998 (from 806,816 to 1,379,249), and then declined by 2 % in 1999. The year ended June 30, 1999 reflects a dramatic decrease in
business filings in comparison with recent years (50,202 filings in 1998, 53,993 filings in
1997, 52,938 filings in 1996, and 51,288 filings in 1995). Id.
13 If each of the 1.3 million bankruptcy cases filed during the year ended June 30,
1999 affected only 20 creditors (or other non-debtors), these cases together would have affected 26 million non-debtors. Some of these creditors (such as institutional lenders) will,
of course, have been affected by multiple bankruptcy filings.
14 See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380,
409 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("An entity in bankruptcy can ill afford to waste resources on litigation; every dollar spent on lawyers is a dollar creditors will never see.").
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interpretive method has plagued courts, interpreters, and scholars
in virtually every field of law governed by statutes. 5 This debate
raises important and extraordinarily intractable questions concerning the proper relationship between courts and legislatures;
the motives of legislators, judges, and interpreters; the determinacy of language; that nature of interpretation; the role of intrinsic values (such as predictability, stability over time, and
coherence throughout the law); and the very objectives of interpretation (which may include legislative intent, statutory purpose,
linguistic meaning, best results, or a shared understanding between the drafter and interpreter). 6
Disputes over these fundamentals have led scholars to advocate a variety of divergent interpretive models. 7 Moreover, scholars cannot even reach accord on the end goal. Even as some
struggle to prove the superiority of their preferred interpretive
models, 8 others contend that the goal of defining one, consistent,
comprehensive, and uniformly applicable interpretive method is
unrealistic and unachievable. 19
Perhaps the only certainty is that interpretive theory is in a
time of turbulent upheaval and transition. Scholars of interpretive theory will likely not achieve consensus for years, if ever. In
the meantime, today's interpreters face a formidable challenge.
We must determine how to preserve the greatest possible degree
of interpretive certainty despite the fact that eminent scholars
and jurists urge us to employ incompatible interpretive methods.
If we hope to identify an effective interpretive model for this
time of transition, we must consider and attempt to reconcile the
15 See generally Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Statutory Interpretation,DemocraticLegitimacy, and Legal-System Values, 21 SETON HALL LEG. J. 233, 234 nn.1-2 (1997) (collecting
authorities).
16 See generally Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 15, at 271-76, 280-88, 291-302.
17 See infra Part H.
18 See, e.g., Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History Without Legislative Intent: The Public
JustificationApproach to Statutory Interpretation,60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1999) (advocating
the use of legislative history to enforce the expectation of public justification of legislation);
WiLiAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994) (advocating dynamic interpretation); David A. Forkner & Kent Kostka, Unanimously Weaving a Tangled
Web: Walters, Robinson, Title VII, and the Need For Holistic Statutory Interpretation, 36
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 161 (1999) (advocating holistic interpretation); Earl M. Maltz, Statutory
Interpretationand Legislative Power: The Case for a Modified IntentionalistApproach, 63
TuL. L. REv. 1 (1988) (advocating a modified form of intentionalism); William D. Popkin,
The CollaborativeModel ofStatutory Interpretation,61 S. CAL. L. REv. 541 (1988) (advocating collaborative interpretation); Edward L. Rubin, Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive
Rationality in the Writing and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1991) (advocating
comprehensive rationality); ANTONIN ScALiA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW (1997) (advocating textualism).
19 See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETrVE COMMIuqTIEs (1980); see also Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 15, at 294-97 & n.174
(collecting authorities).
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empirical, practical, and theoretical aspects of Bankruptcy Code
interpretation.
First, empirical studies are the only way to discern current
interpretive practice in bankruptcy cases. A study of the Supreme
Court's interpretive practices is critical because the lower courts
look to the Court for direction concerning interpretive method,
and the Court is the ultimate arbiter of cases in which the lower
courts have split. When the circuit courts reach conflicting holdings because they have applied conflicting interpretive methods
(such as textual meaning versus congressional intent as discerned
in pre-Code practice or legislative history), the Court's resolution
of the split is a comment on interpretive method. Predicting the
Court's holding in the next bankruptcy case (and, consequently,
understanding which lower court decisions are at risk of being
overruled) depends more on understanding the Court's patterns of
reasoning than on knowing the substantive holdings of each
Supreme Court bankruptcy decision. Consequently, interpreters
should carefully consider the Court's rationale, which is inextricably interwoven with the Court's interpretive method.
This article studies the Court's interpretive methods. Studies
of lower court bankruptcy decisions might also provide valuable
information concerning interpretive method, particularly if such
studies examine whether conflicting decisions arise from conflicting interpretive methods, whether appellate courts and bankruptcy courts apply divergent interpretive methods, and whether
textual or non-textual decisions are more frequently overruled by
higher courts or legislative action.
In a time of interpretive consensus, interpreters might have
achieved certainty by applying the method that conformed to current practice. In this time of interpretive upheaval, however, an
empirical analysis is unlikely to reveal a single, universally accepted and applied interpretive method. Moreover, an empirical
analysis cannot per se ensure interpreters that the Court's current methods are practically or theoretically optimal, or even legitimate. Nevertheless, an empirical study is critical, for two
reasons. First, it is the only way to determine whether the Court's
opinions reveal either a consistent interpretive method or consistent patterns of interpretation, including patterns of agreement
and disagreement among the Justices. Only by identifying these
patterns can interpreters begin to predict the Court's approach in
future cases. Second, an empirical study will establish a foundation of current practice that interpreters can test against practically and theoretically ideal interpretive models. Simply stated, if
the Court is issuing "bad" decisions in bankruptcy cases, an empirical study may reveal why.
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Second, as a practical matter, interpreters should consider
which interpretive method would be most appropriate for a statute that has the unique nature and mix of characteristics of the
Bankruptcy Code. Of course, interpreters cannot achieve certainty simply by adopting the practically optimal approach, unless
that approach happens to conform to current interpretive practice.
Only a practical inquiry, however, will reveal whether the Court's
current interpretive method is well-suited to the Bankruptcy
Code. Moreover, only a practical inquiry will reveal whether any
of the competing interpretive models that theorists claim are optimal, in the abstract, would work well in the specific context of the
Bankruptcy Code.
Third, a theoretical analysis is necessary to determine
whether either the Court's current interpretive methods, or an interpretive model that appears to be well-suited to the characteristics of the Bankruptcy Code, satisfies the fundamental objectives
of statutory interpretation and the mandates of interpretive theory. Theory alone will not permit interpreters to predict consequences if the courts do not, in fact, apply the theoretically
optimal approach. Nevertheless, theory is the only basis for testing the validity of current interpretive methods and practically desirable interpretive methods.
Interpreters operating during today's period of interpretive
discord must begin by understanding current interpretive practices, identifying practically desirable interpretive methods, and
determining whether a single, optimal interpretive model is theoretically possible. They must then determine whether current interpretive practices and desirable interpretive practices can be
reconciled. If these divergent practices cannot be reconciled, interpreters must determine whether it is possible to move incrementally toward an interpretive ideal while hewing closely
enough to current practice to maintain certainty.
The empirical, practical, and theoretical study necessary to
answer these questions cannot be accomplished within the confines of a single law review article. This article embodies the first,
fundamental step of the requisite inquiry, which is a comprehensive, empirical analysis of the interpretive methods the Supreme
Court has employed in its Bankruptcy Code decisions. A separate
work will consider how the results of this empirical study comport
with the practical and theoretical components of Bankruptcy Code
interpretation. °
Part II of this article briefly identifies the essential components of interpretive method. These components include interpre20 See Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Toward a Method and Theory of Interpreting the
Bankruptcy Code (working title, in progress).

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 3:173

tive objectives, sources, and guides. This section is designed to
provide context for an empirical study of the Supreme Court's interpretive approach.
Part III examines the interpretive methods the Court has employed in each of its Bankruptcy Code decisions. This study differs in three ways from other studies that have undertaken
empirical analyses of limited numbers of the Court's bankruptcy
decisions. First, it focuses exclusively on interpretive method.
Second, it comprehensively examines all of the Court's Bankruptcy Code decisions. 21 Third, it examines the Court's majority,
concurring, and dissenting opinions in order to determine the import of interpretive disputes among the Justices. It does not simply on the interpretive methods the Court has used in its majority
opinions.2 2
This article hypothesizes that interpreters can best understand the Court's bankruptcy jurisprudence 2 by examining areas
of agreement and disagreement among the Justices in bankruptcy
cases.
For example, if substantive bankruptcy policy is the linchpin
of the Court's bankruptcy jurisprudence, then one would expect
the Court to issue unanimous opinions when the Justices agree on
substantive bankruptcy policy and to issue divided opinions when
the Justices disagree on substantive bankruptcy policy. One
would also expect disputes among the Justices, as revealed in separate concurring and dissenting opinions, to turn on matters of
bankruptcy policy.
In contrast, to the extent that interpretive method is the
linchpin of the Court's bankruptcy jurisprudence, one would expect that disputes among the Justices concerning the choice and
application of interpretive method would lead to separate
opinions.
Finally, if other considerations affect the Justices' approach to
bankruptcy jurisprudence, if the Court balances interpretive
method and substantive results, or if some Justices decide bankruptcy cases based upon substantive bankruptcy policy while
others decide bankruptcy cases based upon interpretive method,
one would expect the Justices' separate opinions to reflect these
considerations. In other words, an examination of the reasons the
Justices agree and disagree with each other may reveal more
about the Justices' vision for the Bankruptcy Code than an exami21 Cf. sources cited infra note 683.
22 Cf. sources cited supra notes 7-8, infra notes 672-83.
23 In this context, "jurisprudence" is not limited to judicial development of substantive
legal doctrine, but also includes interpretive patterns that help the observer understand
the Court's past decisions and predict the Court's future decisions. The latter is sometimes
labeled "legisprudence."

2000]

Interpretingthe Bankruptcy Code

nation of either the substantive results in bankruptcy cases,
alone, or the interpretive methods the Court has used in its majority opinions, alone.
To test this hypothesis and determine the extent to which interpretive method drives the Court's bankruptcy jurisprudence,
Part III analyzes separately the Court's unanimous, unanimous
with concurrence, minor split, and major split bankruptcy decisions. Part IV summarizes the results and elaborates the implications of this empirical study. Among the observations that Part
IV discusses are the following:
*In one-half of the Court's Bankruptcy Code decisions, all Justices agreed on the result.
*Nevertheless, in more than two-thirds of the Court's Bankruptcy Code cases, one or more Justices wrote separate
opinions.
*The Justices generally decided bankruptcy cases based upon
principles of statutory interpretation rather than, for example,
based upon substantive bankruptcy policy.
*Nevertheless, even the Court's unanimous cases did not consistently employ one, single interpretive method. The Court's
unanimous opinions do not reveal any obvious criteria for choosing among these divergent methods.
*Disputes among the Justices over interpretive method led to a
substantial majority of the Justices' separate opinions. These
separate opinions reveal two significant patterns of discord.
First, particular Justices disagreed strongly and consistently
with other Justices concerning interpretive method. Second,
these disputes centered upon two prominent components of
bankruptcy interpretation - the plain meaning canon and the
pre-Code practice canon.
*The overwhelming majority of cases in which the Justices disagreed with each other for reasons unrelated to interpretive
method involved either constitutional, or quasi-constitutional,
questions or tensions between the Bankruptcy Code and other
applicable non-bankruptcy law. An inordinately large percentage of the Court's major splits arose from constitutional questions. A substantial number of the cases involving tensions
between the Bankruptcy Code and other law caused disputes
among the Justices concerning how to reconcile the Bankruptcy
Code's plain language, pre-Code law, and a "canon" of deference
to important federal or state laws or governmental interests.
Part IV elaborates these and other observations and considers
how bankruptcy judges, practitioners, and scholars might approach bankruptcy cases in light of these results. Seven Appendi-
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ces present compilations of this study's data.24 Finally, Part V
summarizes my conclusions and makes recommendations for further study.
II.

MECHANICS OF INTERPRETATION

The modern interpretive debate is characterized by a dizzying
array of competing interpretive theories and models. Some of the
more commonly discussed models include textualism, originalism,
intentionalism, purposivism, pragmatism, legal process, holistic
interpretation, dynamic interpretation, and integrity in
interpretation.2 5
Competing views of interpretative theory, political theory,
legal theory, and practical reasoning drive these models.2 6 The
complexity of these underlying philosophical motivations leads to
multiple shades, variations, and combinations within each of
these general models and frequent overlap among these models.
Consequently, a particular interpreter's approach may fit within
more than one of these categories.
Despite the complexities and nuances of interpretive theory,
the mechanics of interpretation are relatively simple. Three primary components define every interpretive model. These are the
(i) interpreter's goals or objectives, (ii) sources the interpreter consults, and (iii) interpretive guides the interpreter employs to understand the relationships among these sources and to wield these
sources in a way that achieves the interpreter's objective. The
theoretical or philosophical criteria that drive the different inter24 See Appendix I: The Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Code Decisions (Listed by Term
1981-1998) [hereinafter, "Appendix I"]; Appendix II: Bankruptcy Code Circuit Court Splits
Resolved by the Supreme Court [hereinafter, "Appendix II]; Appendix III: Splits in
Supreme Court Bankruptcy Code Cases [hereinafter, "Appendix III"]; Appendix IV: Distribution of Justices' Opinions in Supreme Court Bankruptcy Code Cases [hereinafter, "Appendix IV]; Appendix V: Supreme Court Justices' Dissent and Divergence Rates in
Bankruptcy Code Cases [hereinafter, "Appendix V"]; Appendix VI: Distribution of Textual,
Non-Textual, and Pre-Code Practice Opinions in the Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Code
Cases [hereinafter, "Appendix VI"]; Appendix VII: Supreme Court Justices' Rates of Joining Textual and Non-Textual Opinions in Bankruptcy Code Cases [hereinafter, "Appendix
VII"], post.
25 See generally ESKRIDGE, supra note 18 (analyzing divergent interpretive methods);
see also sources cited supra notes 15, 18, 19; Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 15 (distinguishing
textualism, intentionalism, purposivism, originalism, and various forms of dynamic interpretation); KENT GREENAWALT, LEGISLATION: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 20 QUESTIONS 5
(1999) (mentioning textualism, intentionalism, purposivism, legal process, pragmatism,
and integrity).
26 See, e.g., Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 15 (extensively analyzing the theoretical foundations of competing interpretive models); GREENAWALT, supra note 25, at 10-11.
27 For example, Justice Thomas's interpretive method might be characterized as textualist, originalist, and linguistically holistic. Justice Stevens's approach might be characterized as intentionalist or purposive, dynamic, substantively holistic, and perhaps
pragmatic.
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pretive models direct interpreters to pursue different objectives,
consult different sources, and apply different interpretive guides.
Part II briefly identifies the primary mechanical components
of interpretation in order to provide the reader with some context
for this article's examination of the Court's interpretive methods.
A. Interpreters' Objectives
When an interpreter applies a statute, she typically has in
mind a particular objective that defines her task. She may seek to
determine and implement the legislature's actual, subjective intent (intentionalist), the statute's objective purpose (purposive),
the text's meaning (textualist, formalist), or the best result (consequentialist). Alternatively, she may view interpretation not as a
search for a specific objective, but rather, as a dialogue through
which the drafter and interpreter achieve a common
understanding. 8
Within each of these categories of inquiry, the interpreter's
approach will depend upon the breadth and temporal focus of her
inquiry. First, an interpreter might focus on the intent, purpose,
or meaning of the statute as a whole (holistic), or of only one particular phrase or section of the statute (narrow or non-holistic).2 9
Second, the interpreter may seek to implement the original intent,
purpose, or meaning (originalist) or she may view the original intent, purpose, or meaning in light of the contexts that surrounded
the enactment of the statute and the manner in which those contexts have changed since the statute was enacted (dynamic).3 0
Although there are exceptions and gradations, intentionalists
generally tend to apply originalist interpretation. Consequentialists are dynamic. Textualists typically claim to be originalist, but
when they apply a current rather than original meaning, they are
dynamic. Purposivists tend to search for the statute's original
purpose, but their efforts to discern how that purpose applies in
the current day often appear to be dynamic. Interpreters may apply both non-holistic and holistic interpretation in either an
originalist or dynamic manner.3
In most of the Court's Bankruptcy Code cases, the Court
either expressly or impliedly searches for legislative intent. 2 In
28 See generally Gebbia-Pinetti, supranote 15 at 271-76, 280-88, 291-302 (for a discussion of different interpretive objectives).
29 See generally Forkner & Kostka, supra note 18 (discussing holistic and non-holistic
interpretation).
30 See generally ESKRIDGE, supra note 18 (contrasting originalist and dynamic
interpretation).
31 See generally sources cited supra notes 28-30.
32 See, e.g., Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 221-22 (1998); Fidelity Financial Servs.,
Inc. v. Fink, 522 U.S. 211, 215-21 (1998); NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 522
n.6, 523, 526 (1984); United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 539-40 (1996); Grogan v. Gar-
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some of these cases, however, the Court's reference to subjective
legislative "intent" seems to refer, more objectively, to the purposes of the statute.3 3 A full examination of the Court's interpretive objective in bankruptcy cases is beyond the scope of this
article.
B.

Sources

Interpreters may consult a variety of sources in their efforts
to implement the legislature's intent, statute's purpose, text's
meaning, best result, or other objective. This section categorizes
interpretive sources according to the following criteria. First,
sources may have existed before the enactment of the statute (historic), may have been created contemporaneous with the enactment of the statute (contemporaneous), or may have been created
after the statute was enacted (subsequent). Second, in each of
these three categories, sources may be either internal or external
to the statute. Finally, external sources may be closely and integrally related to the statute (intrinsic) or only remotely related to
the statute (extrinsic).34

The purpose of this list is simply to identify sources that interpreters might consult and to categorize those sources in a way
that may be helpful as readers consider the interpretive methods
the Court has applied in bankruptcy cases. This list is not
designed as a comprehensive review or as a commentary on the
legitimacy of these sources.
1. Internal sources
Internal to the statute and contemporaneous with the provision being applied:
(1) Text: language of the particular provision
(2) Definitions: statutory definitions of terms and phrases
(3) Formalist holistic (or structural) analysis: use of the term or
phrase in other sections of the statute
(4) Substantive holistic (or structural) analysis: substantive effect of the provision and of related provisions
ner, 498 U.S. 279, 282-83, 287-88 (1991); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S.
235 (1989); United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 372
(1988); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 350-52 (1985);
United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 205, 208, 209 (1983).
33 See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 147-49.
34 The distinction between a "source" and an interpretive guide is not definite. For
example, a dictionary could be considered a "source" or an interpretive guide that assists
the interpreter in applying the text. Similarly, although legislative history is often viewed
as a source, it could be deemed an interpretive guide. For simplicity, this article includes
all of these materials as sources.
35 For other lists of interpretive sources, see generally SuTHERLAND, STATUTORY CoNSrRUCToN, §§ 27.01-27.04 (4th ed. 1991).
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(5) Overarching substantive holistic (or structural) analysis:
the substantive effect, design, object, or policy of the statute as a
whole."s The Court has recognized two overarching policies that
animate the Bankruptcy Code: (a) the rehabilitation of debtors,
and (b) the maximization of value and fair and equitable treatment of similarly situated creditors. 7
Internal to the statute and historic in relation to the provision being applied:'e
(6) Prior law (i.e., the Bankruptcy Act)
(7) Prior versions of the Bankruptcy Code (i.e., how the provision in question altered an earlier version of the provision)
Internal to the statute and subsequent to the provision being
applied:
(8) Amendments made to the provision after the provision was
enacted
(9) Amendments made to other provisions that affect or are related to the provision
2.

Sources that are external but intrinsic to the statute

External, intrinsic, and contemporaneous with the provision being
applied:
(10) Legislative history of the enactment (committee reports,
floor statements, speeches, debates)
External, intrinsic, and historic in relation to the provision being
applied:
(11) Legislative history of Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy
Act predecessors to the provision
(12) Judicial precedents interpreting and pre-Code judicial doctrines elaborating the Bankruptcy Act predecessor to the Bankruptcy Code provision
(13) Judicial precedents interpreting and judicial doctrines
elaborating prior versions of the Bankruptcy Code provision
(14) Legislative history of prior, proposed bills that were not
enacted
36 See, e.g., Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287-88 & n.13 (1991); see also infra text
and accompanying notes 147-49; infra Part IV.A.I.c.3.
37 See, e.g., Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 217 (1998) (citing the fresh start policy);
Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 160-62 (1991) (citing the equitable distribution policy,
and deter a race to the courthouse policy); Begier v. Internal Revenue Serv., 496 U.S. 53, 58
(1990) (citing the equitable distribution policy); NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513,
527 (1984) (citing the reorganization policy); Grogan, 498 U.S. at 287 (citing the fresh start
policy); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 351-54 (1985)
(citing the maximization of value policy); United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S.

198, 203-04 (1983) (citing the reorganization policy); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234,
244 (1934) (citing the fresh start policy).
s These sources might be considered external, because they are no longer part of the
statute, but are nevertheless intrinsic to the statute. The distinction is not important for
purposes of this article.
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External, intrinsic, and subsequent to the provision being applied:
(15) Legislative history of subsequently enacted amendments
(16) Proposed amendments rejected after the provision was
enacted
(17) Legislative history of subsequent, proposed bills that were
not enacted
(18) Judicial precedent interpreting the provision
3.

Sources that are external and extrinsic to the statute
External, extrinsic, and contemporaneous with the provision being applied:
(19) Dictionaries and similar textual aids dated contemporaneous with the statute
(20) Contemporaneous non-bankruptcy statutes, their text,
structure, and policy
(21) Other contemporaneous non-statutory law (its substance
and policy)
(22) Public debate, popular press, scholarly writings, other commentary contemporaneous with the enactment of the provision
External, extrinsic, and historic in relation to the provision being
applied:
(23) Dictionaries and similar textual aids dated prior to the
statute
(24) Non-bankruptcy statutes (their text, structure, policy) that
pre-date the Bankruptcy Code provision
(25) Other non-statutory law (its substance and policy) that
pre-dates the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code provision
(26) Public debate, popular press, scholarly writings, other commentary that pre-dates the enactment of the provision
External, extrinsic, subsequent to the provision being applied:
(27) Dictionaries and similar textual aids dated later than the
statute
(28) Non-bankruptcy statutes (their text, structure, policy) that
were enacted after the Bankruptcy Code provision
(29) Other non-statutory law (its substance and policy) that was
developed after the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code provision
(30) Public debate, popular press, scholarly writings, other commentary subsequent to the enactment of the provision
(31) Changes in social and legal contexts; changes in the
legislature
(32) Consequences in the case and projected consequences in
subsequent cases
Three observations concerning these sources are appropriate.
First, for purposes of this article, it will rarely be necessary to
elaborate the nuances of the competing interpretive models except
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to differentiate textual from non-textual interpretation.3 9 This
distinction, however, is far from simple. Different commentators
hold different views concerning what constitutes textual interpretation.40 For purposes of this article, the Court's interpretation
will be deemed "textual" only if the Court consults no sources
other than those listed above as sources (1) (text), (2) (textual definitions), (3) (formalist holistic analysis), and (19), (23) and (27)
(dictionaries).4 1 If the Court considers any other source, for any
reason, even simply to confirm textual meaning, the analysis is
not purely textual.
Second, although any consideration of post-enactment
sources, including subsequent amendments and subsequently enacted, related laws is considered dynamic, the preceding list
reveals a rich variety of dynamic sources, many of which courts
consult regularly. The more controversial uses of dynamic interpretation involve importing broader changes in the social fabric
and self-consciously protecting interests not protected by the
legislature.
Third, "history" encompasses a broad array of sources other
than "legislative history." Many of these sources, such as prior
law and judicial interpretations of prior law, are intrinsic to the
historical development of the doctrines embodied in the current
Bankruptcy Code.
C.

Interpretive Canons, Guides, and Aids

Interpretive canons, guides, and aids are tools or criteria that
interpreters use to determine which sources to consult, how to
construe those sources, the import, meaning and relationships
among interpretive sources, and how to wield those sources to
achieve the interpretive objective.
Courts employ an enormous variety of interpretive canons,
guides, and aids.4 2 For simplicity, the article will refer to all of
these devices as "canons." For purposes of this article, the reader
should simply be alert to four distinct categories of interpretive
canons that appear with some regularity in the Supreme Court's
bankruptcy cases.
39 See Appendix VI: Distribution of Textual, Non-Textual, and Pre-Code Practice
Opinions in the Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Code Cases [hereinafter, "Appendix VI"],
post; see also infra Parts IV.A.I.c.2, IV.A.2.
40 See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 50, 672-83.
41 See infra Parts IV.A.I.c.2, IV.A.2.
42 For classic discussions of interpretive canons, see generally SUTHERLAND, supra

note 35, at § 45.13, 76-78;

REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF

227-37 (1975); Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision
and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395
(1950); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43 HARv.L. REV. 863 (1930).
STATuTEs
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First, textual guides include general rules of grammar and
linguistic construction.43 Other, more specific, textual canons direct the interpreter when to consider only the text and when to
look beyond the text.'
Second, structural or holistic canons encourage the interpreter to consider the statute's words in the context of other components of the statute, including the use of the same or similar
words and phrases elsewhere in the statute (linguistic or textual),
and the structure, design, object, policy, or purpose of the statute
(substantive).'
Third, pre-Code canons instruct the interpreter to consider or
defer to pre-Code law or pre-Code judicial interpretations, practices, and doctrines, in certain circumstances.6
Fourth, the Court occasionally has applied other, bankruptcyspecific canons.47 Bankruptcy-specific canons include, for example, suggestions that interpreters defer to important state, federal, or governmental interests," or that interpreters construe
discharge exceptions narrowly in favor of the debtor.4 9
Part III examines the interpretive methods the Supreme
Court has employed in its Bankruptcy Code decisions.
III.
A.

THE

BANKRUPTCY CODE IN THE SUPREME COURT

Overview

This article separately analyzes the Court's unanimous (Part
B), unanimous with concurrence (Part C), minor split (Part D),
and major split (Part E) Bankruptcy Code decisions.
43 See, e.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241-45 (1989) (applying rules of grammar); infra notes 629-57 and accompanying text.
44 See, e.g., Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464, 471 (1993); Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393,
401-02 (1992); Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 162 (1991); Ron Pair,489 U.S. at 241-43; see
also Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 435 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); infra Parts
IV.A.I.c.2, IV.A.2.
45 See, e.g., Rake, 508 U.S. at 474-75; Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 288 n.13 (1991);
United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988).
46 See, e.g., Cohen v. de Is Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 221 (1998); United States v. Noland,
517 U.S. 535, 539 (1996); Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 419-20; Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare
v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 563 (1990); Ron Pair,489 U.S. at 251-54 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Timbers, 484 U.S. at 380; Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986); Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 47 (1986); United States v.
Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 208 (1983); cf Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 433-34 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Ron Pair,489 U.S. at 240-41.
47 The Court also applied constitutional canons in one case that raised constitutional
questions in a bankruptcy context. See United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70,
78-80 (1982); infra notes 270-71 and accompanying text.
48 See, e.g., Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 499-501; Kelly, 479 U.S. at 44-49; cf Ron Pair,489
U.S. at 23-46 (distinguishing the case at bar from cases in which such interests were at
stake); see also infra Parts IV.A.1.c, IV.A.1.d.
49 See, e.g., Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998).
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For purposes of this article, a decision is "unanimous" only if
the Justices agreed on a single opinion, and no Justice wrote a
separate concurring or dissenting opinion. In "unanimous with
concurrence" cases, one or more Justices wrote concurring opinions. Together, the unanimous decisions and unanimous with
concurrence decisions are referred to as the "non-split decisions."
The cases in which the Justices did not agree on the result
(the "split decisions") are separated into "minor split" and "major
split" decisions. Major splits occurred when at least three Justices
dissented. Minor splits occurred when one or two Justices
dissented.
Where appropriate, the analysis separates cases decided prior
to the 1986 Term from cases decided in the 1986 and subsequent
Terms. This division is designed to isolate and consider the extent
to which the addition of Justice Scalia (whose iconoclastic interpretive methods are legendary) 0 to the Court in 1986 may have
affected the Court's interpretive splits.
The first of the Court's forty-eight Bankruptcy Code cases
came before the Court during the 1981 Term. 51 Appendix I, post,
reveals that the number of Supreme Court bankruptcy cases increased dramatically from the 1981 through 1985 period to the
1986 through 1998 period.5 2
Despite this increase, however, the raw numbers show little
distinction between either the non-split decisions and the split decisions or the pre-Justice Scalia period decisions and the Justice
Scalia period decisions. Appendix III, post, reveals that the Court
decided one-half of its forty-eight aggregate bankruptcy cases by
50 See generally William N. Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621
(1990); William D. Popkin, An "Internal"Critique of Justice Scalia's Theory of Statutory
Interpretation,76 MiN. L. RaV. 1133 (1992); Robert K. Rasmussen, A Study of the Costs
and Benefits of Textualism: The Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Cases, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 535
(1993); Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing
Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 277
(1990); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12
CARDozo L. REV. 1597 (1991).
51 See Central Trust Co. v. Official Creditors' Comm. of Geiger Enters., Inc., 454 U.S.
354 (1982); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982);
Appendix I, post.
52 See Appendix I, post. During the 1981 through 1985 Terms, the Court decided eight
bankruptcy cases in five years, which is 1.6 cases per year. During the 1986 through 1998
terms, the Court decided 40 bankruptcy cases in 13 years, which is 3.076 cases per year.
Any suggested reasons for this increase would be speculative absent an empirical study
that goes well beyond the scope of this article. Factors relevant to such a study might include the dramatic increase in bankruptcy filings during this period, frequency of amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, time required for cases to rise from the bankruptcy courts
to the Supreme Court, nature of the questions presented, reasons the Court has accepted
bankruptcy cases, and whether the Court's case load has increased correspondingly in
other areas of law.
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split decisions, and one-half by non-split decisions.5 3 The allocation between split and non-split decisions did not change when
Justice Scalia joined the Court. One-half of the eight cases decided during the 1981 through 1985 Terms were split; one-half
were not split. One-half of the forty cases decided during the 1986
through 1989 terms were split; one-half were not split.54
The simple statistics, however, reveal nothing about the reasons the Justices agreed and disagreed with each other in bankruptcy cases. The following analysis examines the areas of accord
and discord among the Justices in order to discern the role and
significance of interpretive method in the Court's bankruptcy jurisprudence. Because this analysis focuses on interpretive
method rather than substantive law, the facts and holdings are
explained only in sufficient detail for the reader to understand the
Court's interpretive method. 55
B.

The Unanimous Decisions
1.

Overview

During the 1981 through 1998 Terms, the Supreme Court issued fifteen unanimous Bankruptcy Code opinions.56 In these
cases, each Justice agreed not only with the Court's result, but
also (presumably) with the Court's reasoning, including its interpretive method. At the least, no Justice disagreed strongly
enough with the Court's reasoning to write a separate
concurrence.
53 See Appendix III: Splits in Supreme Court Bankruptcy Cases [hereinafter, "Appendix III"], post. Appendix III does reveal a significant increase in unanimous as compared to
concurrence decisions from the pre-Justice Scalia era to the Justice Scalia era, and an increase in the number of minor as compared to major splits from the pre-Justice Scalia era
to the Justice Scalia era. Before Justice Scalia joined the Court, one-half (2 cases) of the
four non-split decisions were unanimous and one-half (2 cases) included a concurrence.
After Justice Scalia joined the Court, 621k% (thirteen cases) of the twenty non-split decisions were unanimous, and 37 1h% (seven cases) included a concurrence. Similarly, before
Justice Scalia joined the Court, 25% (1 case) of the four split decisions were minor splits
and 75% (three cases) were major splits. After Justice Scalia joined the Court, however,
70% (fourteen cases) of the twenty non-split decisions were minor splits, and 30% (six
cases) were major splits. Id. The implications, if any, of this shift are unclear, particularly
in light of the small numbers of bankruptcy cases decided in pre-Justice Scalia era.
54 See Appendix II, post.
55 This analysis focuses on whether Justices wrote separate opinions because of methodological disagreements. Consequently, it elaborates the Court's general interpretive appreach in each case, rather than each interpretive nuance. This analysis is not designed to
provide a critical analysis of the cases, their results, or the methods the Court has used to
interpret the Bankruptcy Code.
For other, and, in some instances, more detailed, analyses of limited groups of these
cases, see Lowell P. Botrell, The Supreme Court and the "PlainMeaning"of the Bankruptcy
Code: A Review of Recent And Pending Supreme Court Decisions, 69 N.D. L. REV. 155
(1993); Carlos Cuevas, The Rehnquist Court, Strict Statutory Construction,and The Bankruptcy Code, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 435 (1994); Rasmussen, supra note 50; sources cited
supra notes 7, 8, 50, infra notes 672-83.
56 See Appendix III, post; see also infra notes 57, 72-84.
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This Part concludes that the Court has not applied one, identical interpretive approach in its unanimous bankruptcy cases.
These cases do, however, provide interpreters with useful information concerning the components of the Court's interpretative
approach.
2.

Unanimous decisions in the 1981 through 1985 Terms

The Court issued two unanimous decisions during the 1981
through 1985 Terms.57 In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub,5" the Court authorized the bankruptcy trustee
to waive the corporate debtor's attorney-client privilege with respect to communications that occurred before the filing of the
bankruptcy case.5 9 In United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc.,6 the
Court held that the Bankruptcy Code required the Internal Revenue Service to turn over to the bankruptcy estate property seized
prior to the filing of the debtor's chapter 11 case. 1
In a third case, NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 2 the Court
unanimously held that the Bankruptcy Code authorized a chapter
11 debtor-in-possession to reject a union contract, if certain conditions were satisfied.63 The Bildisco Court split five-to-four, however, on whether the debtor-in-possession committed an unfair
labor practice when it unilaterally modified the contract after the
debtor filed bankruptcy but before it rejected the contract. 6
Weintraub, Whiting Pools, and the unanimous portion of
Bildisco all sought to implement legislative intent or statutory
57 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985);
United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983). Both of these cases arose from
splits among the circuit courts of appeal. See Appendix II, post.
55 Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343. This was an eight-to-zero opinion because Justice Powell
took no part in the decision. Id.
59

Id. at 358.

6o Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. 198.
61 Id. at 211. Bankruptcy Code section 542(a) obligates any entity (other than a custodian) who is in possession, custody, or control of property that the trustee may use, sell, or
lease, or that the debtor may exempt, to turn that property over to the trustee, unless the
property is of inconsequential value. See 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (1994). The Court concluded
that the turnover provision contained no exception applicable to either secured creditors, in
general, or taxing authorities, in particular. See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 207, 209. .
62 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984). Bildisco also arose from a circuit
split. See Appendix II, post.
63 See Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 534. See also 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1994) (governing assumption and rejection of executory contracts, in general). After the Bildisco decision (issued on
February 22, 1984), Congress promptly amended the Bankruptcy Code to add a specialized
provision that now governs the rejection and pre-rejection treatment of collective bargaining agreements. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1994), added by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 391 (1984) (effective July 10, 1984).
64 Five Justices found no unfair practice. See Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513. Four Justices
would have found an unfair practice. Id. at 535 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun joined Justice Brennan's concurrence and dissent. Id. The split portion of Bildisco is discussed infra at Part III.E.3.
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purpose, as revealed in the statutory text and legislative history."
Each decision also drew upon some aspect of bankruptcy policy.
In both Whiting Pools and the unanimous portion of Bildisco, the
Court supported its conclusions by reference to the Bankruptcy
Code's general policy of encouraging reorganization."
The
Bildisco majority also referred to the Bankruptcy Code's equitable
policy. 7 The Weintraub Court sought to ensure that any nonbankruptcy rule it applied in the bankruptcy context would be
consistent with bankruptcy policy, including the general policy of
maximizing value for creditors.6
Only Whiting Pools, however, applied a pre-Code practice interpretive canon. The Court stated the canon mildly 69 when it
noted that its holding was consistent with judicial precedent
under the Bankruptcy Act and that "[niothing in the legislative
history evinces a congressional intent to depart from that practice."7 0 In essence, the Court presumed that Congress knew the
practice under the former law and would have signaled its intent
to alter that practice.
Four aspects of the pre-Code canon, as stated and applied in
Whiting Pools, are significant. First, the Court apparently found
nothing in the text that evidenced a congressional intent to alter
pre-Code practice. Consequently, it applied the canon solely to
consider whether the Bankruptcy Code's legislative history evidenced a congressional intent to change prior practice. Second,
the canon refers to judicial practice under the Bankruptcy Act.
The Court considered whether Congress intended to alter an existing judicial doctrine that the courts had developed to interpret
the former Bankruptcy Act, but which was not codified as part of
the Bankruptcy Act. Third, the Court applied the canon in a supporting role, not as the core of its rationale. Fourth, Whiting Pools
was the first Bankruptcy Code case in which the Court applied
65 See Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 349-50 (citing statutory text); id. at 350-52 (citing legislative history and congressional intent); id. at 358 (citing congressional intent); Whiting
Pools, 462 U.S. at 202-05 (citing statutory text); id. at 205, 208, 209 (citing congressional
intent, congressional purpose); id. at 204-05, 207-09 (citing legislative history); Bildisco,
465 U.S. at 521-22 (citing statutory text); id. at 522 n.6, 523, 526 (citing legislative intent);
id. at 522 n.6 (citing legislative history). Whiting Pools also analyzed the structure of the
Bankruptcy Code. See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 203-04 (viewing the particular provision
as one of a group of provisions designed to protect secured creditors).
66 See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 203-04; Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 527.
67 See Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 525, 527.
68 Weintraub reasoned that, in a corporate bankruptcy case, the person entitled to
waive the privilege would be the person whose duties most closely resembled the duties of
the person entitled to waive the privilege outside of bankruptcy, unless permitting that
person to waive would interfere with or obstruct the Bankruptcy Code's policies or design.
See Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 351-54. Applying this caveat, the Court considered which result
would be most consistent with the Bankruptcy Code's overarching policy of maximizing
value and lesser policy of uncovering fraud. Id.
69 Cf cases cited supra note 46.
70 See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 208.
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such a canon.7 Although the Court applied a mild form of the
canon, the fact that the Court employed this canon during the
1982 Term (the second Term in which the Court considered Bankruptcy Code cases) reflects the canon's established pedigree.
In summary, in these early unanimous decisions, the Court
did not rely solely on the statutory text to interpret the Bankruptcy Code. Rather, in each case, the Court professed a search
for congressional intent, began with the text, checked legislative
history to confirm textual meaning, and verified that its holding
was consistent with the statute's purposes or policies. Whiting
Pools further bolstered its conclusions by considering whether
Congress had evinced an intent to alter pre-Code practice.
3.

Unanimous decisions in the 1986 through 1998 Terms
a.

Overview

During the 1986 through 1998 Terms, the Court issued thirteen unanimous Bankruptcy Code decisions. In chronological order, these are: United Savings Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest
Associates, Ltd. (per Justice Scalia, 1988),72 Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers (per Justice White, 1988), 73 Langenkamp v. Culp
1990), 74 Grogan v. Garner (per Justice Stevens,
(per curiam,
1991), 75 Johnson v. Home State Bank (per Justice Marshall,
1991), 71 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve v. MCorp Financial,Inc. (per Justice Stevens, 1991), 77 Holywell Corp. v. Smith
(per Justice Thomas, 1992), 71 Rake v. Wade (per Justice Thomas,
1993), 79 Citizens Bank v. Strumpf (per Justice Scalia, 1995),s°
United States v. Noland (per Justice Souter, 1996), l Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. v. Fink (per Justice Souter, 1998),2
Kawaauhauv. Geiger (per Justice Ginsburg, 1 9 9 8 ),s and Cohen v.
de la Cruz (per Justice O'Connor, 1998). 4
71 None of the earlier Bankruptcy Code cases considered pre-Code practice. See Central Trust Co. v. Official Creditors' Comm. of Geiger Enters., Inc., 454 U.S. 354 (1982);
United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
72 United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
73 Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988). This was an eight-tozero opinion because Justice Kennedy took no part in the decision. Id.
74 Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42 (1990).
75 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991).
76 Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991).
77 Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32 (1991).
This was an eight-to-zero opinion because Justice Thomas took no part in the decision. Id.
78 Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 503 U.S. 47 (1992).
79 Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464 (1993).
so Citizens Bank v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16 (1995).
s United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535 (1996).
82 Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Fink, 522 U.S. 211 (1998).
s3 Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998).
s4 Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213 (1998).
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Notice that eight different Justices, 5 including six of the nine
currently sitting Justices,"8 authored the opinions in these cases.
Justices Blackmun and Marshall, neither of whom remains on the
Court today, authored the unanimous opinions in the pre-1986
bankruptcy cases. 81 Of the nine sitting Justices, only Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Breyer and Kennedy have not authored a unanimous opinion in a Bankruptcy Code case."'
Consequently, these cases should, at least in theory, provide a fair
cross-section of two-thirds of the Justices' interpretive styles.
In each of these thirteen cases except Langenkamp v. Culp, 9
the Court interpreted a provision of the Bankruptcy Code.
Langenkamp was a per curiam opinion in which the Court addressed the circumstances in which a preference defendant is entitled to a jury trial. 90 Because Langenkamp focussed on a
constitutional question, it adds little to our analysis of the Court's
interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code. 91
The twelve remaining unanimous cases employed divergent
interpretive methods. The Court decided four of these cases by a
primarily textual analysis (Holywell, MCorp, Rake, Strumpf).
Justices Scalia (Strumpf), Stevens (MCorp), and Thomas (Rake,
Holywell) wrote these opinions. 2 The Court decided four cases by
text, structure, and history (Fink,Grogan, Johnson, Kawaauhau).
Justices Ginsburg (Kawaauhau), Marshall (Johnson), Souter
(Fink), and Stevens (Grogan) wrote these opinions. 3 Finally, the
Court decided four cases by reference to pre-Code practice (Ahlers,
Cohen, Noland, Timbers). Justices O'Connor (Cohen), Scalia
(Timbers), Souter (Noland), and White (Ahlers) wrote these
opinions. 4
85 These are Justices Ginsburg (Kawaauhau),Marshall (Johnson), O'Connor (Cohen),
Scalia (Timbers, Strumpf), Souter (Noland, Fink), Stevens (Grogan, MCorp), Thomas
(Holywell, Rake), and White (Ahlers).
86 These are Justices Ginsburg, O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, Stevens, and Thomas.
87 See supra notes 58, 60.
88 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,
465 U.S. 513 (1984). In that case, the Court was unanimous on one issue but split five-tofour on the second issue. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text; infra notes 595605 and accompanying text. He also wrote the majority opinion in United States v. Security
IndustrialBank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982), but three Justices concurred because they disagreed
with Justice Rehnquist's use of interpretive canons. See infra notes 274-81 and accompanying text.
89 Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42 (1990).
90 Id. (holding that an entity that files a bankruptcy claim waives it right to a jury
trial in a preference action filed against it, but that an entity that does not file a claim is
entitled to a jury trial).
91 But see infra Part IV.A.1.a (considering the implications of the Court's constitutional Bankruptcy Code cases).
92 See infra Part III.B.3.b.
93 See infra Part III.B.3.c.
94 See infra Part III.B.3.d.
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Parts (b) through (d) elaborate the Court's interpretive approach in each of these cases. Part (4) considers whether the
Court's apparently conflicting interpretive approaches can be
reconciled.
b.

Unanimous opinions that consider only text

In two of the four cases in which the Court applied a primarily
textual analysis, the Court interpreted the Bankruptcy Code
(Rake, Strumpf).95 In the other two, the Court based its holding
primarily on the interpretation of another federal statute
(Holywell, MCorp).9 6
In Rake v. Wade,97 the Court held that a debtor must pay an
oversecured creditor pre-confirmation and post-confirmation interest on a home mortgage arrearage that the debtor proposes to
cure under a chapter 13 plan.9" The Court began by applying a
text-oriented canon to three Bankruptcy Code sections.9 9 The canon provides that "[wlhere the statutory language is clear, our
'sole function ... is to enforce it according to its terms."' 10
Rake's textualist author, Justice Thomas, might indeed believe that the Court should never look beyond the text.'' Notice,
however, that the canon he employed is not a purely "textualist"
dictate that forbids the Court ever to look beyond the language.
Rather, it is a classic statement of the "plain meaning" rule, which
directs the Court to apply the language if the language is plain
and unambiguous. 10 2 This canon, which is a common feature of
most interpretative models, implies that the Court may, and indeed perhaps must, look beyond the language, typically10 3in a
search for intent or purpose, if the language is ambiguous.
95 See infra notes 97-118 and accompanying text.
96 See infra notes 119-32 and accompanying text.
97 Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464 (1993).
9s Id. at 475 (requiring interest payments regardless of whether state law or the underlying contracts would have required interest on arrearages). Bankruptcy Code section
1322(b)(5) allows a debtor to cure certain defaults under its plan. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1322(b)(5) (1994).
99 See Rake, 508 U.S. at 467-75 (interpreting Bankruptcy Code sections 506(b) (preconfirmation interest), 1322(b) (cure of defaults), and 1325(a)(5) (post-confirmation
interest)).
loo Id. at 471 (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989))
(citations omitted).
lol Justices Thomas and Scalia each wrote six textual Bankruptcy Code opinions and
joined a higher percentage of Bankruptcy Code textual opinions (60%) than any other J
ustices. See Appendix VI: Distribution of Textual, Non-Textual, and Pre-Code Practice
Opinions in the Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Code Cases [hereinafter, "Appendix VI"],
post; Appendix VII: Supreme Court Justices' Rates of Joining Textual and Non-Textual
Opinions in Bankruptcy Code Cases [hereinafter, "Appendix VII"], post.
102 See generally DICKERSON, supra note 42, at 229; Radin, supra note 42, at 867;
GREENAWALT, supra note 25, at 43-57.
103 For example, even in the Court's highly textual (and highly criticized) opinion in
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242-43 (1989), the Court acknowl-
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Consequently, Rake's textualist approach may mean simply
that all of the Justices believed that the language was, in fact,
plain, and not that all of the Justices embraced textualism. Indeed, note that Rake quoted the plain language canon from the
Court's five-to-four split decision in United States v. Ron PairEnterprises, Inc., 10 4 in which the dissenters vehemently disagreed
with the majority's textual analysis. 10 5 This observation demonstrates that the Justices do not always agree on what constitutes
ambiguity or on when the Court should look beyond the language.
In Rake, Justice Thomas supported his plain meaning analysis with a classic textual aid: the dictionary. He consulted a standard dictionary to discern the "natural reading" of the phrase
"provide for." °6
The Court also applied a structural or "holistic" interpretation
canon borrowed from the Court's unanimous opinion in United
Savings Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood ForestAssociates, Ltd. 10 7 That
canon urges interpreters to examine the entire statute because
"statutory terms are often 'clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme - because the same terminology is used elsewhere in
a context that makes [their] meaning clear, or because only one of
the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is
compatible with the rest of the law.'' 8 Notice that this canon
contains both a linguistic component (the same terminology used
elsewhere) and a substantive component (the substantive effect).
In Timbers, the Court applied this canon to compare the substantive effect of related provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 0 9 In
Rake, in contrast, Justice Thomas applied this canon in a narrow,
textual manner to reconcile the meanings of several uses of the
phrase "provide for" and similar phrases throughout the Bankruptcy Code."'
The Court relied upon its conclusion that the language was
plain to dismiss summarily the petitioner's legislative history aredged that, in the rare case in which the language produces a result that is demonstrably
at odds with the intentions of the drafters, the intentions of the drafters control.
1o4 Ron Pair, 489 U.S. 235; see infra notes 629-57 and accompanying text.
105 See Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 249 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ.).
106 Rake, 508 U.S. at 473 (citing AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1053 (10th ed.
1981)).
107 United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988);
see Rake, 508 U.S. at 474-75 (citing Timbers); see also infra notes 209-28 and accompanying
text (discussing Timbers).
1o8 Rake, 508 U.S. at 474-75 (quoting Timbers, 484 U.S. at 371).
1O9 See Timbers, 484 U.S. at 371-76; see infra notes 209-28 and accompanying text.
i1o See Rake, 508 U.S. at 474-75. The Court also applied a canon under which the
Court seeks to give effect to every word of the statute. Id. at 471.
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gument."' It did not consider congressional intent,
statutory pur112
pose, legislative history, or pre-Code practice.
The Court's other leading textualist,"' Justice Scalia, wrote
the strongly textual, unanimous opinion in Citizens Bank v.
Strumpf."4 In Strumpf, the Court held that the automatic stay
did not prohibit a bank from imposing an administrative hold on
the debtor's account and refusing to turn the account over to the
debtor." 5
The Court concluded that this interpretation was the "most
naturally read[ing]" of the Bankruptcy Code and that nothing in
the Bankruptcy Code's language expressly prohibited the administrative hold." 6 The Court referred to state law where relevant,"' but did not refer to congressional intent, statutory
purpose, legislative history, or pre-Code practice." 8 As in Rake,
all of the Justices agreed that the language was, in fact, plain.
In each of the other two unanimous, textual decisions, Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve v. MCorp Financial,Inc.,"9
and Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 2 ° the Court based its holding primarily on the interpretation of another federal law that interacted
with the Bankruptcy Code.
In MCorp, 2 ' the Court held that the automatic stay did not
authorize the bankruptcy court to enjoin the Federal Reserve from
prosecuting an administrative enforcement proceeding against
the debtor, which was a bank holding company.'2 2 The Court
based its holding on the language of the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act, 2 3 the language of the Bankruptcy Code's automatic
stay,'24 and an explanation of an earlier Supreme Court case upon
ill Id. at 472-74.
112 The Court did, however, refer to the Court's prior interpretation of the relevant
Bankruptcy Code sections. Id. at 464.
113 See Appendix VII, post.
114 Citizens Bank v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16 (1995).

115

Id. at 20-21.

Id. at 18-21 (interpreting Bankruptcy Code sections 362 (automatic stay), 553 (setoff), and 542 (turnover)).
117 Id. at 18-19 (referring to state law to determine what constitutes a setoff, and when
a right of setoff exists).
118 If the Court had considered the substantive effect of the Bankruptcy Code sections
that affect entities holding property subject to a right of setoff, the Court might have noted
that the debtor could not compel the bank to turn over funds in the account unless the
debtor provided the bank with adequate protection of its interest in the funds. See 11
U.S.C. §§ 361, 363(c)(2), 363(d), 363(e), 553(a) (1994).
119 Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32 (1991).
12o Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 503 U.S. 47 (1992).
121 MCorp, 502 U.S. 32 (1991).
122 Id. at 41. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994) (embodying the automatic stay).
123 Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 1046, as amended, 12
U.S.C. § 1818 (Supp. II 1997); see MCorp, 502 U.S. at 36-39.
124 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994); see MCorp, 502 U.S. at 39-42 (considering the interaction
among different subsections of section 362).
116
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which the circuit court had erroneously relied. 125 Justice Stevens,
who is not known as a textualist and who generally consults legislative history to confirm textual meaning, 126 wrote MCorp.
In Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 2 7 the debtors' confirmed chapter
11 plan had assigned property to a trust. The Court required the
trustee to file tax returns and pay taxes that the debtors would
have been required to file and pay if the property had not been
assigned to the trust. 2 ' Although the Court based its decision primarily on the Internal Revenue Code, 12 it also considered the
Bankruptcy Code section that elaborates the effects of confirmation. 1 0 In its brief discussion of that provision, the Court relied
solely on the statute's language. 3 ' Justice Thomas, a textualist,
wrote Holywell.
Because MCorp and Holywell focussed primarily on nonbankruptcy law, they add little to our understanding of the
Court's interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code. Notice, however,
that in each of these cases, the Court undertook a non-bankruptcy-centric analysis. In other words, it first considered how
other federal law applied, then considered whether the Bankruptcy Code altered the application of that other federal law. In
each case, the Court held, essentially, that nothing in the Bankruptcy Code barred the federal government from enforcing its
rights under another federal law. Although the Court did not suggest that the Bankruptcy Code is subordinate to other federal law,
these cases are consistent with a pattern of cases in which the
Court has deferred to "important governmental interests" in the
bankruptcy context." 2
Despite these four text-based opinions, two-thirds of the
Court's unanimous bankruptcy decisions issued during and after
the 1986 Term looked beyond the statutory language. Subparts
(c) and (d) examine these non-textual opinions.
125 See Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958); MCorp, 502 U.S. at 42-44.
126 See, e.g., Nobelman v. American Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 332 (1993) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); see also infra notes 327-28; Appendix VII, post (reflecting that Justice Stevens
joined textual opinions in only 15% of the cases in which he participated).
127 Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 503 U.S. 47 (1992).
128 Id. at 58.
129 I.R.C. § 6012 (b)(3) (1988). The Court considered language, a dictionary definition,
and federal regulations when it interpreted the IRC. See Holywell, 503 U.S. at 52-58.
130 See Holywell, 503 U.S. at 58-59; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (1994).
131 See Holywell, 503 U.S. at 58-59.
132 See, e.g., Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 44-49 (1986); Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New
Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 499-501 (1986); cf United States v. Ron
Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 243-49 (1989) (distinguishing the case at bar from cases in
which important state or federal interests were at stake); see also infra Part IV.A.1.d.
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Unanimous opinions that consider text, structure,
and history

In four post-1986 unanimous decisions, the Court considered
the Bankruptcy Code's text, structure, and history. The Court decided Grogan v. Garner (per Justice Stevens)'3 3 and Johnson v.
Home State Bank (per Justice Marshall)' in 1991, after Justice
Scalia joined the Court but before Justice Thomas joined the
Court. The Court decided Fidelity FinancialServices, Inc. v. Fink
(per Justice Souter) 135 and Kawaauhau v. Geiger (per Justice
Ginsburg) 3 ' in 1998, during the Court's most recent Term.
None of the authors of these opinions is generally regarded as
a textualist. 1 ' Despite Justices Scalia's and Thomas's reputations
as textualists, Justice Scalia joined all four of these opinions and
Justice Thomas joined the two opinions that were issued after he
joined the Court. Presumably, even these textualist Justices
agreed that the language was sufficiently ambiguous to merit consideration of other, non-textual sources.
In Grogan v. Garner,'s the Court was required to determine
what standard of proof ("clear and convincing" or "preponder139
ance") applied to a creditor's non-dischargeability complaint.
Justice Stevens examined the text and the legislative history,
but determined that neither expressly provided a standard of
proof for dischargeability actions. 4 ' Faced with a gap, both the
lower court and the Supreme Court reasoned from silence, bankruptcy policy, and negative inferences. The Supreme Court, however, relied more heavily on a substantive, structural analysis of
the Bankruptcy Code than had the lower court.
First, the circuit court had reasoned that prior law had required a higher standard, at least in fraud cases, and that Congress's silence suggested that Congress was not likely to have
intended to change existing law.'
In contrast, the Supreme
Court rejected pre-Code practice because, when Congress added
fraud as a basis for nondischargeability, the courts were split over
which common law evidentiary standard applied. 142 The Court
133 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991).

Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991).
Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Fink, 522 U.S. 211 (1998).
Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998).
See generally Appendix VI, post; Appendix VII, post note. Justice Souter, however,
joined textualist opinions in 50% of the cases in which he participated, which is a higher
percentage than any Justice other than Justices Thomas and Scalia. See Appendix VII,
post.
138 Grogan, 498 U.S. 279.
139 Id. at 285; see 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1994) (setting forth bases upon which particular
claims are non-dischargeable in individual debtors' bankruptcy cases).
14o Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286.
141 See In re Garner, 881 F.2d 579, 582 (1989); see also Grogan, 498 U.S. at 282-83.
142 See Grogan, 489 U.S. at 288-90.
134

135
136
137
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then inferred'" from Congress's silence that Congress probably
had not "intended to require a special, heightened standard of
proof."'"
At first glance, this aspect of Grogan may seem to be inconsistent with the cases in which the Court deferred to pre-Code judicial practice.'45 Grogan, however, may simply suggest that the
Court will rely upon pre-Code judicial practices only if those practices were well-established before the Bankruptcy Code was enacted. Absent a well-established practice, the Court may have
deemed it inappropriate to presume that Congress knew of the
practice and intended to incorporate the practice into the Bankruptcy Code.'"
Second, the Court concluded that the Bankruptcy Code's
structure supported the Court's inference. Two holistic interpretation canons guided the Court's structural analysis. First, "[iun
ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, the court must look
to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole."' 4 Second, "[iin determining the meaning of the statute, we look not only to the
particular statutory language but to the design of the statute as a
whole and to its object and policy.""' Three important observations flow from these canons.
First, these canons view "policy" as an essential embodiment
of the statute's object and design, which is discerned through a
substantive, holistic analysis of the statute. Policy is not an external source that stands in contraposition to the text."' This approach is consistent with a purposive, legal process analysis.
Second, although the Grogan Court was required to fill a statutory gap, these canons do not expressly require the Court to find
a gap or even an ambiguity before the Court undertakes a holistic
analysis of the statute's design, object, and policy.
143 Id. at 287-88 (reasoning that (1) the absence of any suggestion that different standards apply to different discharge exceptions "implies" that Congress intended the same
standard for all of the exceptions, and (2) because it is clear that preponderance is sufficient
to establish some exceptions, "it is fair to infer that Congress intended the ordinary preponderance standard to govern the applicability of all the discharge exceptions" (emphasis
added)).
144

Id. at 286.

145 See supra note 46; infra Parts IV.A.1.c.4,

V.All.d.
Cf., e.g., United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535 (1996) (discussed infra at text accompanying notes 231-34). See also supra note 145.
The Grogan Court also may have found that its structural analysis obviated the need
to consult pre-Cede practice. See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
147 See Grogan, 498 U.S. at 287 n.13 (quoting K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S.
281, 291 (1988)).
148 Id. (quoting Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990)).
149 See supra Parts II.B, II.C; infra Part LVA.l.c.3.
146
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Third, the holistic analysis these canons recommend is
broader and less linguistic that the holistic analysis suggested by
the canon the Court applied in Rake v. Wade. 150
The Court first applied these canons to analyze the Bankruptcy Code's structure. The Court reasoned that, because the exceptions to discharge are all in the same Bankruptcy Code section
and nothing in that section indicates that any one exception is
subject to a special standard, each exception must carry the same
standard. 5 '
The Court then applied these canons to analyze the Bankruptcy Code's purposes. The circuit court had reasoned that the
Bankruptcy Code's policy of giving debtors a "fresh start" justified
a higher evidentiary standard in dischargeability matters. 5 2 The
Supreme Court countered that an unencumbered fresh start is
available only to the "honest but unfortunate debtor. " 153 By implication, the fresh start is not available to a dishonest debtor who
has committed fraud. The Court discerned in the Bankruptcy
Code's general history, rather than in specific legislative history, a
"policy" of preventing discharge of all fraud judgments. The Court
reasoned that it should follow this policy absent a clear congressional expression of a change in policy.' 4 It concluded that a lower
burden of proof would be consistent with this policy.'5 5 Notice how
this reasoning parallels the canon of deference to pre-Code laws or
practices.
As in Grogan, the Court in Kawaauhau v. Geiger156 relied
upon the Bankruptcy Code's text, structure, and history to resolve
a dischargeability question. While the Grogan Court considered a
gap in the statute, however, the Kawaauhau Court considered the
meaning of an undefined term ("willful").
In Kawaauhau, the Court held that a personal injury, medical
malpractice claim arising from the debtor's reckless or negligent
conduct was not a claim arising from "willful and malicious injury
by the debtor." 57
15o Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464 (1993); supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.

See Grogan, 498 U.S. at 287-88; see also supra note 143.
See In re Garner, 881 F.2d 579, 582 (1989) (reasoning that the Bankruptcy Code's
"fresh start" policy warranted a standard that favored the debtor); see also Grogan, 498
U.S. at 282-83.
153 Grogan, 498 U.S. at 287 (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)).
151
152

154

Id. at 290.

Id.
Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998).
157 Id. at 59; see 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1994) (setting forth the willful and malicious
injury discharge exception).
155

156
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The Court referred to both a dictionary 5 ' and legislative history'59 to determine the meaning of the term "willful." The Court
compared these definitions to the statutory language, and concluded that Congress might have worded the statute differently if
it had meant to include reckless or negligent injuries." The
Court added that interpreting the willful and malicious injury exception broadly to include negligent injuries would render other
discharge exceptions superfluous.' 6 ' The Court reasoned that a
broad interpretation "would be incompatible with the 'well-known'
guide that exceptions to discharge 'should be confined to those
plainly expressed.'"'6 2 Here, the Court employed as an "interpretive guide" the well-recognized "policy" that discharge exceptions
should be narrowly construed in favor of the debtor." This policy,
which derives from and implements the fresh start policy, is not
expressly stated in the Bankruptcy Code.
Finally, the Kawaauhau Court declined to adopt a substantive policy that was not expressed in the Bankruptcy Code. The
creditor argued that the Court should not allow a reckless or uninsured debtor to discharge a malpractice judgment,' but the Court
deferred this policy question to Congress. 65
Similarly, in Johnson v. Home State Bank," the Court relied
upon the Bankruptcy Code's text, history, and structure, and rejected an invitation to create bankruptcy policy. Johnson had filed
a chapter 7 case, in which he had discharged his personal liability
on his farm mortgage debt. He then filed a chapter 13 case, in
which he sought to pay the in rem mortgage under a five-year
plan. The creditor argued that, because the debtor's personal liability had been discharged, the mortgage was not a "claim" subject
to treatment under chapter 13.67 The Court disagreed.
The Court viewed the question as "a straightforward issue of
statutory construction to be resolved by reference to 'the text, his158 Kawaauhau, 523 U.S. at 61 n.3 (citing BLAces LAw DicTioNARY 1434 (5th ed.
1979)).
159 Id.
160

Id.

Id. The Court also confined the holding of an earlier Supreme Court case that
seemed to support the creditor's argument. Id. at 61-64.
162 Id. at 62. (citation omitted).
163 See generally 3 COLLIER ON BANYuurcy I 523.05c, 523-20 (15th ed. rev. 1996); 1
GINSBURG & MARTIN ON BANKRupTcy, PART XI, § 11.06[6], 11-57 (1996 & 1998 Supp.).
In Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991), in contrast, the Court did not consider
whether this policy might have warranted a higher evidentiary standard in nondischargeability actions. See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text; see also infra note
138 and accompanying text (offering a suggestion why the Court applied this policy in
Kawaauhau but not in Grogan).
164 Kawaauhau, 523 U.S. at 64.
161

165 Id.
166 Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991).
167 Id. at 83-88.
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tory, and purpose' of the Bankruptcy Code."1 6 8 The Court relied
upon (i) the broad definition of "claim" in the text of the Bankruptcy Code,' 6 9 (ii) the broad definition of "claim" in the text, legislative history, and construction of the former Bankruptcy Act, (iii)
Bankruptcy Code legislative history that suggested that Congress
had intended to expand the Bankruptcy Act's already broad definition of "claim," and (iv) other legislative history that confirmed
the broad meaning of "claim." 7 °
Although the Court did not cite a pre-Code canon, note the
similarity between the Court's broad use of history and the use of
a pre-Code canon. In Johnson, the Court consulted the Bankruptcy Act and judicial precedent interpreting the Bankruptcy Act
to shed light upon the Bankruptcy Code. Under a pre-Code canon,
the Court consults judicial practice under the Bankruptcy Act. In
each case, the Court is seeking to determine whether Congress, in
enacting the Bankruptcy Code, intended to depart from prior
practice. Part of this analysis requires the Court to determine
whether Congress was aware of the existing practice. In referring
to history, the Court assumes that Congress was aware of prior
statutory provisions. In referring to pre-Code practice, the Court
assumes that Congress also was aware of established judicial interpretations of these provisions and of established judicial doctrines that developed in the absence of express statutory
provisions.
Finally, although Johnson seemed to present a narrow question concerning the meaning of the term "claim," it also presented
a broader question concerning the propriety of a so-called chapter
20 case. 17 1 The creditor argued that the debtor was using an improper serial filing to evade the limits of chapter 7 and chapter
13.172 The Court applied a structural analysis to reject this appeal
to the presumed purposes of the Bankruptcy Code. It reasoned
that Congress had specifically prohibited other types of serial filings, but had not categorically prohibited the filing of a chapter 7
case followed by a chapter 13 case.'7 3
Finally, in Fidelity Financial Services, Inc. v. Fink'7 4 the
debtor filed a preference action to avoid a late-perfected security
interest. The Court held that, in order to escape avoidance, a seId. at 83 (citation omitted).
169 Id. at 83-85; see 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1994) (defining "claim").
17o Johnson, 501 U.S. at 85-87.
171 Bankruptcy practitioners have coined the term "chapter 20 case" to refer to a serial
filing in which the debtor first files a chapter 7 case to discharge the majority of his debts,
and then files a chapter 13 case to restructure payments on nondischargeable debts or to
discharge additional debts that were not dischargeable in chapter 7.
172 See Johnson, 501 U.S. at 79.
173 Id. at 87-88. The Court left open the possibility that such a plan might violate
chapter 13's good faith or feasibility requirements. Id. at 88.
174 Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Fink, 522 U.S. 211 (1998).
168
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curity interest must be perfected within the Bankruptcy Code's
twenty-day grace period, not the longer state law grace period. 175
17
The Court based its holding upon congressional intent,
which it discerned in the "text, structure, and history of the preference provisions."'77 First, the text expressly provided a specific
grace period. 178 Second, the structure of the Bankruptcy Code suggested, by negative implication, that Congress did not intend to
allow state law relation-back provisions to govern this preference
defense. 1 79 Third, the creditor's reliance upon "an isolated piece of
legislative history" was misplaced because the creditor had misinterpreted the legislative history and the legislative history was inconsistent with the text and the broader history.'8° Fourth, the
Court relied upon "broader statutory history," including the preference rules and defenses under the former Bankruptcy Act, the
subsequent development of those rules and defenses, and the circumstances surrounding the 1994 Bankruptcy Code amendments.'
Again, the Court's consideration of broad statutory
history, including prior practice under the Bankruptcy Act and
Bankruptcy Code predecessor provisions, is similar to reliance
upon a pre-Code practice canon.
In all four of these cases, the Court consulted the text, structure, and history of the statute. None of these cases, however,
contained an extensive analysis of legislative history." 2 Instead,
the Court consulted the Bankruptcy Code's broad "history," including prior Bankruptcy Act provisions, case precedent interpreting the Bankruptcy Act provisions, changes the Bankruptcy Code
had made to the Bankruptcy Act rules, and changes that amendments to the Bankruptcy Code made to earlier versions of the
Bankruptcy Code. Although none of these cases applied a preCode canon, three of the cases (Grogan, Johnson, and Fink) ap175 Id. at 221; see 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3) (1994) (prohibiting the trustee from avoiding a
purchase money security interest that was perfected within 20 days after the debtor received possession of the collateral). The state law applicable in Fink contained a "relation
back" provision that deemed a purchase money security interest to have been perfected on
the date of its creation if the creditor acted to perfect its interest before or within 30 days
after the interest was created. The creditor had acted to perfect its interest more than 20
days after the debtor acquired possession of the goods but less than 30 days after the interest had been created. See Fink, 522 U.S. at 212.
176 See Fink, 522 U.S. at 215-21 (referring to what Congress intended or understood).
177 Id. at 221.
178
179

Id. at 214.
Id. at 216.

18o Id. at 218-21.

181 Id. at 217-21. The 1994 amendments extended the grace period from 10 days to 20
days. See the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394 (enacted on Oct. 22,
1994).
182 In Kawaauhau v. Geiger,523 U.S. 57, 61 n.3 (1998), the Court consulted the legislative history to define the term "willful." See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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plied analogous reasoning when they considered whether Congress had intended to change prior practices. 18
d.

Unanimous opinions that consider pre-Code practice

In the four remaining unanimous decisions, the Court expressly relied upon pre-Code practice. The Court decided two of
these cases based upon text, structure, history, and pre-Code practice (Cohen v. de la Cruz,'" United Savings Association v. Timbers
of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd.185), and two based primarily
upon an analysis of pre-Code practice (NorwestBank Worthington
5 6 United States v. Noland117).
v. Ahlers,1
As in Kawaauhau v. Geiger" and Grogan v. Garner,8 9 the
Court in Cohen v. de la Cruz 9 interpreted the Bankruptcy Code's
non-dischargeability provisions. The Court held that the fraud exception prevented discharge of all damages assessed on account of
the debtor's fraud, including treble damages, attorneys' fees, and
costs. 9 1
The Court relied upon the "text of § 523(a)(2)(A), the meaning
of parallel provisions in the statute, the historical pedigree of the
fraud exception, and the general policy underlying the exceptions
to discharge"'9 2 to discern congressional intent. 93 Pre-Code practice came into consideration as part of the fraud exception's
history.
Justice O'Connor established the context by identifying the
overarching purposes and policies of the Bankruptcy Code. The
non-dischargeability provisions, she noted, were a component of
the "basic policy animating the Code of affording relief only to an
'honest but unfortunate debtor.'"'"
183 In Grogan v. Garner,498 U.S. 279 (1991), the Court concluded that the pre-Code
practice was not well-established, see supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text; in Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991), the Court noted that Congress had expanded
the Bankruptcy Act's already broad definition of "claim," see supra note 170 and accompanying text; in Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Fink, 522 U.S. 211 (1998), the Court compared the
current preference provisions to the provisions under the former Bankruptcy Act, see supra
notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
184 Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213 (1998).
185 United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
186 Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988).
187 United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535 (1996).
188 Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998); see supra notes 156-65 and accompanying text.
189 Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991); see supra notes 138-55 and accompanying
text.
19o Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213 (1998).
191 Id. at 223.
192
193

Id.
Id. at 221-22.

194 Id. at 217. Cf supra text accompanying notes 152-55 (discussing Grogan's reference to dischargeability policy); text accompanying notes 162-63 (discussing Kawaauhau's
reference to dischargeability policy).
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Turning to the text, the Court reasoned that the "most
straightforward reading" 9 ' of the statutory language required
that all damages be included.'9 6 The Court referred to a standard
dictionary and a law dictionary (textual aids) to confirm its
definitions.' 9 7
The Court supported this textual interpretation with a holistic, textual analysis that compared the use of the phrase "debt...
for" in the fraud exception to the use of that same phrase in the
other dischargeability exceptions. 9 ' The Court reasoned that, because the phrase served the same function in each subsection, the
"presumption that equivalent words have equivalent meaning
when repeated in the same statute ... has particular resonance
here."'199
Up to this point, the Court's consideration of text and structure had a strongly textual emphasis. As in Johnson v. Home
State Bank and Grogan v. Garner, however, the Court reinforced
its textual analysis with an analysis of the statute's broad history.2 °° Unlike Johnson and Grogan, however, the Court in Cohen
expressly applied a pre-Code canon. Under this canon, the Court
"will not read the Bankruptcy Code to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a departure." 20 1 The Court considered, as part of the fraud exception's
broad history, the pre-Code judicial construction of the fraud exception and the similarity between the Bankruptcy Code exception and the Bankruptcy Act exception. °2 As in FidelityFinancial
Services, Inc. v. Fink, the Court rejected the debtor's appeal to
statements in the narrow legislative history of the section. 0 3
Finally, the Court returned to the policy considerations with
which it had begun its discussion. The Court concluded that the
debtor's construction of the fraud exception was contrary to the
congressional policy of compensating a creditor fully for its loss or
195 Cohen, 523 U.S. at 218.
196 Id.
The Bankruptcy Code excludes from discharge any "debt - for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by
... actual fraud." 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (1994). Such debts will be discharged, however,
unless the creditor files a timely complaint to determine dischargeability. Id. at § 523(c)(1).
197 Cohen, 523 U.S. at 220.
198

Id. at 217-20.

199 Id. at 220 (citations omitted).
200 Id. at 219-21; cf. Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 85-87 (1991); Grogan v.
Garner, 498 U.S. 279,286-90 (1991); see supra notes 141-46, 154-55, 170 and accompanying
text (discussing this aspect of Johnson and Grogan).
201 Cohen, 523 U.S. at 221 (quoting Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport,
495 U.S. 552, 563 (1990) (internal quotations omitted)).
Although a 1984 amendment had modified the fraud exception, this amendment did
not deter the Court from relying upon pre-Code practice because the legislative history
noted that the amendment had effected only a stylistic change. Id.
202 Id.
203 Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Fink, 522 U.S. 211, 218-21 (1998); supra note 180; Cohen, 523 U.S. at 221-22.
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injury, and of protecting the victim rather than giving the debtor a
fresh start. 20 4 Recall the Court's similar, creditor-oriented reasoning in Grogan v. Garner.°5 In contrast, the Kawaauhau v. Geiger
Court applied a debtor-oriented "policy" of construing discharge
exceptions narrowly in favor of the debtor. 2 6 Neither Grogan nor
Cohen v. de la Cruz 20 7 mentioned this policy, perhaps because both
Grogan and Cohen involved the debtor's fraud. Both cases noted
that the discharge was designed for the "honest but unfortunate"
debtor, not for the dishonest (fraudulent) debtor. 208 Kawaauhau,
in contrast, involved no question of fraud or dishonesty.
The Court applied a similar text, structure, history, and preCode canon analysis in United Savings Association v. Timbers of
Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd.2" 9 The Court held that an undersecured creditor was not entitled to "lost opportunity costs" as adequate protection for the delay in foreclosure caused by the automatic stay.21 0 The case turned on whether such costs were
included in the creditor's "interest in property," as that phrase
was used in the Bankruptcy Code. 2 1'
Justice Scalia began by examining the text. He noted that the
phrase in question, "viewed in the isolated context of § 362(d)(1)"
might include the right to foreclose.21 2 Nevertheless, in an oftenquoted passage, he noted that:
[s]tatutory construction ... is a holistic endeavor. A provision
that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the
remainder of the statutory scheme - because the same terminology is used elsewhere in a context that makes its meaning clear,
...or because only one of the permissible meanings produces a
substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the

law.

... 213

As previously noted, this holistic/structural interpretive canon contains both a linguistic component (the same terminology
used elsewhere) and a substantive component (the substantive effect of the language). 1 4 In contrast to the Court's linguistic, holisCohen, 523 U.S. at 221-23.
205 See Grogan, 498 U.S. at 287; supra note 153 and accompanying text.
206 See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 62 (1998); supra note 162 and accompanying text.
207 Cohen, 523 U.S. 213.
204

208 See supra notes 153, 194.
209 United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988).

210 Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1994) (elaborating examples of adequate protection); id.
§ 362(d)(1) (relief from the automatic stay).
211 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (entitling a creditor to relief from the stay if the creditor's
interest in property is not adequately protected); see Timbers, 484 U.S. at 370-71.
212 Timbers, 484 U.S. at 371.
213 Id. (citations omitted).
214 See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text (discussing Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S.
464 (1993)). Compare the more substantive textual holistic canons the Court employed in
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tic interpretation in Rake v. Wade,215 and despite Justice Scalia's
textualist reputation, the Timbers Court engaged in an admirable
exercise of substantive, holistic interpretation. First, the Court
recognized that:
[slection 362(d)(1) is only one of a series of provisions in the
Bankruptcy Code dealing with the rights of secured creditors.
The language in those other provisions, and the substantive dispositions that they effect, persuade us that the "interest in property" protected by § 362(d)(1) does not include a secured party's
right to immediate foreclosure.2 16
The Court based this conclusion on its analysis of the substantive effect of several other Bankruptcy Code provisions that
govern secured creditors' rights, principally including section
506.217 For example, the Court dismissed one possible interpretation of section 506 as unsupported by legislative intent218 and inconsistent with legislative history. 219 The Court then stated that:
[e]ven more important for our purposes than § 506's use of terminology is its substantive effect of denying undersecured creditors postpetition interest on their claims - just as it denies
oversecured creditors postpetition interest to the extent that
such interest, when added to the principal amount of the claim,
will exceed the value of the collateral.2 2 °
Grogan v. Garner,498 U.S. 279, 288 n.13 (1991). See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
215 Rake, 508 U.S. 464. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
216 Timbers, 484 U.S. at 371 (emphasis added).
217 Id. at 371-76 (interpreting Bankruptcy Code sections 506 (determination of secured
claims and allowance of certain interest on oversecured claims), 552 (post-petition effect of
pre-petition security interest), and 362 (automatic stay and grounds for relief from the
stay)). See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 506, 553 (1994).
218 Timbers, 484 U.S. at 372 ("No one suggests this was intended.").
219 Id. Justice Scalia consulted the legislative history of section 506 to confirm his interpretation despite his reputation for spurning references to legislative history and despite his criticism of legislative history later in this same opinion. See infra note 225.
220 Timbers, 484 U.S. at 372 (emphasis added). The Court interpreted section 506 to
mean that the undersecured creditor was not entitled to post-petition interest at the end of
the case or during the pendency of the case. Id. at 373.
The Court applied a similar substantive inquiry when it concluded that the creditor's
reading was "structurally inconsistent with" Bankruptcy Code section 552, which governs
the post-petition effect of a pre-petition security interest. Id. at 374. Section 552 states the
general rule that a pre-petition security interest does not reach property the debtor acquires post-petition, unless that property is the proceeds of the creditor's pre-petition collateral. See 11 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
The Court also applied a structural analysis when it concluded that allowing interest
would "make nonsense of 362(d)(2)." See Timbers, 484 U.S. at 374.
The Court applied structural and pragmatic reasoning when it commented that it
would be "incomprehensible why Congress would want to favor undersecured creditors
with interest if they move for it under 362(d)(1) at the inception of the reorganization process - thereby probably pushing the estate into liquidation - but not if they forebear and
seek it only at the completion of the reorganization." Id. at 374. Similarly, "petitioner offers
no reason why Congress would want to provide relief for such an obstreperous and thoroughly unharmed creditor." Id. at 375.
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The Court then moved beyond the text and structure and applied a pre-Code interpretive canon. The Court noted that section
506(b)'s denial of post-petition interest to undersecured creditors
merely codified pre-Code law.221 The Court reasoned that "a major

change in the existing rules would not likely have been made
without specific provision in the text of the statute,... [and] it is

most improbable that it would have been made without even any
mention in the legislative history."222 The creditor's alternate interpretation, therefore, was "implausible even in the abstract, but
so in light of the historical principles of bankruptcy
even 22more
3

law."

In this iteration of the pre-Code canon, Justice Scalia implied
that Congress should signal its intent to alter existing practice in
the text of the Bankruptcy Code, but that Congress might evidence its intent in the legislative history.22' According to Justice
Scalia, however, generalizations in legislative history, "are inadequate to overcome the plain textual indication .... "225 Because
the text seemed to be clear, and was consistent with the pre-Code
rule, the Court followed the pre-Code rule.
Timbers, which was the first bankruptcy opinion that Justice
Scalia wrote, does not comport with the commonly held view of
Justice Scalia as a formalistic wordsmith. Despite the Justices'
lack of bankruptcy expertise and despite their apparent discomfort with the Bankruptcy Code, the Timbers opinion embodies a
thoughtful understanding of the substantive effect of related provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The Timbers Court clearly benefited from a superb Fifth Circuit opinion and briefs written by
some of the country's leading bankruptcy scholars and practitioners. 226 In contrast, in more recent cases, Justice Scalia has castigated the Court for relying on pre-Code practice.22 7 It is not clear
whether Justice Scalia saw some distinction between Timbers and
these later cases, whether he has changed his method over time,
221 Timbers, 484 U.S. at 373; see also id. at 379 (noting that the Bankruptcy Code generally continues pre-Code law); id. at 380-81 (comparing the Bankruptcy Code's automatic
stay provisions to similar provisions of the former Bankruptcy Act); cf United States v. Ron
Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1989) (reasoning that the Bankruptcy Code significantly changed bankruptcy law).
222 Timbers, 484 U.S. at 380.
223 Id. at 373.
224 Cf. Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 419-20 (1992) (reviewing legislative history for
evidence of a congressional intent to change pre-Code practice) (quoted infra at text accompanying note 488).
225 Id. at 380 (dismissing legislative history "[i]f it is at all relevant").
226 See infra note 822.
227 See, e.g., Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, __ U.S. __, 119 S. Ct. 1411,1426 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Scalia, J.);
Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 433-434 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoted infra at text accompanying
note 504).
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or whether he simply has applied inconsistent interpretive
methods.228

In the two remaining unanimous opinions, the Court relied
even more heavily on pre-Code practice than it had in Cohen and
Timbers. Both of these cases involved judicial doctrines that had
been developed under the Bankruptcy Act.
In United States v. Noland,22 9 the Court held that the Bankruptcy Code did not allow the courts categorically to subordinate
tax penalty priority claims. Justice Souter began not by analyzing
the statutory text but by considering the pre-Code judicial development of the doctrine of equitable subordination. 2 0 He applied a
pre-Code canon under which "[t]he normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the
interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent
specific. The Court has followed this rule with particular care in
construing the scope of bankruptcy codifications."23 ' In the absence of any indication that Congress intended to change pre-Code
practice, the Court concluded that the Bankruptcy Code's unde23 2 must
fined reference to "principles of equitable subordination"
23 3
doctrine.
pre-Code
the
embody
have been designed to
Legislative history stating that Congress intended to embrace
the existing doctrine and leave its continued development to case
law bolstered the Court's deference to pre-Code practice. 234 A conbeflicting legislative statement was not authoritative, however,
23 5
law.
pre-Code
of
statement
accurate
an
not
was
it
cause
In the final unanimous case, Norwest Bank Worthington v.
Ahlers,23 6 the Court considered whether the pre-Code, judicially
developed "new value" exception to the judicially developed "abso228
229
230
231

See generally infra Part IV.A.I.c.2.
United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535 (1996).

Id. at 538-39.

Id. at 539 (quoting Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envt'l Protection,
474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986)). The Court consulted pre-Code practice in a search for congressional intent. Id. at 539, 540.
232 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1) (1994).
233 See Noland, 517 U.S. at 539.
234 Id. The Court reasoned that Congress's grant of a general power of equitable subordination allows the courts to apply equitable principles to subordinate particular claims,
but that Congress's specific policy decision to grant priority status to certain tax penalties
precludes the courts from subordinating those claims based solely on the fact that they are
in the category of priority tax penalty claims. Id. at 540-41. "More fundamentally, statements in legislative history cannot be read to convert statutory leeway for judicial development of a rule on particularized exceptions into delegated authority to revise statutory
categorization, untethered to any obligation to preserve the coherence of substantive congressional judgments." Id. at 542. See also id. at 543 (noting that Congress could have
made but chose not to make that categorical determination).
235 Id. at 542; Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (declining to rely on a preCode practice that was not well-established under pre-Code law); see supra notes 142-46
and accompanying text.
236 Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988).
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lute priority" doctrine retained its viability after the Bankruptcy
priority rule that did not contain
Code codified a modified absolute 37
an express new value exception.
After stating the Bankruptcy Code rule, 238 the Ahlers Court
reviewed the history of the judicially developed absolute priority
rule under the former Bankruptcy Act. 239 That rule essentially required that creditors be paid in full before equity holders would be
entitled to receive any distribution.2 4 ° The Court then discussed
Bankruptcy Act case law precedent that allowed equity holders to
retain interests in a reorganized debtor in exchange for "new
value.""'
The Court expressly declined to determine whether the new
value exception (or corollary) had survived the codification of a
modified absolute priority rule in the Bankruptcy Code.2 42 It held,
however, that even if the new value exception had survived, the
237 The most often-cited articulation of the elements of the new value exception is contained in dicta in the well-known Bankruptcy Act case, Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939). The exception requires that the old equity contribute "new
capital in money or money's worth, reasonably equivalent to the property's value, and necessary for successful reorganization." Los Angeles Lumber, 308 U.S. at 118; accordAhlers,
485 U.S. at 201; Bank of America Natl Trust & Say. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 119 S. Ct. 1411, 1416 (1999).
In recent years, bankruptcy scholars and commentators have argued that "new value"
should be viewed as a "corollary" rather than an "exception" to the absolute priority rule.
This view is based largely on the argument that a debtor who contributes money or money's
worth that is at least equivalent in value to the property or interest that the debtor receives, receives property "on account of' his new contribution, not "on account of" his old
equity interest. One difficulty with this analysis is that old equity holders are often given
the exclusive right to make such a contribution. A divided Court recently held that such an
exclusive right, in and of itself, constituted value to the equity holders. See LaSalle, 119 S.
Ct. 1411 (discussed infra at notes 520-53 and accompanying text).
For a discussion of the absolute priority rule and its new value exception/corollary, see
generally Edward S. Adams, Toward a New Conceptualizationof the Absolute PriorityRule
and Its New Value Exception, 1993 DET. C.L. REv. 1445 (1993); John D. Ayer, Rethinking
Absolute PriorityAfter Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV. 963 (1989); G. Eric Brunstead, Jr. & Mike
Sigal, Competitive Choice Theory and the Broader Implications of the Supreme Court's
Analysis in Bank of America v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership, 54 Bus. LAw. 1475
(1999); 7 COLLIER, supra note 163, 1129.04[4] [a], 1129-82 to 1129-126.3; 1 1129.LH[41 [a]
1129-187 to 1129-201 (15th ed. rev. 1996); Richard E. Coulson, "New Value" and the Absolute Priority Rule in Chapter 11 Cramdowns, 48 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 220 (1994);
Kenneth N. Klee, Cram Down II, 64 Am. BANER. L.J. 229 (1990); Bruce Markell, Owners,
Auctions and Absolute Priorityin Bankruptcy Reorganizations,44 STAN. L. REV. 69 (1991);
Raymond T. Nimmer, Negotiated Bankruptcy ReorganizationPlans:Absolute Priorityand
New Value Contributions,36 EMORY L.J. 1009 (1987); Linda J. Rusch, The New Value Exception to the Absolute PriorityRule in Chapter 11 Reorganizations:What Should the Rule
Be?, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 1311 (1992); Ronald Trost et al., Survey of the New Value Exception to
the Absolute Priority Rule and the PreliminaryProblem of Classification, SD24 ALI-ABA
401 (1998); Elizabeth Warren, A Theory of Absolute Priority, 1991 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 9
(1992); James J. White, Absolute Priority and New Value, 8 COOLEY L. REV. 1 (1991).
238 See Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 201 n.1; 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (1994) (stating the conditions
under which a plan is "fair and equitable" to a dissenting class).
239 Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 202.
240 See generally sources cited supra note 237.
241 Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 203.
242 Id. at 203 n.3.
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debtors' promise to contribute future "labor, experience, and expertise"" to the reorganization effort would be inadequate because the Court had found a virtually identical contribution to be
inadequate in a case interpreting the Bankruptcy Act rule. 2"
In essence, the Ahlers Court engaged in a common-law-type
analysis in which it compared the facts of the case at bar to the
facts of the leading pre-Code case.245 To justify using pre-Code
case law to interpret the Bankruptcy Code, the Court reviewed the
Bankruptcy Code's history and confirmed that the Bankruptcy
Code had not liberalized the pre-Code doctrine. 2 "
The Court rejected the debtor's argument that the bankruptcy
court's equitable powers permitted the Court to effectuate a result
that was in the best interests of all creditors and the debtors.247
The Court also declined to implement a result that would foster
Congress's broad policy of assisting family farmers in financial
distress. 2 "
The Bankruptcy Code rule is a modified absolute priority rule because it does not absolutely prohibit equity from retaining an interest. The rule prohibits pre-petition equity
holders from receiving or retaining property under a chapter 11 plan "on account of"their
prior interests if (i) a senior class of claims rejects the plan, and (ii) the members of that
senior class receive less than full payment on their claims. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(b)(1),
1129(2)(B)(i), (ii), 1129(a)(8) (1994). Equity can retain an interest even if a senior class is
not paid in full if the senior class accepts the plan and the plan satisfies the other requirements for confirmation. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a), (a)(8) (1994). The rule does not mention
the rights of equity holders who contribute new value contributions.
243 Bankruptcy practitioners refer to this type of contribution as "sweat equity."
244 Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 206-07; see Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S.
106 (1939).
245 Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 204-05.
246 Id. at 205-06 (noting that, when Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code, it rejected
a proposed "liberalization" of the absolute priority rule that would have allowed equity
holders to retain an interest in exchange for a contribution similar to the contribution
found to be inadequate in Los Angeles Lumber); see also id. at 206 (noting that the legislative history stated that section 1129 codified the absolute priority rule).
The Court also turned to legislative history to determine whether the equity holder's
retention of ownership would deprive creditors of "property." Id. at 207-08. Although the
Bankruptcy Code does not define the term "property," the legislative history suggests that
'property" has a broad meaning. Id. at 208-09 (also reasoning that the company's equity
must have some value, otherwise the old equity holders would not be litigating to retain
ownership).
247 Id. at 206 ("[Wlhatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and
can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code.").
m48Id. at 209-11. Making it easier for family farmers to retain their farms in chapter
11 cases, the Court reasoned, would be contrary to Congress's expectations in enacting
chapter 12. See Family Farmers Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 255, 100
Stat. 3105-3114 (creating chapter 12); Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 210. The legislative history of
chapter 12 noted that chapter 12 was designed to make it easier for family farmers to
retain their farms, because it was difficult for family farmers to retain their farms in chapter 11 cases. See Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 210-11. The Court declined, therefore, to misconstrue
chapter 11 in order to help family farmers. Id. at 209. Note that this reasoning considers
the views of a current Congress - which is an interpretive strategy of dynamic interpreters.
Originalist interpreters consider only what the original enacting legislature intended, not
what the current legislature might desire.
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Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code
Summary of unanimous decisions

The Court's unanimous Bankruptcy Code opinions seem to
apply three distinct interpretive methods: text only; text, structure, and history; and pre-Code practice, with or without reference
to text, structure, and history.
It is not surprising that the Court's most prominent textualists, Justices Scalia and Thomas, wrote three of the Court's four
unanimous textual opinions."' Nevertheless, non-textualist Justices joined these opinions, apparently because they agreed that
the language was so plain that there was no need to consult
sources other than the text.
The Court's unanimous opinions do not, however, provide any
definitive guidance concerning when the Court will consider the
statutory language to be plain. For example, in cases where the
Bankruptcy Code clearly contains a gap, undefined term, or ambiguity, such as Weintraub, Grogan, Kawaauhau, and Noland, the
Court's reliance on sources other than the language is understandable. It is not immediately clear, however, why the Court
considered structure, history and/or pre-Code practice to confirm
an apparently clear meaning in Johnson,Fink, and Whiting Pools,
but declined to consult these sources to confirm an apparently
clear textual meaning in Rake and Strumpf.
Similarly, no obvious reason explains why the Court consulted only text, structure, and history in some cases, but added
pre-Code practice in other cases. The Court's review of the Bankruptcy Code's "broad history," including provisions of the former
Bankruptcy Act and judicial interpretations of the Bankruptcy
Act, is similar to the Court's review of "pre-Code" law and judicial
practices. Although some of the cases in which the Court applied
the pre-Code canon involved judicially developed doctrines rather
than prior statutory provisions (Timbers, Noland), this postulate
is not true of all of the Court's pre-Code canon cases (Cohen,
Ahlers). It is unclear, therefore, whether broad history and preCode practice are distinct concepts or merely gradations of the
same continuum.
Several possible explanations exist for the Court's use of different interpretive methods:
1) Perhaps the Court does not care about interpretive method,
but uses whatever
method allows it to achieve a desirable sub250
stantive result.
See infra Parts LV.A.I.c.2, rV.A.2; Appendix VI, post; Appendix VII, post.
Cynics might suggest that the Justices, or the Court, might employ whatever
method enables them to achieve a result that is consistent with their own personal biases
or political alms.
249
250
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2) Perhaps the author of each opinion chooses his or her preferred interpretive method, and other Justices join the opinion if
they agree with the substantive results, without regard to the
interpretive method.
3) Perhaps the Court, as a body, applies some not immediately
apparent criteria, rules, or guidelines to determine when to consider only the statutory text, when to consult the text, structure,
and history, and when to consult pre-Code practice.
4) Perhaps different Justices employ different criteria to determine when to apply these apparently diverse interpretive
methods.
If either of the first two explanations are accurate, then critics
are correct to lament a lack of clear direction concerning how the
Court will interpret the Bankruptcy Code. In the first case, interpreters cannot predict results unless they understand the criteria
the Court applies to determine what is a desirable substantive result (and, perhaps, understand the Justices' personal agendas). In
the second case, interpreters cannot predict results unless each
Justice applies a consistent interpretive approach, interpreters
know in advance which Justice will author each opinion, and interpreters know what interpretive approach that each Justice
generally employs. Moreover, in either case, interpreters will be
unable to predict how lower courts will interpret the Bankruptcy
Code because the Supreme Court's random choice of interpretive
method leaves the lower courts with inadequate guidance.
If either of the first two explanations are correct, however, we
would not expect to find Justices writing separate concurring
opinions based upon methodological disputes. Consequently, if we
do find methodological disputes raised in separate concurring
opinions, we must conclude that at least some of the Justices care
about the interpretative method the Court has employed in those
cases as much as or more than they care about the results in those
cases.
If the fourth explanation is correct, then we should expect to
see the Justices writing separate opinions to voice their methodological disputes. If the third explanation is correct, we might
hope that the Court would elaborate on its methods in cases we
have not yet examined.
Legal scholars (or at least those versed in hermeneutics) understand that interpretation is a fluid process in which meaning is
not fully developed until a statute is applied, in context, by an interpreter. We also suspect that there may never be one definitive
set of interpretive rules. We nevertheless refuse to believe that
results are random and completely unpredictable. We cling to the
belief that courts, or at least individual Justices, apply coherent
criteria when they interpret statutes.
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Assume for a moment, therefore, that either the third or
fourth explanation is accurate; that is, there are some criteria that
distinguish the Court's three apparently divergent interpretive
methods, even though the Justices may not be in accord concerning those criteria. Can we define a set of guidelines that would
explain the divergent methods in the Court's unanimous opinions?
Suppose we make the following somewhat imprecise observations
concerning the Court's unanimous opinions:
Tentative general observation: The Bankruptcy Code's text,
structure, and history assist the Court in interpreting the Bankruptcy Code.25 '
Corollary 1 concerning the text: The court need not, or perhaps
should not, or perhaps may not, consider the statute's structure
and history if the text is "lear," or perhaps "plain," or perhaps
"unambiguous," or perhaps not the product of an obvious "scrivener's error." This corollary reveals three criteria that are unclear from an examination of only the Court's unanimous cases.
First, is the rule permissive (need not or should not look beyond
the text) or prohibitive (may not look beyond the text)? Second,
what level of textual indeterminacy is required to trigger an examination of the sources other than the text? Third, what does
it mean for text to be plain, clear, or unambiguous?
Corollary 2 concerning statutory structure: When the Court considers the structure of the Bankruptcy Code, it may, or perhaps
should, or perhaps must, undertake a linguistic holistic analysis
and a substantive holistic analysis. In a linguistic holistic analysis, the Court considers the meaning of the same term or
phrase used throughout the Bankruptcy Code. In a substantive
holistic analysis, the Court considers the substantive effect or
function of the applicable provision and related provisions. In a
substantive holistic analysis, the Court might also consider the
broad statutory design, object, purpose or policy. This corollary
leaves open questions concerning (i) whether a structural analysis is required, permitted, or encouraged, and (ii) what criteria,
if any, guide the Court's decision to employ a linguistic versus a
substantive holistic analysis.
Corollary 3 concerning statutory history: History includes both
legislative history and broader statutory history. This broader
history includes prior practice, including prior codifications and
well-established judicial practices and interpretations.2 52 When
the Court considers the statutory history, it may, or perhaps
must, or perhaps should, consider the statute's broader history.
The line between broad history and pre-Code practice is indefinite. Although the Court spurns isolated and general state251 This observation obviates questions concerning whether the Court's interpretive objective is textual meaning, congressional intent, statutory purpose, or something else.
252 This approach is analogous to common law analysis, in which the courts trace the
development of a doctrine over time through case law.
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ments in the legislative history, none of these cases presents an
in-depth analysis of legislative history. Therefore, the weight
and import of legislative history is unclear.
These observations explain the Court's unanimous decisions,
but leave important questions open concerning the Court's choice
of interpretive method. By examining the cases in which the Justices wrote separate opinions, we can determine whether (i) those
opinions confirm these basic observations, (ii) disputes among the
Justices arise from the use of different interpretive methods, and
(iii) disputes among the Justices center upon the questions left
open in the foregoing general observations about the Court's interpretive method.25 3
Section C reviews the Court's unanimous with concurrence
decisions.
C.

The Unanimous with Concurrence Decisions
1. Overview

In nine Bankruptcy Code cases decided during the 1981
through 1998 Terms, all of the Justices agreed on the result, but
one or more Justices wrote a separate concurring opinion.25" In
chronological order these are: United States v. Security Industrial
Bank, 5 Ohio v. Kovacs, 6" Begier v. Internal Revenue Service,2 5
Farrey v. Sanderfoot,2 5 Union Bank v. Wolas,259 Connecticut National Bank v. Germain,2" Patterson v. Shumate,2"' Nobleman v.
American Savings Bank,6 2 and Things Remembered, Inc. v.
263
Petrarca.
The Court decided two of these cases before Justice Scalia
joined the Court. 6 4 In these two cases, the Justices who wrote or
joined a concurrence did so for reasons other than disagreement
with the majority's statutory interpretation methods.265 In con253 This article does not consider whether the justices or other interpreters could actually apply these rules in each case and achieve undeniably predictable results. There are
many reasons to doubt interpreters' ability to achieve unbiased, neutral and certain interpretation. Rather, the inquiry focuses on whether the Justices appear to follow certain
criteria and, if so, whether we can identify those criteria and apply them to predict the
results in future cases.
254 See Appendix III, post.
255 United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982).
256 Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
257 Begier v. Internal Revenue Serv., 496 U.S. 53 (1990).
25s Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291 (1991).
259 Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151 (1991).
260 Connecticut Natl Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992).
261 Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992).
262 Nobleman v. American Say. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993).
263 Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124 (1995).
264 See Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985); United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459
U.S. 70 (1982); see also Part III.C.2; Appendix VI, post; Appendix VII, post.
265 See infra notes 71-273, 280-81 and accompanying text.
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trast, in all but one of the seven cases decided after Justice Scalia
joined the Court, disputes concerning interpretive method were at
the heart of the disagreements among the majority Justices and
the concurring Justices.266
2. Concurring decisions in the 1981 through 1985 Terms
During the 1981 through 1985 Terms, the Court issued only
two Bankruptcy Code decisions in which the result was unanimous but one or more Justices wrote or joined a separate concurring opinion.6 7
First, in Ohio v. Kovacs,28 the Court held that a debtor's obligation under an injunction that required the debtor to clean up a
hazardous waste site was a "debt" that was dischargeable in the
debtor's bankruptcy case.26 9 In an opinion written by Justice
White, the majority implemented congressional intent, which it
discerned from the Bankruptcy Code's text, structure, and legislative history. 270 In this pre-Justice Scalia and pre-Justice Thomas
opinion, none of the Justices objected to the Court's reference to
legislative history.
Justice O'Connor joined the majority, but wrote a separate
concurrence 27 ' "to address the petitioner's concern that the Court's
action will impede States in enforcing their environmental laws"
and explain why the majority's holding was not hostile to state
enforcement of environmental laws.272 She did not challenge the
majority's interpretive method. Query whether Justice O'Connor
and the other Justices might have reached a different result if
they had believed that the application of the273 Bankruptcy Code
was detrimental to environmental law policy.
Second, in United States v. Security IndustrialBank,274 Chief
Justice Rehnquist, writing for six Justices, held that the Bankruptcy Code did not permit the trustee to avoid liens that were
perfected before the Bankruptcy Code was enacted.275 The Court
reasoned that retroactive application might violate the Fifth
Amendment.276 In order to avoid the constitutional question, the
See infra Part III.C.3.
See Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274; Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70.
268 Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274.
269 Id. at 282-83; see 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (1994) (defining "debt").
270 Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 279 (citing congressional intent); id. at 278 (citing language of
the applicable provision); id. at 279 (citing language of other Bankruptcy Code provisions);
id. at 279 n.3, 280 & nn.6-8 (citing legislative history).
271 See Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 285 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
272 Id.
273 See infra Part IV.A..c.3; Part IV.A.I.d.
274 United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982).
275 Id. at 81-82; see 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1994) (permitting the debtor to avoid certain
pre-petition liens).
276 Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. at 81-82; see U.S. CONST. amend. V.
266
267
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Court relied upon two "canons" of construction. The first urges
the Court to read a statute to avoid a constitutional question, if
such a reading is "fairly possible."2 77 The second favors prospective application of a statute absent a clear indication that the legislature intended that the statute be applied retroactively.2 78 In
applying these two canons, the Court found no clear expression
that Congress intended
the applicable Bankruptcy Code section to
27
apply retroactively. 1
In an opinion written by Justice Blackmun, three concurring
Justices agreed that Supreme Court precedent mandated the result. 280 Absent that precedent, however, they would have concluded that the section did apply retroactively and that retroactive
application did not violate the Fifth Amendment.28 '
The separate opinions in Kovacs and Security Industrial do
not embody disputes concerning the method the majority used to
interpret the Bankruptcy Code. Kovacs is consistent with the observation that the Court considers the Bankruptcy Code's text,
structure, and history. Security Industrial is a constitutional
case, which adds little to our understanding of how the Court will
interpret the Bankruptcy Code.
3.

Concurring decisions in the 1986 through 1998 Terms

During the 1986 through 1998 terms, the Court issued seven
bankruptcy opinions in which all of the Justices agreed with the
result, but one
or more Justices wrote or joined a separate
28 2
concurrence.
a.

Single Justice concurrence decisions

In four of these cases, a single Justice concurred: Begier v.
Internal Revenue Service,8 3 Union Bank v. Wolas,2 Patterson v.
277 Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. at 78 (stating the "cardinal principle that this Court
will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the
constitutional question may be avoided" (citations and internal quotations omitted)).
278 Id. at 79-80 (stating that the "first rule of construction is that legislation must be
considered as addressed to the future, not to the past.... [and that] a retrospective operation will not be given to a statute which interferes with antecedent rights... unless such be
'the unequivocal and inflexible import of the terms, and the manifest intention of the legislature'" (citations omitted)).
279 Id. at 81-82.
280 Id. at 82 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justices Brennan and Marshall joined Justice
Blackmun's concurrence. Id.
281 Id. at 83-85. Although the concurring justices disagreed with the majority's use of
canons, these were constitutional canons, not bankruptcy law statutory interpretation canons. Cf id. at 81 (drawing from earlier Supreme Court cases the "principle of statutory
construction" that "[n]o bankruptcy law shall be construed to eliminate property rights
which existed before the law was enacted in the absence of an explicit command from
Congress").
282 See infra notes 283-86, 329-31; Appendix HI, post.
283 Begier v. Internal Revenue Serv., 496 U.S. 53 (1990).
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Shumate,285 and Nobleman v. American Savings Bank.286 In three
of these cases, Justice Scalia was the lone concurring Justice
(Begier, Wolas, and Patterson). In the fourth, Justice Stevens was
the lone concurring Justice (Nobleman).
In all four of these cases, the concurring Justice wrote separately solely to criticize the majority's interpretive method. In
both Begier and Wolas, Justice Scalia wrote separately to castigate the Court for considering legislative history.287 In Nobleman,
in contrast, Justice Stevens wrote separately to complain of the
Court's failure to consult legislative history to confirm the textual
meaning." In Patterson,Justice Scalia wrote separately to praise
the Court for using a "holistic," textual interpretation and to criticize the Court for having failed to do so in another case decided
earlier in the same Term.28 9
In Begier v. Internal Revenue Service,29° the Court held that
the trustee could not recover as preferential transfers certain of
the debtor's pre-petition tax payments because the payments had
been made from funds held in trust for the Internal Revenue Service.29' The Court relied upon the language of the Bankruptcy
Code,2 92 the language of relevant provisions of the Internal Revenue Code,293 the history of the Bankruptcy Code, including the legislative history and the broader history of how the Bankruptcy
Code had modified pre-Code law, 29 4 and the legislative history of

the Internal Revenue Code.295 The Court interpreted these
sources in the context of the preference provisions' role in furthering the overarching bankruptcy policy of equitable distribution
among creditors.296 The Court's approach is consistent with the
observation that the Court will consider the statute's text, structure, and history.
Justice Scalia, concurring, 29 excoriated the Court for relying
upon legislative history.298 He argued that "[i]f the Court had ap284
285
286
287
288
289
290

Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151 (1991).
Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992).
Nobleman v. American Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993).
See infra notes 297-99, 304-05 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 327-28 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 318-22 and accompanying text.
Begier v. Internal Revenue Serv., 496 U.S. 53 (1990).

291
292

Id. at 60-67.

295
296

Id. at 61.

298

Id. at 67-70.

Id. at 56 n.1, 59. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1994) (defining property of the bankruptcy
estate); id. § 547 (authorizing the trustee to recover preferential transfers).
293 Begier, 496 U.S. at 60-61.
294 Id. at 57, 59 n.3, 63-67.
Id. at 58. For example, the Court defined "property of the debtor" by reference to
the purposes underlying the preference provisions and by analogy to the Bankruptcy
Code's definition of "property of the estate." Id.
297 See Begier, 496 U.S. at 67 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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plied to the text of the statute the standard tools of legal reasoning, instead of scouring the legislative history for some scrap that
is on point . . . , it would have reached the same result it does
today .... .299 Justice Scalia did not, however, clearly state a "test"
for when, if ever, the Court might consider legislative history. He
also did not expressly object to the Court's references to the Bankruptcy Code's purposes and overarching policies.
In Union Bank v. Wolas, 0 Justice Stevens, writing for eight
Justices, held that the "ordinary course" of business preference defense applied to payments on long-term debts as well as shortterm debts. Although the Court reasoned that the text of the
Bankruptcy Code led clearly to this result, 30 1 the Court did not
stop with the text. It also considered the legislative history and
bankruptcy policy.
As for legislative history, however, the Court noted that
"[giiven the clarity of the statutory text, respondent's burden of
persuading us that Congress intended to create or to preserve a
special rule for long-term debt is exceptionally heavy. "32 The respondent failed to meet this burden.
As for policy, the Court considered how the rule it announced
would foster the fundamental bankruptcy policies served by the
preference rules, which include providing equitable distribution
among similarly situated creditors, and deterring a race to the
courthouse. 03
Justice Scalia concurred, including in the portions of the opinion that "respond[ed] persuasively to legislative-history and policy
arguments made by respondent." 30 4 He argued, however, that
"[slince there was here no contention of a 'scrivener's error' producing an absurd result, the plain text of the statute should
have
30
made this litigation unnecessary and unmaintainable." 5
Wolas reveals a clash between the majority's test for looking
beyond the plain text (may look beyond the text but with an exceptionally heavy burden to overcome plain meaning), and Justice
Scalia's test (do not look beyond the text absent a scrivener's error
that produces an absurd result). It also reflects a dispute between
Justice Scalia and the other Justices concerning what it means for
the text to be plain.
299
300

Id. at 70.

303
304

Id. at 160-62.

305

Id.

See Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151 (1991). See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994) (setting forth the elements of a preferential transfer); id. § 547(c) (creating exceptions); id.
§ 547(c)(4) (embodying the ordinary course exception).
301 See Wolas, 502 U.S. at 152, 154-56.
302 Id. at 155-56; see also id. at 156-60 (analyzing legislative history).
Id. at 163 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Pattersonv. Shumate30 6 applied the Wolas test 07 to determine
what weight the Court should accord to legislative history when
the text appears to be plain.
In Patterson,the Court was asked to determine whether the
bankruptcy estate included the debtor's interest in an Employee
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") qualified pension
plan. 0 The issue arose because the Bankruptcy Code excludes
from the debtor's estate the debtor's interest in a trust that contains a transfer restriction enforceable under "applicable nonbankruptcy law." 0 9 The Court held that the phrase "applicable
non-bankruptcy law" included both state spendthrift trust law,
which the legislative history expressly mentioned, 10 and federal
law, such as ERISA, which the legislative history did not expressly mention. 1 '
Justice Blackmun, writing for eight Justices, began by stating
that "the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code and ERISA is
our determinant."3 12 In an exemplary use of holistic, textual interpretation, he considered not only the language of the applicable
Bankruptcy Code section, but also the uses of the phrases "state
law" and "applicable non-bankruptcy law" throughout the Bankruptcy Code. 13
With respect to the legislative history's reference to state
spendthrift trust law, Justice Blackmun quoted Wolas314 for the
proposition that, because the text was clear, the petitioner carried
an "exceptionally heavy" burden to convince the Court the Congress intended a result other than the result that followed from
the plain language.3 1 5
Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992).
See Wolas, 502 U.S. at 155-56; supra text accompanying note 302 (quoting Wolas);
Patterson, 504 U.S. at 760.
308 Patterson, 504 U.S. 753.
3o9 See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) (1994). For a general discussion of the treatment of pension plans in bankruptcy, see 4 COLLIER, supranote 163, 541.1117], 541-54.9 to 541-54.11;
Patricia E. Dilley, Hidden in PlainView: The Pension Shield Against Creditors,74 IND. L.J.
355 (1999); 1 GINSBURG & MARTIN ON BANKRupTcy, § 5.02[G] at 5-17 to 5-18 (4th ed. 1996 &
1997 Supp.); Mary Ann Jackson, Pattersonv. Shumate: What Happens to Pension Benefits
in Bankruptcy?, 47 ARK. L. REV. 449 (1994); Michael Sabino & John P. Clarke, The Last
Line of Defense: The New Test for ProtectingRetirement Plans From Creditors in Bankruptcy Cases, 48 ALA. L. REV. 613 (1997). See also Patterson,504 U.S. at 757 n.1 (listing the
circuit courts that were split over this issue).
310 See Patterson,504 U.S. at 761-62 & n.4; see also H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 176, 369
(1977), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5869, 6136, 6325.
311 See Patterson, 504 U.S. at 757-59.
306
307

312

Id. at 757.

Id. at 759; see also id. at 762-63 (rejecting the petitioner's argument that the
Court's holding would render another section of the Bankruptcy Code superfluous).
314 Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 155-56 (1991); see supra text accompanying
note 302 (quoting Wolas).
315 Patterson, 504 U.S. at 760.
313
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Finally, the Court explained why its holding was consistent
with both the Bankruptcy Code's policy of broadly including assets
in the estate, and ERISA's policies of fully protecting pension benefits3 16and providing uniform national treatment of pension benefits.
Once again, the Court supported an apparently clear
textual statement with references to broad statutory design. 17
Once again, the broad design and policy overcame a more particular statement in the legislative history.
Justice Scalia joined the majority opinion, but used a concurring opinion to comment on the Court's interpretive method. 1 Interestingly, Justice Scalia did not criticize the Court for applying
in Patterson the same interpretive canon to which Justice Scalia
had objected in Wolas 19 Instead, Justice Scalia praised the majority for using a "holistic" textual interpretation, in which a particular phrase means the same thing throughout the Bankruptcy
Code.2 0 Justice Scalia used his concurrence primarily to castigate
the Court for failing to follow this same approach in another case
earlier in the same Term (Dewsnup v. Timm). 32 1 In one of his
more biting criticisms of the Court's interpretive methodology, he
wrote: "I trust that in our search for a neutral and rational interpretive methodology we have now come to rest, so that the symbol
of our profession may remain the scales, not the seesaw."322
Justice Scalia did not expressly object to the Court's consideration of the broad statutory design (i.e., "policy" inherent in the
Bankruptcy Code's structure). This suggests that Justice Scalia's
criticism in Wolas may have been addressed more to the Court's
discussion of legislative history than to the Court's discussion of
policies and purposes.32 3
Finally, in Nobleman v. American Savings Bank,3 24 the Court
held that the Bankruptcy Code prohibited a chapter 13 debtor
from "lien-stripping" a claim secured solely by the debtor's principal residence. 25 In a heavily textual opinion written by Justice
Thomas, the Court relied exclusively on the interplay between the
language of two relevant sections of the Bankruptcy Code.326 The
Id. at 763-65.
Because the Court considered sources other than the text, Pattersonis not classified
as a "textual" opinion for purposes of Appendices VI and VII.
318 See Patterson, 504 U.S. at 766 (Scalia, J., concurring).
319 See supra notes 314-15.
320 Patterson,504 U.S. at 766-67 (Scalia, J., concurring).
321 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992); see infra notes 479-507 and accompanying
text; Patterson, 504 U.S. at 766 (Scalia, J., concurring).
322 Patterson,504 U.S. at 766-67 (Scalia, J., concurring).
323 See supra note 304-05 and accompanying text.
324 Nobleman v. American Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993).
325 Id. at 327-32.
326 Id. at 325-32. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994) (providing generally for the strip down
of undersecured claims); id. § 1322(b)(2) (prohibiting the debtor from altering the "rights"
of holders of claims secured solely by the debtor's principal residence).
316
317
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opinion made no reference to legislative history or bankruptcy
policy.
In his Nobleman concurrence,32 7 Justice Stevens appeared as
the other side of Justice Scalia's legislative history mirror. Justice
Scalia avoids considering legislative history whenever possible,
whereas Justice Stevens prefers to consider legislative history
whenever it might be helpful, particularly if the apparently plain
meaning produces an odd result. In his concurrence, Justice Stevens explained that the majority's interpretation created an apparent anomaly under which the Bankruptcy Code granted
debtors less protection for their principal residences than for their
other assets. The legislative history resolved this anomaly because it revealed that Congress had, indeed, intended to grant
mortgage lenders favorable treatment in order to encourage them
to make home loans.3 28
In summary, each of the single-Justice concurring opinions
decided after Justice Scalia joined the Court involves a dispute
over interpretive method. In three of the majority opinions
(Begier, Wolas, Patterson), the Court considered text, structure
(including policy and purpose), and history (in Begier, including a
reference to pre-Code practice). Justice Scalia objected to the
Court's reference to legislative history in two of these cases
(Begier, Wolas), and commented on the Court's use of a holistic
analysis in the third (Patterson). In the fourth case (Nobleman),
the Court considered only the text and textual structure. Justice
Stevens concurred to confirm the textual meaning by reference to
legislative history. These cases suggests that Justices Scalia and
Stevens, at least, care enough, or disagree enough, about interpretive method to write separate opinions, even if they agree with the
Court's results.
b.

Multiple Justice concurrence decisions
In the three remaining unanimous with concurrence decisions
33 °
(Farreyv. Sanderfoot,3 2 9 ConnecticutNational Bank v. Germain,
331
and Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca ), three or four Justices
diverged from the majority opinion.
Two of these cases (Germain and Things Remembered) involved the interaction between general jurisdiction statutes and
bankruptcy jurisdiction statutes. Because neither case interpreted a provision of the Bankruptcy Code, neither adds to our
understanding of how the Court will interpret the Bankruptcy
327
328
329
330
331

See Nobleman, 508 U.S. at 332 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id.
Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291 (1991).
Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992).
Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124 (1995).
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Code, itself. Nevertheless, these cases are consistent with the pattern of cases in which disagreements over interpretive method
have led to concurrences. In each case, Justice Thomas wrote a
textual majority opinion. In each case, other Justices wrote nontextual concurrences. In each case, the Justices disagreed over aspects of the plain meaning rule, including what it means for language to be plain, and when the Court may or should look beyond
the language.
33 2 the Court considIn ConnecticutNational Bank v. Germain,
ered whether the federal circuit courts of appeals have power to
review interlocutory orders issued by district courts in appeals
from bankruptcy courts. The question arose because the bankruptcy appeals jurisdiction statute expressly grants the circuit
courts power to hear only final orders issued by bankruptcy appellate panels and by district courts sitting as appellate courts in
bankruptcy cases."' The general jurisdiction statute grants the
courts of appeal power to hear interlocutory orders issued by the
district courts, in certain circumstances, but does not expressly refer to orders issued by district courts sitting as appellate courts in
bankruptcy cases, rather than as trial courts. 34
Writing for the five-Justice majority,33 5 Justice Thomas held
that the bankruptcy jurisdiction statute did not limit the courts of
appeals' power under the general jurisdiction statute. 3 6 The
Court reasoned that the language of the general jurisdiction statute was plain and unambiguous. 3 7 Although the respondent argued that the legislative history of the bankruptcy jurisdiction
statute suggested a different result, the Court refused to consider
the legislative history: "When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: 'judicial inquiry is complete'.... [Judicial inquiry into the applicability of § 1292 begins
with what § 1292 does say and with what § 158(d) does
and ends
338
not."

The five Justices who joined this opinion embraced a prohibitive rule (the Court "may not" look beyond the text), and determined that this rule applied when the words were "unambiguous."
332

Germain, 503 U.S. 249.

333

See 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994).

See 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1994); Germain, 503 U.S. at 253.
Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion, which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter joined. See Germain, 503 U.S. 249.
336 Id. at 250-55.
337 Id. at 251-52; 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1994).
Another general jurisdiction statute grants the courts of appeals power to hear appeals
of final orders of the district courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994). The Court concluded that
this statute did not render the bankruptcy jurisdiction statute superfluous. See Germain,
503 U.S. at 252-53.
338 Germain, 503 U.S. at 254.
334
335
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In two separate concurrences, four Justices disagreed with
the majority's staunch refusal to look beyond the "plain" language.
First, Justice Stevens's concurrence"3 9 began with a concise, classic statement of his interpretive philosophy: "Whenever there is
some uncertainty about the meaning of a statute, it is prudent to
examine its legislative history."3" Justice Stevens argued that, if
Congress had intended to alter appellate jurisdiction in the drastic way urged by the respondent, Congress is likely to have indicated that purpose in the legislative history. 4 ' Consequently, the
legislative history's silence on the issue supported the Court's
holding.34 2 In these short statements, Justice Stevens disagreed
with the majority on all three elements of the plain meaning rule.
First, he rejected the prohibitive rule (may not look beyond the
language), in favor of a persuasive rule (should look beyond the
language if there is some uncertainty). Second, by rejecting the
"unambiguous" test in favor of a "some uncertainty" test, he
seemed to require a lesser degree of textual inexactitude. In contrast, the test Justice Scalia articulated in his Union Bank v. Wolas concurrence (do not look beyond the language absent a
scrivener's error that produces an absurd result) 43 seems to be
stricter than either Justice Stevens's "some uncertainty" test or
the Germain majority's "unambiguous" test.3 Justice Stevens
encouraged the Court to examine sources other than the text if the
text contained "some uncertainty," but cautioned that the parties
would have a heavy burden of demonstrating that Congress's intent was contrary to the plain text. Third, Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the language was plain.
Finally, in reasoning that paralleled the pre-Code canon, Justice
Stevens urged the Court to consider not only the legislative history, but also prior practice.
Second, Justice O'Connor wrote a separate concurrence that
Justices White and Blackmun joined.34 3 These three Justices argued that the language was not plain. Rather, they reasoned that
the language of the general jurisdiction statute rendered the
bankruptcy jurisdiction statute largely superfluous. Nevertheless, because they did not believe that Congress "intended" this
result, they agreed with the majority's result.34 6 In this concurrence, congressional intent trumped the apparent textual meanSee Germain, 503 U.S. at 255 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. (emphasis added).
341 Id. at 255-56.
342 Id.
343 Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151 (1991); see supra text accompanying note 305.
344 See Germain, 503 U.S. at 254; see supra text accompanying note 338.
345 See Germain, 503 U.S. at 256 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
346 Id.
339
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ing. Justices O'Connor, White and Blackmun agreed with Justice
Stevens that the language was not plain.
Germain suggests that Justice Thomas required less clarity to
deem the language unambiguous than did the four concurring
Justices.
Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca34 7 presented a similar
dispute over the meaning of "plain" and the parameters of the
plain meaning rule. Justice Thomas, writing for six Justices, 48
held that the general federal remand statute prohibited review of
a remand order, regardless of whether the proceeding had been
removed under the general removal statute or the bankruptcy removal statute.34 9
In a characteristically textual opinion, Justice Thomas relied
solely on the text of the bankruptcy removal statute and the general remand statute. He found that these statutes comfortably coexisted in the bankruptcy context.3 10 He declined to rely on the
(arguably ambiguous) bankruptcy remand statute.
Justice Ginsburg, in a concurrence that Justice Stevens
joined, agreed with the result but argued that the Court should
have considered the bankruptcy remand statute. She reconciled
the two remand statutes using dictionaries 351' and substantive holistic interpretive canons.35 2 She did not agree that the statutes,
considered together, were "plain."
Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurrence, which Justice
Ginsburg joined, to clarify the effect of the holding on an earlier
Supreme Court removal decision.3 53
In Things Remembered and Germain, Justice Thomas applied
a narrow, textual interpretation to avoid considering sources that
might have raised ambiguity.
Finally, in Farrey v. Sanderfoot,3 54 three Justices concurred
for reasons unrelated to interpretive method. The Court held that
a Bankruptcy Code lien avoidance provision did not apply if the
Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124 (1995)
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Breyer, O'Connor, Scalia, and Souter joined
Justice Thomas's majority opinion. Id. Cf Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (per Thomas, J., joined
by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy, Scalia, Souter, JJ.); see supra note 335.
349 Things Remembered, 516 U.S. 124.
347

348

350
351
352

Id. at 129.

Id. at 133 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Id. at 133 (consulting dictionaries); id. at 135-36 (citing canons that interpret the
text in context; look to the whole law, its object, and policy; reconcile statutes to fit harmoniously within a set of provisions; clarify the meaning of a term by considering the statutory scheme; and consider the statute's substantive effect).
353 Id. at 129-30 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy noted that Thermtron
Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer,423 U.S. 336 (1976), on which the majority had relied, had
been limited by Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988). See Things
Remembered, 516 U.S. at 129-130.
354 Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291 (1991).
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property was subject to the lien when the debtor acquired the
property. The Court discerned this rule in the language of the
Bankruptcy Code,355 supported by the purposes and legislative
history of the provision in issue. 5 6 The decision turned on the
Court's factual finding that the lien had attached, under state law,
at the same time the debtor acquired the property. 5 7 This factual
conclusion, and its broader implications for subsequent cases,
raised concern among the concurring Justices. 5 s
In summary, in two of the three multiple Justice concurrence
cases, interpretive disputes led to separate opinions. In these concurrences, five separate Justices (Justices Blackmun, Ginsburg,
O'Connor, Stevens, and White) objected to Justice Thomas's narrow, textual interpretation.
4.

Summary of the unanimous with concurrence decisions

In all but three of the Court's nine unanimous with concurrence decisions, Justices wrote separately because they disagreed
with the majority's interpretive method.
Two of these three cases were decided before Justice Scalia
joined the Court. One, Security Industrial, involved a constitutional question; the other, Kovacs, involved a tension between
bankruptcy law and environmental law. The third case, Farrey,
decided after Justice Scalia joined the Court, involved the application of state law. These cases do not yet reveal any pattern.
The six cases in which Justices disagreed over interpretive
method were all decided after Justice Scalia joined the Court
(Begier, Wolas, Patterson, Nobleman, Germain, Things
Remembered). All but one, Begier, were decided after Justice
Thomas joined the Court. Three were textual opinions written by
Justice Thomas, which spurred non-textual concurrences (Noble355 Id. at 295-96; see 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1994).

See Farrey, 500 U.S. at 297-99.
Id. at 299-301. A divorce decree had granted the ex-husband the marital home,
subject to a lien that secured the ex-husband's obligation to pay certain monies to his exwife. The Court concluded that the divorce decree had extinguished the ex-husband's property rights and created new property rights. Id.
358 Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurrence, which Justice Souter joined. See
Farrey, 500 U.S. at 301-04 (Kennedy, J., concurring). They argued that, if the debtor had
not conceded that his interest in the property arose at the same time the lien attached, the
Court might have concluded that the debtor had held an interest in the property before the
lien attached. Under the majority's holding, if the debtor had a property interest under
state law before the lien attached, the Bankruptcy Code would have allowed the debtor to
avoid the lien. The concurring justices lamented that this result would be contrary to fairness, common sense, and the policies recognized by the Court in the majority opinion. They
suggested that congressional action might be necessary to avoid this result. Id.
Similarly, although Justice Scalia did not write a separate opinion, he declined to join
in the one paragraph in which the Court presented a hypothetical case under which the
debtor might have held an interest in the property, under state law, before the lien attached. Id. at 300 n.4.
356
357

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 3:173

man, Germain, Things Remembered). Two were non-textual opinions to which Justice Scalia wrote textual concurrences (Begier,
Wolas). The sixth was a quasi-textual opinion to which Justice
Scalia wrote a concurrence praising the Court's holistic textualism
(Patterson). It seems clear from these cases that Justices Scalia's
and Thomas's interpretive methods have adversely affected the
Court's ability to reach consensus in bankruptcy cases.
One might argue that the disputes among the Justices in
these cases have not undermined certainty because these disputes
merely led to concurring opinions, rather than to disagreements
over the results in these cases. These disputes, however, give the
lower courts inconsistent signals concerning how to interpret the
Bankruptcy Code. Moreover, Parts C (minor splits) and D (major
splits) demonstrate that the Justices frequently have written dissents in Bankruptcy Code cases because disputes over interpretive method caused the Justices to reach different results.
D.

The Minor Split Decisions
1.

Overview

This article separates the minor splits and major splits simply
to determine whether any pattern emerges that distinguishes
those cases in which three or four Justices disagreed with the result from those cases in which only one of two Justices disagreed
with the result.
The minor splits show a continuing pattern of divergent opinions arising from interpretive disputes, particularly between Justice Stevens, on the one hand, and Justices Scalia and Thomas, on
the other. Other patterns also begin to emerge, including disputes
arising in cases in which the Bankruptcy Code is in tension with
other law.
2.

Minor split decisions in the 1981 through 1985 Terms

Central Trust Co. v. Official Creditors' Committee of Geiger
Enterprises, Inc."' is the only Bankruptcy Code decision of the
pre-Justice Scalia era that the Court decided by a minor split.
In a per curiam opinion expressing the views of seven Justices, 6 the Court held that a debtor could not dismiss a case filed
under the former Bankruptcy Act in order to file a case under the
359

Central Trust Co. v. Official Creditors' Comm. of Geiger Enters., Inc., 454 U.S. 354

(1982).
360 Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Brennan, O'Connor, Powell, Rehnquist, and White joined the majority opinion. See Geiger, 454 U.S. at 355-60.

20001

Interpretingthe Bankruptcy Code

new Bankruptcy Code. The Court based its holding on the plain
language of the Bankruptcy Code. 6 '
It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first
instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed,
and if that is plain, and if the law is within the constitutional
funcauthority of the law-making body which passed it, the sole
tion of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms. 62
Although the Court wrote a primarily textual opinion, and applied a textual canon, the Court, nevertheless, consulted legislative history. It noted that the legislative history supported the
Court's interpretation of the plain meaning. The Court did not,
however, engage in a detailed analysis of the legislative history. 63
Justice Stevens dissented, in an opinion that Justice Marshall
joined.3 " The dissenters spurned the majority's search for "meaning" in favor of a search for congressional intent. 6 5 Justice Stevens discerned Congress's intent in the purpose and spirit of the
3
" He supported his underBankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Act6.
standing of Congress's intent through a plausible reading of the
statute's language. 67 Finally, the dissent criticized the Court for
accepting the case on an interlocutory appeal when the Court
could have mooted the issue by denying certiorari. 63
Geiger is a good example of a case in which the Justices split
(even before Justice Scalia joined the Court) in an interpretive dispute over the statute's letter versus its presumed purpose and
spirit. The dissenters discerned congressional intent by reconciling all of the sources that shed light on the statute's meaning
rather than by relying primarily, or exclusively, on the text.
Minor split decisions in the 1986 through 1998 terms
In fifteen Bankruptcy Code cases decided after Justice Scalia
joined the Court, one or two Justices dissented. In chronological
order, these cases are Kelly v. Robinson169 (seven-to-two, Justices
Marshall and Stevens dissenting), Pennsylvania Department of
Public Welfare v. Davenport3 70 (seven-to-two, Justices Blackmun
3.

361 See Geiger,454 U.S. at 357 & n.1, 359-60; see also Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 403(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2683 (1978); 11 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). Because
Geiger consulted legislative history only in passing, it is included as a "textual" opinion in
Appendices VI and VII.
362 Geiger, 454 U.S. at 359-60 (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485
(1917)).
363

Id. at 355-56.

364 Id. at 360 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
365

Id. at 360, 363.

366

Id. at 360-61.

367

Id. at 361-63.

368
369

Id. at 363.

370

Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990).
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and37 O'Connor dissenting), United States v. Energy Resources
Co. ' (eight-to-one, Justice Blackmun dissenting), Owen v.
Owen3 72 (eight-to-one, Justice Stevens dissenting), Toibb v. Radloff 7 3 (eight-to-one, Justice Stevens dissenting), Dewsnup v.
Timm 37 4 (six-to-two, Justices Scalia and Souter dissenting),
United States v. Nordic Village, Inc.3 75 (seven-to-two, Justices Stevens and Blackmun dissenting), Barnhill v. Johnson37 6 (seven-totwo, Justices Stevens and Blackmun dissenting), Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz 7 7 (eight-to-one, Justice Stevens dissenting), Celotex
Corp. v. Edwards38 (seven-to-two, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg
dissenting), Field v. Mans37 9 (seven-to-two, Justices Breyer and
Scalia dissenting, and Justice Ginsburg joining the majority but
also writing a separate concurrence), United States v. Reorganized
CF&I Fabricatorsof Utah, Inc 8 ° (eight-to-one, Justice Thomas
concurring in part and dissenting in part), Associates Commercial
Corp. v. Rash3"' (eight-to-one, Justice Stevens dissenting and Justice Scalia joining the majority but declining to join in one footnote), and Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association
v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership"2 (six-to-one-to-two, Justice Stevens dissenting, and Justices Thomas and Scalia
concurring).
To determine whether these dissents embody any patterns of
disputes among the Justices, including patterns of disputes concerning interpretive method, this section separates the dissents
according to their authors. Part (a) discusses Justice Stevens's
dissents, Part (b) discusses Justices Marshall's and Blackmun's
dissents, Part (c) discusses Justices Thomas's, Scalia's, and
Breyer's dissents, and Part (d) discusses a case in which Justice
Stevens dissented and Justices Thomas and Scalia concurred.
Notice that only six Justices wrote dissents in these fifteen
minor split cases. 383 Of ths
these, only four, Justices Breyer, Scalia,
Stevens, and Thomas, remain on the Court today. The analysis
below reveals that most of Justices Scalia's, Stevens's, and
Thomas's dissents arose from disagreements among these three
United States v. Energy Resources Co., 495 U.S. 545 (1990).
Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305 (1991).
Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991).
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992).
375 United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992).
376 Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393 (1992).
377 Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992).
378 Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300 (1995).
379 Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59 (1995).
380 United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213 (1996).
381 Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997).
382 Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 119 S.
Ct. 1411 (1999).
383 These are Justices Blackmun, Breyer, Marshall, Scalia, Stevens, and Thomas.
371
372
373
374
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Justices over interpretive method. 84 Not surprisingly, Justices
Scalia and Thomas prefer textual interpretive methods whereas
Justice Stevens prefers more flexible interpretive methods. 8 5
a.

Justice Stevens's dissents

Justice Stevens dissented in nine of the fifteen minor splits
during the 1986 through 1998 Terms. He wrote the dissents in
the following eight cases: Owen v. Owen, 8 6 Toibb v. Radloff,38 7
United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 5 8 (joined by Justice Blackmun), Barnhill v. Johnson,"9 (joined by Justice Blackmun), Taylor
v. Freeland& Kronz,3 90 Celotex Corp. v. Edwards,3 9 ' (joined by Justice Ginsburg), Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash,39 2 and Bank
of America National Trust & Savings Association v. 203 North
LaSalle Street Partnership.93 In the ninth case, Kelly v. Robinson,394 Justice Stevens joined a dissent that Justice Marshall
wrote. Kelly is discussed in Part (b) together with Justices Marshall's and Blackmun's other dissents.
In six of the eight dissents that he wrote, Justice Stevens dis3
agreed with the majority over interpretive method9.
s The two remaining cases each involved some disagreement over interpretive
method; however, these cases are better understood as disputes
concerning constitutional or quasi-constitutional issues
that sim96
ply happened to arise in the bankruptcy context.1
In five of the six cases involving Bankruptcy Code interpretation disputes, the majority relied primarily on the text of the
Bankruptcy Code. These are Owen v. Owen,391 Barnhill v. JohnSee infra notes Part III.D.3.a, c, d.
Id.; see also infra Part IV.A.2.
Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305 (1991).
387 Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991).
388 United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992).
389 Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393 (1992).
390 Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992).
391 Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300 (1995).
392 Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997).
393 Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 119 S.
Ct. 1411 (1999).
394 Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
395 See infra notes 397-408, 520-53 and accompanying text.
396 See infra notes 409-18 and accompanying text.
397 Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305 (1991) (holding that Bankruptcy Code section 522(f)
allows the debtor to avoid a judicial lien that impairs the debtor's state law exemptions,
even though the state law defines exemptions to exclude property subject to such a lien); id.
at 311 ("this meaning is more consonant with the text. . . ."). See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (1994)
(permitting the debtor to avoid certain liens that impair the debtor's exemptions); id.
§ 522(b) (authorizing individual debtors to exempt certain property from their bankruptcy
estates).
The majority rejected an appeal to policy. It stated that the opt-out policy did not
impel the Court to "create a distinction [between federal and state exemptions] that the
words of the statute do not contain." Owen, 500 U.S. at 313; see 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1994)
(providing debtors with a choice between state and federal exemptions unless the debtor's
384

385
386
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son,398 Taylor v. Freeland& Kronz, 3ss Toibb v. Radloff,4°° and Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash.40 ' In each of these cases, Justice
Stevens would have reached a different result by applying an interpretive method that relied less exclusively on the text and more
flexibly on other sources. Specifically, Justice Stevens would have
relied on (i) the text viewed in the context of the function of the
Bankruptcy Code sections in issue (Owens);4°2 (ii) the text, holistic
interpretive canons, consistency with commercial practice, and
4 0 3 (iii)
legislative history (Barnhill);
policy, equity, and the com4 °4 (iv)
mon law, supported by the text (Taylor);
a holistic reading of
state has "opted out" of the federal exemption scheme and limited its residents to the state
law exemptions). The Court also suggested that the opt-out policy was limited by the
Bankruptcy Code's policies. See Owen, 500 U.S. at 313.
398 Barnhill v. Jolinson, 503 U.S. 393 (1992) (holding that, for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code's preferential transfer recovery provisions, a transfer by check is made when
the debtor's bank honors the check rather than when the debtor delivers the check to the
payee); id. at 397-98 (reasoning that the Bankruptcy Code's definition of "transfer" turns on
the meaning of "property" which is determined by state law); see 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1994)
(establishing rules for the avoidance of preferential transfers).
399 Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992) (holding that a chapter 7 trustee
may not challenge a debtor's exemptions after the period for objecting has expired if the
trustee never sought an extension of time to file an objection, even if the debtor had no
colorable basis for claiming the exemption); id. at 643-45 (applying a textual analysis); see
11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1994) (establishing exemptions rules); FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b) (West
1999) (fixing time for filing objections to exemptions).
4oo Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991) (holding that an individual not engaged in
business may file for relief under chapter 11); id. at 160 (reasoning that "the plain language
of the Bankruptcy Code disposes of the question before us"); id. at 166 (reasoning. that
"[t]he plain language of the Bankruptcy Code permits individual debtors not engaged in
business to file for relief under Chapter 11. Although the structure and legislative history
of Chapter 11 indicate that this Chapter was intended primarily for the use of business
debtors, the Code contains no 'ongoing business' requirement for Chapter 11 reorganization, and we find no basis for imposing one."). See 11 U.S.C. § 109(d) (1994) (establishing
eligibility requirements for chapter 11).
The Court also rejected an appeal to policy considerations and warnings of dire consequences that would follow from allowing individuals to file chapter 11. Toibb, 501 U.S. at
163-65.
401 Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 959-63 (1997) (holding that,
when a chapter 13 debtor proposes to retain property under the cramdown provision, the
value of the collateral is the price a willing buyer would pay to obtain similar property from
the seller). See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) (1994) (providing for cramdown against secured
claims).
402 See Owen, 500 U.S. at 314-21 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
403 See Barnhill, 503 U.S. at 403 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, J.) (arguing that a transfer by check occurs on the date of delivery, provided that the check is
honored within 10 days thereafter); id. at 403-04 (reasoning from consistency with commercial practice); id. at 404-06 (reasoning from the text); id. at 406 (reasoning that the result is
consistent with legislative history and with the canon of construction under which the
same term is presumed to have the same meaning in different sections of the statute).
4o4 See Taylor, 503 U.S. at 646 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the limitation
period for objecting to the debtor's exemptions should be tolled if the debtor has no colorable basis for claiming an exemption); id. at 646-50 (reasoning from equitable tolling, equitable considerations, common law); id. at 650-51 (reasoning from the text); id. at 651-52
(appealing to the Court's "power to reach a just result despite the 'plain meaning';" arguing
that the Court should "be guided by common law principles;" and concluding that "itis a
mistake to adopt a 'strict letter' approach.., when justice requires a more searching inquiry" (citations omitted)).
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the Bankruptcy Code, supported by the legislative history
(Toibb);4 5 and (v) the text, supported by the context of the entire
Bankruptcy Code, and a comparison of similar substantive bank4"'
ruptcy concepts in different Bankruptcy Code chapters (Rash).
These cases demonstrate Justice Stevens's standard approach
of reviewing all relevant sources of meaning and determining congressional intent through the best justification of these sources,
rather than giving primacy to one source, such as the text. In the
majority opinions, the Court generally deferred to the text because
the text was clear. Two of the majority opinions employed a textual canon that prohibited the Court from consulting legislative
history because the text was unambiguous.4 7
The sixth Justice Stevens dissent, in Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association v. 203 North LaSalle Street
4 °s will be discussed in Part (d). This discussion will
Partnership,
allow the reader to review Justices' Thomas's and Scalia's dissents
in Part (c) and then compare Justice Stevens's dissent in LaSalle
to Justice Thomas's and Justice Scalia's concurrence in LaSalle.
The two remaining minor split cases in which Justice Stevens
wrote a dissent involve interpretive disputes; however, they are
best understood not as Bankruptcy Code interpretive disputes but
as constitutional or quasi-constitutional questions that simply
happened to arise in the bankruptcy context.
405 See Toibb, 501 U.S. at 166 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the history and
structure of the Bankruptcy Code suggest that individual debtors not engaged in business
should not be allowed to file for relief under chapter 11); id. at 166-67 (arguing that, while
"[tihe Court's reading of the statute is plausible.... [w]hen the statute is read as a whole,
... it seems quite clear that Congress did not intend to authorize a 'reorganization' of the
affairs of an individual consumer debtor"); id. at 167 (arguing that "the word 'only' [in
Bankruptcy Code section 109(d)] introduces sufficient ambiguity to justify a careful examination of other provisions of the Act, as well as the legislative history"); id. at 167-69 (considering repeated references to the debtor's business in other sections of chapter 11 and its
legislative history); id. at 168-69 (comparing chapter 11 and chapter 13); id. at 170 (reasoning based upon "read[ing] the statute as a whole").
406 See Rash, 520 U.S. at 966 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[a]lthough the
meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) is not entirely clear, I think its text points to foreclosure as
the proper method of valuation in this case"); id. at 967 (reasoning from text, context, purpose, coherent use of section 506(a) throughout the Bankruptcy Code, economic reality,
consequences, and "consist[ency] with the larger statutory scheme").
407 See Barnhill, 503 U.S. at 401-02 (reasoning that "appeals to statutory history are
well taken only to resolve 'statutory ambiguity,'" and that the legislative history did not
support the petitioner's argument in any event); Toibb, 501 U.S. at 162 (rejecting an appeal
to legislative history because "[w]here, as here, the resolution of a question of federal law
turns on a statute and the intention of Congress, we look first to the statutory language
and then to the legislative history if the statutory language is unclear.... although a court
appropriately may refer to a statute's legislative history to resolve statutory ambiguity,
there is no need to do so here." (internal quotations and citation omitted)). Cf Rash, 520
U.S. at 963 n.4 (giving no weight to legislative history because the history was "unedifying,
offering snippets that might support either standard of valuation").
408 Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 119 S.
Ct. 1411 (1999).
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The seventh case, United States v. Nordic Village, Inc.4 "s
presented a quasi-constitutional question that is clearly explained
as a part of the Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence. 410 The

majority's reading of the text in Nordic Village was heavily influenced by a judicially created rule applied exclusively to sovereign
immunity cases. This rule requires that Congress make an "unequivocal statement" in order to waive the federal government's
immunity from suit.41' The Court held that the statement in the

Bankruptcy Code was not sufficiently unequivocal.412
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Blackmun, disagreed.413 He
argued that the Court's result was not only unjust, but also unnecessary because the text plainly provided a waiver and the legislative history suggested that Congress had intended to effect a
waiver.414 The dissent also castigated the majority for insisting
that Congress make a "clear statement" in order to waive sover"
eign immunity.15
The eighth, and final, Justice Stevens dissent occurred in Celotex Corp. v. Edwards.416 In Celotex, the Court held that creditors
could not collaterally attack a bankruptcy court injunction that
prohibited the creditors from executing upon a bond issued by the
debtor's surety. 417 The dissent argued that the non-Article III
bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction to enjoin an Article III court.
Even if bankruptcy courts did have such jurisdiction, the dissent
argued, the injunction should have been voided because it had
only a frivolous pretense to validity.1 s Celotex raised a constitutional question - not a question of statutory interpretation.
b. Justices Blackmun's and Marshall's dissents
Justices Stevens's, Blackmun's, and Marshall's dissents overlap. Justice Blackmun joined Justice Stevens' dissent in Barnhill
v. Johnson.419 Justice Blackmun wrote the dissent in two other
United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992) (per Scalia, J.).
See also Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96 (1989)
(concerning abrogation of state sovereign immunity); see infra notes 570-78 and accompanying text. See also sources cited infra at note 574. Nordic and Hoffman are quasi-constitutional because they apply to the Bankruptcy Code a strict interpretive test reserved for
statutes purporting to waive or abrogate sovereign immunity.
411 See Nordic Village, 503 U.S. at 33-37.
412 Id. at 39; see 11 U.S.C. § 106 (1994) (entitled "waiver of sovereign immunity").
413 See Nordic Village, 503 U.S. at 39 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
414 Id. at 39-41.
409
410

415
416
417

Id. at 45.

Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300 (1995).
Id. at 313.
418 See Celotex, 514 U.S. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.); id. at
313-30. See also U.S. CONST. art. III.
419 See Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 403 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by
Blackmun, J.). Justice Blackmun also joined Justices Stevens's dissent in Nordic Village,
503 U.S. at 39 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, J.). Justice Ginsburg joined
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minor split decisions, namely PennsylvaniaDepartment of Public
v. Davenport4 2 ° and United States v. Energy Resources
Welfare
421
Co.
In another minor split decision, Kelly v. Robinson,42 2 Justice
Marshall wrote the dissent, which Justice Stevens joined. 423 Part
(b) discusses Justices Marshall's and Blackmun's dissents in
Kelly, Davenport, and Energy Resources.
Kelly 424 and Davenport425 considered the Bankruptcy Code's
treatment of criminal restitution obligations. 6
In Kelly, the Court held that a state criminal restitution obligation imposed as a condition of probation was not dischargeable
in an individual's chapter 7 case.4 27 The Court concluded that
such an obligation fits within the exception to discharge for fines
and penalties that are payable to or for the benefit of the govern4 2s
ment and that are not "compensation for actual pecuniary loss."
In dictum, the Court also suggested that, even if this exception to
discharge did not apply, a restitution penalty might be enforceable
notwithstanding the bankruptcy case because the Court had "serious doubts whether Congress intended to make criminal penalties
'debts'"429 under the Bankruptcy Code.43 °
The Court based its holding on the "language .. . in light of
the history of bankruptcy court deference to criminal judgments
and in light of the interests of the States in unfettered administraJustice Stevens' dissent in Celotex, 514 U.S. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.). Those cases did not involve statutory interpretation disputes, however.
420 Davenport, 495 U.S. at 564 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by O'Connor, J.). Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens are not always in accord. In Davenport, for example, Justice Blackmun dissented from Justice Marshall's majority opinion. In Toibb v.
Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1998), Justice Stevens dissented from Justice Blackmun's majority
opinion.
421 United States v. Energy Resources Co., 495 U.S. 545, 551 (1990) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (without opinion).
422 Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
423 Id. at 53 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J.).
424 Id. Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion, which Justices Blackmun, Brennan,
O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, and White joined. Id. Justice Marshall wrote the dissent,
which Justice Stevens joined. Id. at 53 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
425 Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990). Justice
Marshall (who had written the dissent in Kelly) wrote the majority opinion, which Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Brennan, Scalia, Stevens, Kennedy, and White joined. Id.
Justice Blackmun wrote the dissent, which Justice O'Connor joined. Davenport, 495 U.S.
at 564 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1328.02[2], at 1328-6 to 1328-8,
426 See generally 8 COLLIER, supra note 163,
1328.0231[fl, 1328-15 to 1328-17 (15th ed. rev. 1999) (discussing criminal restitution debts
in bankruptcy); John P. Hennigan, Jr., Criminal Restitution and Bankruptcy Law in the
Federal System, 19 CONN.L. REV. 89 (1986).
427 See Kelly, 479 U.S. at 43-53.
428 Id. at 50-53; see 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (1994) (excluding from discharge certain penalties payable to a governmental unit).
429

Id. at 50.

43o Id. at 43-50 (dictum).
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tion of their criminal justice systems." 431 Faced with a perceived
tension between bankruptcy law and states' interests, the Court
heavily favored the states' interests. The Court reasoned that the
bankruptcy courts had always deferred to state criminal proceedings and judgments, both under the Bankruptcy Code and prior
law, even where that deference seemed inconsistent with the
bankruptcy law's plain language. 43 2
The Court applied a pre-Code canon to justify its reliance on
prior practice. This canon states that "'ifCongress intends for legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent specific. The Court has followed this
rule with particular care in construing the scope of bankruptcy
codifications.'" 4
Kelly embodies the Court's broadest application of the preCode canon. In Kelly, the Court applied the canon not simply to
embrace a judicial interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act, 43 4 nor
simply to trace the historical development of a Bankruptcy Code
concept. 5 Instead, the Court applied the canon broadly to comment on the historical relationship between the Bankruptcy Code
and state criminal law, and to incorporate into the federal Bankruptcy Code an implied principle of deference to an important
state interest, despite the Supremacy Clause.4 36
The dissenters (Justices Marshall and Stevens) argued that,
according to the language and history of the Bankruptcy Code,
restitution claims were indeed "debts" under the Bankruptcy
Code. 43 ' They also argued that, on its face, the discharge exception, upon which the Court relied, did not apply to restitution obliId. at 43-44. See also id. at 43 (arguing that "the text is only the starting point... '
we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the
provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy'" (citations omitted)); id. at 49
(noting that "the States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from
federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence
a court considering equitable types of relief. [citation omitted] ... [and that] [t]his reflection
of our federalism also must influence our interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code in this
case."); id. at 53 (reasoning that, "[iun light of the strong interests of the States, the uniform
construction of the old Act over three-quarters of a century, and the absence of any significant evidence that Congress intended to change the law in this area, we believe this result
best effectuates the will of Congress.").
431

...

432
433

Id. at 44-49.

Id. at 47 (quoting Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection,
474 U.S. 494, 501 (1986)); see also supra note 431.
434 Cf United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 538-43 (1996) (applying a pre-Code canon to determine the scope of the equitable subordination power); MidlanticNat'l Bank,
474 U.S. at 499-505 (applying a pre-Code canon to determine the scope of the abandonment
power).
435 Cf Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213 (1998); United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 373-80 (1988).
436 U.S. CONST. art. VI; see infra Parts IV.A.1.c.4; TV.A.I.d.
437 Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 53, 56-58 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by
Stevens, J.).
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gations.4" The dissenters expressed sympathy for the policy
interests that drove the Court's reasoning, but argued that separation of powers prohibited the Court from pre-empting congressional action in favor of the Court's own view of good policy. 9
Finally, the Kelly dissenters warned that the restitution issue
was likely to arise again because the discharge exception upon
which the Court had relied in Kelly applies only in chapter 7
cases. A chapter 13 case would force the Court to revisit the dicta
in which the Court had suggested that restitution obligations
might not be "debts.""'
Four years after Kelly, the Court was required to revisit the
restitution question in a chapter 13 case, Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v. Davenport."' In Davenport, the Court
abandoned the Kelly dicta." 2 Instead, the Court relied upon the
language and structure of the Bankruptcy Code to hold that criminal restitution obligations do, indeed, constitute "debts" for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code."3 Because the discharge exception
upon which the Court had relied in Kelly does not apply in chapter
13 cases, the Court held that restitution debts are dischargeable
in chapter 13 cases."
The Court embraced the same pre-Code practice canon that it
had applied in Kelly: "We will not read the Bankruptcy Code to
erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a departure." 5 Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code did,
indeed, clearly evince Congress's intent to change prior practice.
The Court reasoned that concerns for the administration of states'
criminal justice systems could not justify rewriting the plain language6 of the Bankruptcy Code in order to defer to state criminal
law. "
Justice Blackmun's dissent, which Justice O'Connor joined,
heartily embraced Kelly's states' rights dicta and concluded that
the Bankruptcy Code does not permit the discharge of criminal
438 Id. at 54-56 (reasoning that such obligations are, in fact, compensation for actual
pecuniary loss).
439

Id. at 58-59.

44o Id.

at 59 n.6. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (1994) (discharging individual chapter 13
debtors from certain debts that are not dischargeable in chapter 7 cases).
441 Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990).
442 Id. at 557 (referring to Kelly's discussion of whether restitution obligations are
debts as dicta).
443 Id. at 555, 557-60 (analyzing the relevant provision's language and history to determine the meaning of "debt"); id. at 560-63 (analyzing the structure of the Bankruptcy Code,
including other Bankruptcy Code sections and their history); see 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (1994)
(defining "debt").
444 See Davenport, 495 U.S. at 562-63.
445
446

Id. at 563.
Id. at 563-64.
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restitution obligations in chapter 13 cases. 447 Both Justices had
joined the majority opinion in Kelly.
The dissent's attempt to justify its deference to state law despite the Bankruptcy Code's plain language provides a fascinating
reconciliation of the Court's prior decisions and a revealing insight
into the interpretive method that at least two Justices consider
proper for the Bankruptcy Code. The dissent lamented the majority's approach, stating:
This Court carefully has set forth a method for statutory analysis of the Bankruptcy Code.... When analyzing a bankruptcy
statute, the Court, of course, looks to its plain language. But
the Court has warned against an overly literal interpretation of
the Bankruptcy Code. "'[W]e must not be guided by a single
sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of
the whole law, and to its object and policy.'" The strict language
of the Bankruptcy Code does not control, even if the statutory
language has a "plain" meaning, if the application of that language 'will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of its drafters'.... To determine the drafters' intent, the
Court presumes that Congress intended to keep continuity between pre-Code judicial practice and the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978.... For me, the statutory language, the
consistent authority treating criminal sanctions as nondischargeable under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the absence of
any legislative history suggesting that the Code was intended to
change that established principle, and the strong policy of deference to state criminal judgments all compel the conclusion that
a restitution order is not a dischargeable debt.'
This statement raises three critical issues concerning the
plain meaning canon and the relationship between that canon and
the pre-Code practice canon. First, in the unique context of the
Bankruptcy Code, Justices Blackmun and O'Connor would have
required very little evidence of "ambiguity" before looking beyond
the text. Indeed, they suggested that the Court should be chary of
accepting a textual interpretation that fails to reconcile the statute's language with the statute's structure, object, policy, and history. Second, in this iteration of the pre-Code canon, Justices
Blackmun and O'Connor seemed to suggest that, if Congress intends to alter pre-Code practice, it will do more than indicate its
intent in the text. It will also confirm, through statements in the
447 Id.
at 564, 574 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by O'Connor, J.). Justice Marshall, who wrote the dissent in Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986), and objected to the
Court's dicta in that case, wrote the majority opinion in Davenport. Justice Stevens, who
joined Justice Marshall's dissent in Kelly, also joined Justice Marshall's majority opinion in
Davenport. Five justices, however, namely Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Brennan,
Scalia, and White, joined the majority opinions in both Kelly and Davenport.
448 Davenport, 495 U.S at 565 (citations omitted); see also id. at 555-74 (applying this
interpretive method).
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legislative history, that it knew it was making a change and that
it intended to make that change. In contrast, for the majority, a
clear statement in the text was adequate evidence of Congress's
intent to change pre-Code practice. Third, like the Kelly majority,
the Davenport dissent linked the pre-Code canon with deference
to state criminal processes. The Kelly majority and the Davenport
dissent did not go so far as to suggest, in contravention of the
Supremacy Clause, that federal bankruptcy law is subordinate to
state criminal law. Rather, they suggested that the history and
practice of federal bankruptcy law, itself, embodied a principle of
deference." 9
A similar question of deference to important governmental interests arose, although more subtly, in United States v. Energy Resources Co.45 0 The Court held that the bankruptcy court has
authority to order the Internal Revenue Service to treat tax payments made by a chapter 11 debtor as trust fund payments.4 5 '
The Court found that this power was consistent with the bankruptcy courts' broad equitable powers to adjust debtor-creditor relationships, and that this power did not conflict with other laws
protecting important governmental interests.4 52 The latter part of
this reasoning implies that the Court might have balked if the exercise of this power had conflicted with important governmental
interests.4 5 3 The Court also noted that the bankruptcy court had
the power to designate trust fund taxes if the court concluded that
such an order was necessary for the success of the
reorganization.4 5 4
Justice Blackmun dissented. 45 5 Because Justice Blackmun
did not write an opinion, it is difficult to classify the nature of his
disagreement with the majority. The dissent appears, however, to
be consistent with Justice Blackmun's view that bankruptcy law
should defer to important governmental interests. This speculation follows from the fact that Justice Blackmun joined the states'
rights oriented Kelly majority and wrote the states' rights-oriented Davenportdissent. Each of these opinions required that the
Court read the Bankruptcy Code to defer to state governmental
interests. By dissenting in Energy Resources, Justice Blackmun
recorded his opposition to the Court's refusal to defer to the federal government's interest in designating the treatment of tax
payments. Because the Court issued Energy Resources and DavSee infra Part V.A.1.d.
United States v. Energy Resources Co., 495 U.S. 545 (1990).
Id.
Id. at 549-51; see generally 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1994) (granting bankruptcy courts
broad equitable powers).
453 See infra Part IV.A.1.d.
454 Energy Resources, 495 U.S. at 551.
455 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
449
450
451
452
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enport on the same day,45 Justice Blackmun may have had inadequate time to write a separate opinion in Energy Resources, and
may have believed that his opinion in Davenport adequately conveyed his views concerning the Bankruptcy Code's deference to
important governmental interests.
Kelly, Davenport, and Energy Resources introduce questions
concerning the manner in which the Court will interpret the
Bankruptcy Code when the Bankruptcy Code interacts with important state and federal governmental interests. We shall see
this pattern arise again in the major splits.45 7
c.

Justices Scalia's, Thomas's and Breyer's dissents

Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Breyer dissented in three minor
split cases. In United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricatorsof
Utah, Inc.,45 Justice Scalia declined to join a portion of the majority opinion,4 59 and Justice Thomas concurred, in part, and dissented, in part.4"' In Dewsnup v. Timm,4 6 ' Justice Scalia
dissented.4 2 In Field v. Mans,4" 3 Justice Breyer wrote a dissent,
which Justice Scalia joined.4 6 In Field, Justice Ginsburg joined
the majority but also wrote a concurrence.4 6 5
4 6 the Court held that (i) for purposes of
In CF&I Fabricators,
the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme, certain payments required under the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") in connection
with pension plan funding deficiencies were penalties rather than
priority excise taxes, and (ii) the Bankruptcy Code did not allow
the courts categorically to subordinate all such penalty
obligations.45 7
In the absence of any clear textual guidance,4 68 Justice Souter
based his analysis primarily on Supreme Court Bankruptcy Act
precedents, which required the courts to apply a "functional anal456 Both cases were decided on May 29, 1990. See Energy Resources, 495 U.S. 545;
Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990).
457 See infra Part III.E.3.
458 United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213 (1996).
459 Id. at 215 n.t; infra note 473 and accompanying text.
460 See CF&I Fabricators,Inc., 518 U.S. at 229 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); infra notes 474-75 and accompanying text.
461 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992).
462 See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 420 (Scalia, J., dissenting); infra notes 490-507 and accompanying text.
463 Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59 (1995).
464 See Field, 516 U.S. at 79 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J.); infra notes
517-19 and accompanying text.
465 See Field, 516 U.S. at 78 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); infra note 516 and accompanying text.
466 United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213 (1996).
467 Id.
468 Id. at 219-20 (noting the absence of any express reference to the IRC provisions in
the Bankruptcy Code priority section).
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ysis" to determine whether an exaction was a "tax" for Bankruptcy
Code priority purposes. 8 9 In an unusual twist on the pre-Code
canon, he noted that "Congress could, of course, have intended a
different interpretive method for reading terms used in the Bankruptcy Code it created in 1978. But if it had so intended we would
expect some statutory indication .... "470 The Court relied upon its
Bankruptcy Code precedent, United States v. Noland,4"' to conclude that the bankruptcy court could not categorically
subordinate tax penalties.47 2
Justice Scalia, true to his textualist leanings, declined to join
the portion of the majority opinion that discussed the IRC's legislative history.473 He did not, however, object to the Court's examination of other sources beyond the text. Presumably, he
concurred in this examination because he agreed that the text was
ambiguous.
Justice Thomas concurred in part and dissented in part.47 4 He
argued that, if Congress imposes a "tax" that is generally considered to be an excise tax, then it is an excise tax for Bankruptcy
Code priority purposes. Although the bankruptcy court can apply
a functional analysis to determine whether a statutory obligation
that a state calls a "tax" is a "tax" for federal Bankruptcy Code
priority purposes, the bankruptcy court must view any "tax" that
Congress imposes in a federal statute as a "tax" for bankruptcy
purposes.4 7 5
Second, in Dewsnup v. Timm, 476 as in Kelly v. Robinson477 and
4 vs the
Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v. Davenport,
Justices split again over the scope, application, and interaction between the plain-meaning rule and the pre-Code practice canon.
In Dewsnup, the Court considered the interplay between
Bankruptcy Code subsections 506(a) and (d).479 Under section
469 Id. at 220-22, 222 n.6; see also id. at 224-25 (applying the functional analysis to
conclude that the exaction was a penalty rather than a tax); id. at 225-26 (analyzing the
legislative history of the IRC to bolster this conclusion).
470 Id. at 221; see also id. at 222-24 (concluding that neither the language nor the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code or IRC reflected such an intent).
471 United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535 (1996); see supra notes 229-235 and accompanying text.
472 See CF&I Fabricators,518 U.S. at 228-29; see generally 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1994)
(providing for equitable subordination).
473 See CF&I Fabricators,518 U.S. at 215 n.t, 225-26.
474 Id. at 229 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
475 Id. at 229-30.
476 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992). This was a six-to-two decision because
Justice Thomas took no part in the consideration of the case. Id.
477 Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986); see supra notes 427-40 and accompanying
text.
478 Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990); see supra
notes 441-49 and accompanying text.
479 See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a), (d) (1994); Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 416-17.
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506(a), a secured creditor's "allowed secured claim" is equal to the
lesser of the amount of the claim or the value of the collateral. 80
Consequently, if an "undersecured" creditor holds a claim for one
million dollars, but the collateral is worth only seven hundred
thousand dollars, the creditor will have an allowed secured claim
of seven hundred thousand dollars and an unsecured claim of
three hundred thousand dollars. The creditor in Dewsnup held
such an undersecured claim. 48 1
Section 506(d) allows a debtor to avoid a lien to the extent
that the lien secures a claim that is not an "allowed secured
claim. " 48 2 This section allows the debtor to avoid a lien when the
underlying claim has been found to be invalid. The debtor argued
that section 506(d) also allowed the Court to "strip down" an undersecured creditor's lien to the judicially determined value of the
property.43 Avoiding the lien would make it easier for the debtor
to confirm a plan of reorganization over the creditor's objection.
The Court denied the strip down, even though only the "secured" portion of the claim was an "allowed secured claim" under
section 506(a).1 The Court reached this result by declining to apply section 506(a)'s definition of "allowed secured claim" to section
506(d). Instead, the Court concluded that the debtor could not
avoid the lien if the creditor's claim was both "allowed" (i.e., was a
valid claim not subject to disallowance or avoidance) and "secured" (i.e., any portion of the allowed claim was secured by any of
the debtor's property). 5
The Court reasoned that the divergent views espoused by the
parties and amici demonstrated that the language was ambiguous. 4 The Court then rejected the "words have the same meaning throughout the statute" canon in favor of a pre-Code practice
canon.
Were we writing on a clean slate, we might be inclined to agree
with petitioner that the words allowed secured claim must take
the same meaning in § 506(d) as in § 506(a). But, given the ambiguity in the text, we are not convinced that Congress intended
to depart from the pre-Code rule that liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected. 487
48o See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994). This shorthand statement of the effect of section
506(a) applies if the debtor is the sole owner of the collateral and the claim is a recourse
claim. Section 1111(b)(1)(A) creates essentially the same result for non-recourse claims.
Id. § 1111(b)(1)(A).
481 See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 413.
482 See 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1994).
483 See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 415.
484 Id. at 417; see 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994).
485 See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 418.
486 Id. at 416.
487 Id. at 417.
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In perhaps the strongest statement yet of the Court's pre-Code
practice canon, the Court explained that:
[wihen Congress amends the bankruptcy laws, it does not write
"on a clean slate." [citations omitted] Furthermore, this Court
has been reluctant to accept arguments that would interpret the
Code, however vague the particular language under consideration might be, to effect a major change in pre-Code practice that
is not the subject of at least some discussion in the legislative
history. [citations omitted] Of course, where the language is
unambiguous, silence in the legislative history cannot be controlling. But, given the ambiguity here, to attribute to Congress
the intention to grant a debtor the broad new remedy... without the new remedy's being mentioned somewhere in the Code
itself or in the annals of Congress is not plausible, in our view,
and is contrary to basic bankruptcy principles.48 8
Notice the similarity between this iteration of the manner in
which the Court will reconcile the text and pre-Code practice and
the interpretive philosophy stated in the Davenport dissent.48 9
Not surprisingly, the same Justice, Justice Blackmun, wrote both.
Because Justice Blackmun is no longer on the Court, the continued viability of his flexible test is unclear. Only four of the Justices who joined Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Dewsnup
remain on the Court today. These are Chief Justice Rehnquist,
and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Stevens. Justices Blackmun and White, who also joined the Dewsnup majority, have been
replaced by Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
Justice Scalia answered with a stinging dissent, which Justice Souter joined.4 9 The dissenters castigated the majority for
"replac[ing] what Congress said with what it thinks Congress
ought to have said - and in the process disregard[ing], and hence
impair[ing] for future use, well-established principles of statutory
construction."4 9 ' Similarly, the dissent complained that:
[t]he principal harm caused by today's decision is not the misinterpretation of § 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code.... The greater

and more enduring damage of today's opinion consists in its destruction of predictability, in the Bankruptcy Code and elsewhere. By disregarding well-established and oft-repeated
principles of statutory construction, it renders those principles
less secure and the certainty they are designed to achieve less
attainable. When a seemingly clear provision can be pronounced ambiguous sans textual and structural analysis, and
when the assumption of uniform meaning is replaced by 'oneId. at 419-20.
Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 565 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying note 448.
490 See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 420 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
488
4s9

491

Id.
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subsection-at-a-time' interpretation, innumerable statutory
texts become worth litigating.4 92

In this concise statement of his interpretive philosophy, Justice Scalia objected to three aspects of the Court's interpretive
method. He argued that the Court manufactured an ambiguity,
failed to apply holistic textualism, and improperly considered preCode practice and legislative history.
First, the dissent undertook a natural or plain meaning reading. According to the dissent, section 506(d) "[r]ead naturally and
in accordance with other provisions of the statute" "unambiguously provides" that the lien is avoidable. 49 3 Disagreement among
self-interested litigants cannot create an ambiguity49 4 because

"[t]his mode of analysis makes every litigated statute
ambiguous."495
Second, the dissent applied a holistic textual analysis. The
dissent argued that the phrase "allowed secured claim," used in
section 506(d) "obviously bears" the meaning set forth in section
506(a) and "inevitably means" the same thing when that phrase is
used throughout the Bankruptcy Code.496 In a "clear and unmistakable pattern of usage," the Bankruptcy Code is similarly consistent in its use
of the phrases "allowed unsecured claim" and
"allowed claim. " 4 97 The dissent argued that "the normal rule of
statutory construction that identical words used in different parts
of the same act are intended to have the same meaning .... must
surely apply, a fortiori, to use of identical words in the same section of the same enactment." 495 According to the dissent, the ma-

jority replaced this "normal and sensible" rule with a "one-sectionat-a time" approach.499
Third, the dissent challenged the majority's application of the
pre-Code canon. 500 The dissent did not absolutely prohibit all uses

of the pre-Code canon, but it articulated a narrower canon under
which the Court may consult pre-Code practice only if the statute
contains a gap or true ambiguity. The dissent acknowledged that:
[w]e have, of course, often consulted pre-Code behavior in the
course of interpreting gaps in the express coverage of the Code,
492
493

Id. at 435.

494
495

Id. at 422-23.
Id. at 432.
Id. at 421.

Id. at 420; see also id. at 425-27 (arguing that the majority's reading created redundancy in § 506(d) was not consistent with a "natural reading," "natural meaning," or
'straightforward reading," and created a practical absurdity).

496
497
498

Id. at 422.
Id. (emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted; citations omitted); cf
Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 766-67 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the
majority's approach in Dewsnup).
499 Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 423.
500

Id. at 432-35.
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or genuinely ambiguous provisions. And we have often said in
such cases that, absent a textual footing, we will not presume a
departure from longstanding pre-Code practice [citing Midlantic
NationalBank v. New Jersey Departmentof Environmental Protection, ° and Kelly v. Robinson"°2 ]. But we have never held
pre-Code practice to be determinative in the face of what we
have here: contradictory statutory text. To the contrary, where
"the statutory language plainly reveals Congress' intent" to alter pre-Code regimes [citing PennsylvaniaDepartmentof Public
Welfare v. Davenport"s], we have simply enforced the new Code
according to its terms, without insisting upon "at least some discussion [of the change from prior law] in the legislative history,"
Congress' careful reexamination and entire rewriting of
those provisions supports the conclusion that, regardless of
whether pre-Code practice is retained or abandoned, the text
means precisely what it says."°

Finally, in an innocuous but intriguing comment, the dissent
quoted from United States v. Ron PairEnterprises,Inc.505 The dissent noted that, in Ron Pair,"[h]aving found a 'natural interpretation of the statutory language [that] does not conflict with any
significant state or federal interest, nor with any other aspect"5of
°6
the Code,'... we deemed the pre-Code practice to be irrelevant.
This passage suggests that Justice Scalia might allow language,
textual canons, and structure to be overridden when the Bankruptcy Code clashes with some important state or federal
interest.507
Finally, in Field v. Mans,5 the Justices disagreed not on interpretive method, but on the application of the law to the facts.
The circuit courts of appeal were split over the level of reliance required under the fraud exception to discharge. 59o As in
51 0 the statute contained a gap - it did not exGrogan v. Garner,
5ol Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986);
see infra notes 583-94 and accompanying text.
502 Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 46-47 (1986); see supra notes 427-40 and accompanying text.
503 Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 553 (1990); see
supra notes 44149 and accompanying text.
504 Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 433-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
5o5 United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989), which is one of the
Court's most highly criticized five-to-four opinions, is discussed infra at notes 629-52 and
accompanying text.
5o6 Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 434-35 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
507 Indeed, this result is essentially what occurred in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.,
511 U.S. 531 (1994), in which Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that the Bankruptcy Code's fraudulent transfer provisions could not be used to set aside a non-collusive
foreclosure sale that had been conducted in accordance with state law. See infra notes 60624 and accompanying text.
5o8 Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59 (1995).
5o9 Id. at 59.
5io Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991); see discussion supra text accompanying note
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pressly state what type of reliance was required. 511 The Court
held that the exception required "justifiable reliance," which it defined as being a lower standard than "reasonable reliance," but a
higher standard than "actual reliance."5 12 The Court reasoned
that, when Congress uses a term that had a settled meaning
under the common law (i.e., the term "fraud"), Congress intends to
incorporate the common law meaning.51 The Court concluded
that, under the common law in effect in 1978 (when the relevant
provision was enacted), a party was required to show justifiable
reliance in order to prove fraud. 1 4 In essence, the Court defined a
Bankruptcy Code term by reference to its established pre-Code,
common law meaning.5 15
Justice Ginsburg joined the majority and agreed with its reasoning, but wrote separately516solely to highlight the need to determine causation on remand.
Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justice Scalia.5 17 The dissenters agreed that justifiable reliance was the proper standard.51
They argued, however, that the bankruptcy court had, in fact, applied a justifiable reliance standard, even though it had used the
phrase "reasonable reliance." 19
The questions raised in Kelly, Davenport, and Dewsnup concerning the scope of and relationship between the plain meaning
rule and the pre-Code canon arose again in the final minor split.
d.

Justices Scalia's and Thomas's concurrence with
Justice Stevens's dissent

Bank of America National Trust & Savings Assoc. v. 203
5 2 ° was
North LaSalle Street Partnership,
the final minor split of
the 1986 through 1998 Terms. LaSalle, which is the Court's most
511 Field, 516 U.S. at 63 & n.4, 69-70; see also 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (1994) (setting
forth the fraud exception).
512 Field, 516 U.S. at 59.
513
514
515

Id. at 69, 73.

517
518

Id. at 79.
Id. at 79-80.

Id. at 64, 69-72; see also id. 64-66 (considering the fraud exception's history).
The creditor argued that the existence of other provisions that required reasonable
reliance suggested that the fraud exception required only actual reliance. The Court disagreed, reasoning that negative pregnant structural arguments such as these were at their
weakest when the result was at odds with textual pointers such as the use of a common law
term. Id. at 75-76.
516 Field, 516 U.S. at 78 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
519 Id. at 80-82; see also id. at 82-84 (arguing that the bankruptcy court's use of the
phrase "reasonable reliance" should not have warranted reversal because no one had used
the phrase "justifiable reliance" in the lower court arguments, the term "justifiable" would
not have been obvious to a bankruptcy judge, and remand would create unnecessary expense and delay).
52o Bank of America Natl Trust. & Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 119 S.
Ct. 1411 (1999).
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recent Bankruptcy Code decision, represents a culmination of the
Court's bankruptcy jurisprudence, in several ways.
First, the separate opinions are based upon disputes concerning interpretive method. Second, these disputes relate to the major interpretive elements that have caused rifts among the
Justices in other cases, including what constitutes plain meaning,
when the Court may consider legislative history (if ever), and
what role pre-Code law and practice should play in Bankruptcy
Code interpretation. Third, the Justices who have carried the
banner for more formalistic interpretation (Justices Scalia and
Thomas) and more flexible interpretation (Justice Stevens), concurred and dissented in LaSalle. Fourth, LaSalle raised a hotly
contested issue that has widely split the circuit courts of appeal5 2 1
and that has come before the Court three times without a definitive resolution.52 2
In LaSalle, the Court once again considered, and once again
refused to determine, whether the so-called new value corollary
(or exception) to the absolute priority rule had survived the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code. 23
Because the Bankruptcy Code's language was "inexact," the
Court did not rely solely upon the text.52 4 The Court, nevertheless,
declined to rely upon an out of context reading of seemingly absolute statements in legislative history. 55 Instead, the majority examined the pre-Code judicial development of the absolute priority
rule and the new value corollary. 52 6 It characterized the corollary
as an "observation" that the Court had made in dictum in a preCode case.52 7 LaSalle, in its own dictum, seemed to embrace this
"observation" when it stated that:
[t]he upshot is that this history does nothing to disparage the
possibility apparent in the statutory text, that the absolute priority rule now on the books as subsection [1129] (b)(2)(B)(ii) may
carry a new value corollary. Although there is no literal reference to new value in the phrase on account of such junior claim,
the phrase could arguably carry such an implication in modify521
522

See, e.g., id.at 1416; see also sources cited supra at note 237.
See Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988) (discussed supra at

notes 236-48 and accompanying text); In re Bonner Mall Partnership, 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir.
1993), cert. granted sub nom, U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 510
U.S. 1039, motion to vacate denied and appeal dismissed as moot, 513 U.S. 18 (1994).
523 See LaSalle, 119 S. Ct. at 1422-24 (concluding that it was unnecessary to decide
whether the new value exception remained viable because the elements of any such exception had not been satisfied); see also Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (same; discussed supra at notes
236-48 and accompanying text); 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (1994) (setting forth the conditions under which a plan will be "fair and equitable" to a dissenting class of unsecured
claims).
524 See LaSalle, 119 S.Ct. at 1417.
525 Id. at 1421 n.25.
526 Id. at 1417.
527 Id. at 1417-18. See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 116 (1939).
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ing the prohibition against receipt by junior claimants of any
interest under a plan while a senior class of nonconsenting creditors goes less than fully paid.52
This passage suggests that, when old equity receives property
in exchange for a new contribution, it does not violate the absolute
priority rule because old equity does not receive property "on account of" its prior equity interest.5 2 9 The Court found that this
interpretation, which was suggested by the text, context, and
practical considerations, 530 was consistent with Bankruptcy Code
policy because it read section 1129 "as intended to reconcile the
two recognized policies underlying Chapter 11, of preserving going
concerns and maximizing property available to satisfy creditors
"531

Nevertheless, the Court concluded that old equity would be
receiving property "on account of' its old interest if it received the
32
exclusive opportunity to acquire the new ownership interest.
Stated simply, the opportunity to acquire ownership is valuable
"property," similar to a purchase option, for which someone might
pay. Even if the ownership is acquired for market value (like an
option exercised at market value), the exclusive right to buy has
value.
Because the old equity holders in LaSalle had, in fact, been
given the exclusive opportunity to acquire the new equity interest,
the Court concluded that the plan did not satisfy the elements of
any new value corollary that might have survived the enactment
of the Bankruptcy Code. 5 3 The Court declined to offer suggestions
on the type of marketing or bidding that would meet the requisite
opportunity for competition. 5 34
Justice Thomas, in a concurrence that Justice Scalia joined,
agreed that the plan should not be confirmed.5 35 These two formalist Justices wrote separately, however, to object to the Court's
"approach to interpretation."5 36 They advocated textual interpretation in place of the Court's more flexible reliance on history and
pre-Code practice.
First, they argued that the Bankruptcy Code's text does not
expressly authorize pre-petition equity holders to receive or retain
528

LaSalle, 119 S. Ct. at 1419.

529

Id. at 1416.

Id. at 1413. The Court mentioned that a huge tax liability would be imposed if
anyone other than the former partners acquired the property, but the Court did not take
this into consideration in its analysis. Id. at 1415 n.11.
530

531
532

Id. at 1413.
Id. at 1422.

533 Id. at 1411.
534

Id. at 1424.

535 See LaSalle, 119 S. Ct. at 1424 (Thomas, J., concurring).
536

Id.
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property in exchange for an infusion of new value." 7 Rather, it
provides that a plan is fair and equitable if either the objecting
senior class is paid in full or no junior class retains any property
"on account of" its junior interest.5 3' After consulting two dictionaries, the concurring Justices concluded that the "common understanding" of the phrase "on account of' denoted some type of
causal relationship between the junior interest and the property
retained.51 9 Applying this definition, they concluded that the equity holders undoubtedly received property on account of their
prior interests.5 4 9
Second, they launched a more general criticism in which they
complained that:
[tihe majority also underestimates the need for a clear method
for interpreting the Bankruptcy Code. It extensively surveys
pre-Code practice and legislative history,... but fails to explain
the relevance of these sources to the interpretive question apart
from the conclusory assertion that the Code's language is "inexact" and the history is "helpful." . .. This sort of approach to
interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code repeats a methodological
error committed by this Court in Dewsnup v. Timm. 54 1
Dewsnup's approach to statutory interpretation enables litigants to undermine the Code by creating "ambiguous" statutory
language and then cramming into the Code any good idea that
can be garnered from pre-Code practice or legislative history.542
The concurrence argued that the Court should not refer to
pre-Code practice unless the statute truly is ambiguous.5 4 3 Even
then, the concurring Justices suggested that the Court should not
engraft onto the Bankruptcy Code concepts developed in a preCode era because the Bankruptcy Code had substantially changed
pre-Code law. 5 "
537

Id. at 1424.

538 Id.

539 Id. at 1424 (citing RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 13 (2d
ed. 1987) (defining "by reason of" and "because of") and WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW WORL INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 13 (1976) (defining "for the sake of," "by reason of," and "because
of')).
540 Id. at 1424 (concluding that the plan violated the fair and equitable requirement
because a rejecting senior class was not paid in full but a junior class would receive property on account of its interest).
541 Id. at 1425 (citations omitted).

542

Id.

W43
Id. at 1425 (acknowledging that the Court had found ambiguity in MidlanticNat'l
Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986), but suggesting that
instances of ambiguity were rare: "Even assuming the relevance of pre-Code practice in
those rare instances when the Code is truly ambiguous ....").
544

Id. at 1425 (noting that the Bankruptcy Code had made significant changes in both

the substantive and procedural laws of bankruptcy, and arguing that "[hience, it makes

little sense to graft onto the Code concepts that were developed during a quite different era
of bankruptcy practice."); cf United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240
(1989) (making a similar argument) (quoted infra at text accompanying note 640).
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Recall that Justice Scalia raised three principal complaints in
his Dewsnup v. Timm54 5 dissent. First, he complained that the
Court had creating ambiguity where none existed. Second, he argued that the Court should have applied a holistic, textual analysis. Third, he complained that the Court had rejected the plain
meaning in favor of pre-Code practice."
Justice Scalia had
agreed, in his Dewsnup dissent, that the Court could consider preCode practice if the Bankruptcy Code's language was ambiguous. 547 When Justices Scalia and Thomas, in LaSalle, criticized
the Court for applying a method like the one the Court had applied in Dewsnup, they were complaining that the Court found
ambiguity where there was none. In LaSalle, however, the dissenters read the language narrowly to avoid finding ambiguity.
This observation suggests that Justices Scalia and Thomas embrace a more formalistic view of what it means for the language to
be plain.5*
In striking contrast, Justice Stevens's LaSalle dissent reflects
impatience with the Court's continued refusal to resolve the new
value question.5 49 First, he argued that the Court should have
held, rather than merely observed in dictum, that the holder of a
junior interest does not receive property "on account of' his prior
interest when he receives property based upon adequate new
value. 55 0 To Justice Stevens, this result was obvious because the
Court had unequivocally accepted the new value corollary in preCode case law.55 '
Second, Justice Stevens argued that the Court's objections to
the plan because of lack of bidding were "unsupported by either
the text of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) or the record in this
case." 552 According to Justice Stevens, the sole issue should have
been the fairness of the price. If the price was fair, it should not
have mattered
whether the old equity or a third party made the
553
offer.
LaSalle both complicates and clarifies the Court's interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code. It complicates the Court's method
Id. at 420-35; see supra notes 490-507 and accompanying text.
See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 420 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 433-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying note 507.
548 Cf Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 766-67 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the majority for engaging in a one-subsection-at-a-time analysis in Dewsnup); see
infra Part 1V.A.I.c.2.
549 See LaSalle, 119 S. Ct. at 1426 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55o Id. at 1427.
551 Id. at 1426.
545
546
547

552
553

Id. at 1427.

Id. at 1430. See also id. 1427 (arguing that, if an old equity holder receives the new
equity for a bargain price, it receives property "on account" of its old interest, but if it
receives the new equity on a fair price, it does not receive property "on account" of its old
interest); id. at 1428-29 (noting that the text does not require competitive bidding).

2000]

Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code

253

because it creates greater uncertainty concerning when the Court
will rely upon only the text, and when it will consider pre-Code
law. It clarifies the Court's approach because it suggests that the
majority of the Court employs an interpretive method that is both
less rigid that Justices Thomas's and Scalia's formalist approach,
and less dynamic that Justice Stevens's flexible approach. In
other words, six of the Justices are more liberal than Justices
Scalia and Thomas in their willingness to find ambiguity and to
consult Bankruptcy Code history, including pre-Code practice, to
clarify that ambiguity. These same Justices, however, are more
conservative than Justice Stevens in their reluctance to embrace a
definitive rule when the facts allow them to avoid doing so. This
conclusion suggests that the Court may have a six-Justice interpretive center, a two-Justice interpretive "right," and a single-Justice interpretive "left."
Summary of the minor split decisions
First, the minor split decisions display a continuing strong
pattern of disputes among the Justices over interpretive method.
Consequently, interpretive method matters to the Justices, particularly to Justices Scalia, Stevens, and Thomas.
Second, these cases reveal more clearly the parameters of
these disputes. The principal elements over which the Justices
disagree relate to the parameters of the plain meaning canon and
the relationship between that canon and the pre-Code canon.
Third, some of these cases reveal an emerging pattern of disputes among the Justices concerning deference to non-bankruptcy, state and federal law or important governmental interests.
Part D considers whether these emerging patterns continue
in the major split decisions.
4.

E.

The Major Split Decisions
1.

Overview

Since the Bankruptcy Code was enacted, the Court has issued
only nine major split decisions.
The Court has decided only two bankruptcy cases by plurality
decisions: Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co. 554 and Hoffman v. Connecticut Department of Income
555
Maintenance.
The Court has issued five five-to-four split decisions: NLRB v.
Bildisco & Bildisco,556 Midlantic NationalBank v. New Jersey De554 Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
555 Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96 (1989).
556 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984) (unanimous on one issue; five-tofour split on one issue).
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partment of Environmental Protection,5 7 United States v. Ron
PairEnterprises,Inc.,5 5 PioneerInvestment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Limited Partnership,5 9 and BFP v. Resolution
Trust Corp.5 6 °
In the two remaining major split decisions, three Justices dissented: Granfinancierav. Nordberg,561 and CaliforniaState Board
of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc.562
The Court decided three of these nine cases (Marathon,
Bildisco, and Midlantic) before Justice Scalia joined the Court.
Because no obvious pattern distinguishes the major split decisions
issued before Justice Scalia joined the Court from those issued after he joined the Court, analyzing the opinions based upon when
they were decided will not be useful.5 63
Similarly, there is no clear pattern that distinguishes these
cases based upon which Justices authored the majority and dissenting opinions.164
Instead, these cases reveal an interesting pattern rooted primarily in the nature of the questions presented. Three of the
cases raise constitutional or quasi-constitutional questions. Four
involve tensions between the Bankruptcy Code and other law.
The remaining two continue the pattern of cases in which the Justices split over interpretive method.
2.

The constitutional and quasi-constitutional questions

Each of the two plurality decisions (Marathon,Hoffman) and
one of the two six-to-three splits (Granfinanciera)turned on a constitutional or quasi-constitutional question, not a bankruptcy
question.
In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
565
Co.,
the Court considered the constitutionality of the Bank557 Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
558 United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
559 Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380 (1993).
560 BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, reh'g denied, 512 U.S. 1247 (1994).
561 Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
562 California State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc., 490 U.S. 844 (1989).
563 The Court issued one plurality decision before Justice Scalia joined the Court (Marathon), and one after he joined the Court (Hoffman); two five-to-four decisions before Justice Scalia joined the Court (Bildisco, Midlantic), and three after he joined the Court (Ron
Pair,Pioneer, BFP); and both six-to-three decisions after Justice Scalia joined the Court
(Granfinanciera,Sierra Summit).
564 Seven different justices wrote the majority opinions (Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Powell, Scalia, Stevens, and White); nine different justices
wrote the dissenting opinions (Chief Justice Rehnquist, former Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, O'Connor, Souter, Stevens, and White); and three
separate justices wrote the concurring opinions (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor and Scalia). Five of the justices who wrote majority opinions also wrote dissents
(Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Stevens, and White).
565 Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
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ruptcy Code's original jurisdictional structure, which granted
broad powers to non-Article III judges. 66 Four Justices joined the
plurality opinion, which held that the grant was overbroad. 67
Two Justices joined a concurrence.568 Three Justices joined two
separate dissents. 6 9
In Hoffman v. Connecticut Department of Income Maintenance,570 the Court considered whether the Bankruptcy Code provided an unmistakably clear waiver of states' immunity from suits
filed in bankruptcy courts to recover money damages and, if so,
whether Congress had constitutional power to effect such a waiver
in a federal statute. Although the four-Justice plurality opinion
avoided the constitutional question by holding that the Bankruptcy Code did not provide a clear waiver 5 7 1 all six of the concurring and dissenting Justices would have reached the
constitutional question.5 72 This case, like United States v. Nordic
Village,57 1 is best understood as a quasi-constitutional question
that arises from the Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence.57 4
In Granfinancierav. Nordberg, 11 the Court held that the Seventh Amendment entitles a person who has not filed a claim
against the bankruptcy estate to a jury trial when the trustee sues
that person to recover an allegedly fraudulent transfer, even
though fraudulent transfer actions are "core proceedings" in bankruptcy cases. 7 6
566 Id. at 62 ("[W]e turn to the question presented for decision: whether the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 violates the command of Art. III that the judicial power of the United
States must be vested in courts whose judges enjoy the protections and safeguards specified
in that article.").
567 See Marathon, 458 U.S. 50. Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion, which
Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens joined. Id.
568 See Marathon, 485 U.S. at 89 (Rehnquist, J., concurring, joined by O'Connor, J.).
569 See Marathon, 485 U.S. at 92 (Burger, J., dissenting); Marathon, 485 U.S. at 92
(White, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., & Powell, J.).
570 Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96 (1989).
571
572

Id. at 104.

See Hoffman, 492 U.S. at 105 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Hoffman, 492 U.S. at 105
(Scalia, J., concurring); Hoffman, 492 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ.); Hoffman, 492 U.S. at 111 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by
Blackmun, J.).
573 United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992); see supra notes 409-15 and
accompanying text.
574 For example, even though the plurality did not reach the constitutional question, it
applied special interpretive rules adapted for sovereign immunity cases, such as the requirement that Congress make its intention "unmistakably clear" in the text, and the presumption that legislative history is not relevant to determining whether Congress intended
to abrogate immunity. See Hoffman, 492 U.S. at 101, 104. For a detailed analysis of the
sovereign immunity problem in the bankruptcy context, including a discussion of Hoffman's place in the Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence, see Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti,
State Sovereign Immunity and the Bankruptcy Code, Part One, 7 J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 521
(1998); Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, State Sovereign Immunity and the Bankruptcy Code, Part
Two, 8 J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 3 (1998).
575 Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
576 Id. at 36, 49, 50-61.
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Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment and concurred in the
opinion, except for the Court's discussion of "private rights" and
"public rights" for purposes of determining which matters Congress may assign to non-Article III tribunals. 7
Three dissenting Justices argued that the Seventh Amendment does not prohibit Congress from assigning avoidance power
actions to the bankruptcy courts without giving the defendants a
right to a jury trial."'
3. The Bankruptcy Code interaction with other law cases
In three of the five-to-four split decisions (NLRB v. Bildisco &
Bildisco,579 Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Departmentof
Environmental Protection,"' and BFP v. Resolution Trust
Corp.581), and one of the six-to-three split decisions (California
State Board of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc.58 2), the Jus-

tices disagreed among themselves concerning how to reconcile the
Bankruptcy Code and other non-bankruptcy law. In each case,
the split arose when one group of Justices took a bankruptcy-centric view and the other group of Justices took a non-bankruptcycentric view of the question presented.
First, in Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department
583 the trustee sought to abandon conof EnvironmentalProtection,
taminated properties over the objection of two state environmental protection agencies. The agencies demanded a clean-up and
argued that abandonment would threaten the public health and
safety and violate federal environmental law.5 "
577 See Granfinanciera,492 U.S. at 65 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
578 Id., at 71 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 79-81 (arguing that the majority misinterpreted Seventh Amendment jurisprudence by considering only the nature of the claim and
not the forum in which the claim was tried); id.at 81-82, 87-90 (arguing that the majority
undermined Congress's power to assign selected causes of action to specialized tribunals);
id. at 83 (arguing that the majority undermined the bankruptcy scheme); id. at 84-86 (disagreeing with the majority's conclusion that fraudulent transfer actions had been actions
at law, rather than in equity, when the Seventh Amendment was enacted); Id. at 91 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by O'Connor, J.); id. at 91-92 (noting the uncertainty of the
historical record concerning whether fraudulent transfer actions were actions at law or in
equity); id. at 92-95 (agreeing that the bankruptcy court is an equitable tribunal in which a
jury would dismantle the statutory scheme; arguing that the question is whether Congress
had constitutional power to assign an action to the bankruptcy court without a right to jury
trial; suggesting that the answer turns on whether the action involved a public right; concluding that Congress's designation of core proceedings made those actions public rights;
and reasoning that it was not beyond Congress's power to designate fraudulent transfer
actions as core proceedings).
579 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
58o Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
581 BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, reh'g denied, 512 U.S. 1247 (1994)
582 California State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc., 490 U.S. 844 (1989).
583 Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
584 Id. at 496-98; see 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1994) (permitting the trustee to abandon certain

property).
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The majority ruled in favor of the states in an opinion that
attempted to reconcile the Bankruptcy Code with federal environmental law and policy. The majority relied heavily upon a liberal
application of the pre-Code interpretive canon and deference to
environmental policy.
First, the Court noted that "[tihe normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress intends for legislation to change the
interpretation of a judicially created concept, it makes that intent
specific," and that the Court has followed this rule with "particular care" in interpreting bankruptcy legislation. 5 s The Court reasoned that the pre-Code judicially developed abandonment
doctrine was subject to well-recognized, judicially developed limitations designed to protect important federal or state interests. 8 6
The Court concluded that Congress had not clearly abrogated
those limitations on abandonment when it codified the abandonment power.5 87
This reasoning is quite similar to that employed by the Kelly
v. Robinson58 8 majority. In both cases, the pre-Code practice that
the Court adopted embraced a policy of deference to non-bankruptcy law that had a substantial impact on an important governmental interest.
Second, the Court acknowledged Congress's "undisputed" concern over hazardous waste disposal, and concluded that Congress
had not intended to undermine its goal of environmental protection when it expressly codified the abandonment power without
also expressly codifying the established common-law restrictions
on abandonment. 8 9
The dissenters, in contrast, took a bankruptcy-centric view of
the question. They argued that the clear text of the Bankruptcy
Code allowed abandonment without restrictions,5 9 ° the scant legislative history did not reflect a congressional intent to limit the
abandonment power,5 91 and the few pre-Code cases on which the
majority relied did not support the Court's conclusion that there
were broad, well-established limitations on abandonment before
the Bankruptcy Code was enacted. 92 The dissent further suggested that imposing limits on the abandonment power and forcing the debtor to clean up hazardous waste sites violated the
58s5 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 501.
586
587

Id. at 499-501.
Id. at 502-05.

588 See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986); see supra notes 427-36 and accompanying
text.
589 Midlantic, 474 U.S. at 506.
590 Id. at 509, 513 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
591 Id. at 509-10.
592

Id. at 510-13.

258

Chapman Law Review

(Vol. 3:173

purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.5 93 Finally, the dissent argued
that the Court had improperly employed equitable powers to enforce its own view of sound public policy. 9'
In NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,5 9 5 the Court struggled to reconcile bankruptcy policy with the policies underlying federal labor
law. In Bildisco, however, unlike Midlantic, the Court viewed the
non-bankruptcy federal law from a bankruptcy law perspective.
Five Justices concluded that the debtor-in-possession had not
committed an unfair labor practice when it had unilaterally modified a collective bargaining agreement before rejecting it. The majority relied heavily on bankruptcy policy, and briefly noted that
honoring the Bankruptcy Code's language and policies would not
violate labor policy.5 96
The Court reasoned that the authority to reject an executory
contract was vital to the "fundamental purpose of reorganization
... to prevent a debtor from going into liquidation, with an attendant loss of jobs and possible misuse of economic resources." 9 7 The
Court concluded that allowing the NLRB to pursue an action for
unfair labor practices would "run directly counter to the express
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and to the Code's overall effort
to give a debtor-in-possession some flexibility and breathing
space." 598
The dissent, in contrast, argued that there was an unavoidable conflict between Bankruptcy Code and the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"). 5 9
Permitting a debtor in possession unilaterally to alter a collective-bargaining agreement in order to further the goals of the
Bankruptcy Code seriously undermines the goals of the NLRA.
We thus have the duty to decide the issue before us in a way
that accommodates the policies of both federal statutes. That
cannot properly be done, in the Court's fashion, by concentrating on the Bankruptcy Code alone ... 600
Rather than beginning with the Bankruptcy Code, the dissent
relied heavily on the language and policies underlying the NLRA.
It concluded that the NLRA's unfair labor practice provisions applied to debtors seeking to modify union contracts in bankruptcy
593 Id. at 514-15; id. at 508 (arguing that the majority's errors arose, at least in part,
from the "Court's failure to discuss even in passing either the nature of abandonment or its
role in federal bankruptcy").
594 Id. at 514-15.
595 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
596 Id. at 534; see 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1994) (authorizing the debtor in possession to
assume or reject executory contracts); id. § 1113 (specifying the treatment of collective bargaining agreements; enacted after Bildisco).
597 Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 528 (citing legislative history).
598 Id. at 532 (citing legislative history).
599 Id. at 540-42; see National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994).
6oo Id. at 541.
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cases.60 The dissent concluded that, if one were to consider only
the NLRA's language and policy, one would necessarily conclude
that it was intended to apply in a bankruptcy case.60 2 The dissent
then considered whether any Bankruptcy Code provisions or policies altered this conclusion.603
The question then is whether application of § 8(d) would so undermine the goals of the Bankruptcy Code that, despite the deleterious effect on the policies of the NLRA, Congress could not
have intended that § 8(d) remain applicable once a bankruptcy
petition has been filed.' 4
Applying this labor-law-centric test, the dissent concluded
that not applying NLRA section 8(d) in bankruptcy "strikes at the
very heart of the policies underlying that section and the NLRA,"
but that applying NLRA section 8(d) in bankruptcy would not "seriously impair" bankruptcy policies or debtors' prospects for a successful reorganization.60 5
In BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.,60 6 the Court considered the
interaction between bankruptcy law and state foreclosure law.
Both the majority and dissent claimed the mantle of plain language. The majority, however, deferred strongly to states' interests, and the dissent appealed to structure, history, and policy to
confirm its reading of the text.
The majority held that the price received in a pre-bankruptcy
foreclosure sale conducted in accordance with state law was conclusively deemed to constitute the "reasonably equivalent value"
of the property for purposes of bankruptcy fraudulent transfer
law.60 7 As a result, the trustee could not avoid the sale.
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia began with a primarily textual analysis that examined the three-word phrase "reasonably equivalent value."60 8 The Bankruptcy Code defined only one
of these words, "value."60 Justice Scalia reasoned that "reasonably equivalent" could not mean "fair market" or Congress would
have used the phrase "fair market," as it did elsewhere.61 0 With
little textual support, he concluded that the price received at a
6ol Id. at 535 (Brennan J., dissenting).
602
603

6o4

Id. at 541-49.
Id. at 550-53.
Id. at 550.

605 Id. at 554; see also id. at 539-40 (criticizing the majority for inferring intent from
the general treatment of executory contracts and from Bankruptcy Code policies without
express textual support for the conclusion that the Bankruptcy Code rendered the NLRA
inapplicable in bankruptcy).
606 BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994).
607 Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1994) (authorizing the trustee to avoid fraudulent
transfers made for less than reasonably equivalent value).
6o8 See BFP, 511 U.S. at 535.
609 See 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(A) (1994) (defining "value").
610 See BFP, 511 U.S. at 536-39.
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non-collusive foreclosure sale was "reasonably equivalent"
value. 1 ' He did not engage in a substantive, holistic analysis of
the purposes of the fraudulent transfer provisions or their role as
part of a group of provisions designed to maximize value, equitably distribute assets, and foster rehabilitation. In other words, his
analysis was not bankruptcy-centric.
Instead, he based his conclusion primarily on the relationship
between state foreclosure law, on the one hand, and fraudulent
transfer law (including as embodied in the Bankruptcy Code), on
the other hand. Because these two bodies of law had coexisted for
centuries, he argued that bankruptcy and fraudulent transfer law
were not meant to usurp state law foreclosure processes.6 12 As in
Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection"' and Kelly v. Robinson,6 14 the majority deferred to important state interests, despite the Supremacy
Clause. 15
Although the BFP majority did not cite a pre-Code canon, its
review of the historic relationship between foreclosure law and
fraudulent transfer law was similar to the review the Court undertook616in Midlantic and Kelly, with the support of the pre-Code
canon.

The dissent6 17 castigated the majority for corrupting the statute's plain language. Justice Souter, writing for four Justices, argued that the majority's analysis was both too narrow and too
broad.
It was too narrow because it read the text out of context.
"Closer familiarity with the text, structure, and history of the disputed provision (and relevant amendments) confirms the soundness of the plain reading," the dissent argued. 618 According to the
dissent, the text, viewed in light of the Bankruptcy Code's structure, was plain." 9 The historic development of fraudulent transfer law in the bankruptcy context, particularly including
Congress's rejection of an amendment that would have allowed
avoidance of foreclosure sales only if such sales were collusive,
611
612
613
614

Id. at 545.
Id. at 546.

618

Id. at 553.

Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
615 See supra notes 431-36, 585-89 and accompanying text; infra Parts IV.A.I.c.4;
IV.A.I.d.
616 See supra notes 431-36, 585-89 and accompanying text. 617 See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 549 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 552 (arguing that the words and meaning were plain); id. at 550 n.1 (criticizing the majority for referring to only two uses of the phrase "fair market value" but not
referring to the Bankruptcy Code's more than 30 uses of the term "value"); id. at 550-51
(agreeing that fair market value was not the proper test, but arguing that the actual price
received was neither the only alternative test nor a plausible reading of the statute).
619
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and Congress's adoption of amendments designed to include fore6 2 ° Finally,
closure sales, supported the textual meaning.
bankruptcy policy supported the avoidance of foreclosure sales if the
price received was too low.6 2'
The majority's analysis was too broad because it disingenuously manufactured an ambiguity,6 2 2 then used that ambiguity to
depart from the plain meaning in order to vindicate important
state62 3interests, despite the preemption of state law by federal

law.

In BFP, as in Kelly, the Justices split concerning the interaction between the Bankruptcy Code and other law, and the proper
degree of deference, if any, that bankruptcy courts should accord
to state or federal law, especially if that law protects important
governmental interests. 2 4
Finally, California State Board of Equalization v. Sierra
Summit, Inc.,626 also involved the application of non-bankruptcy
law in the bankruptcy context. The six-Justice majority resolved
a conflict among the circuits when it ruled that the states could
impose sales and use taxes on bankruptcy liquidation sales. 26
These taxes applied because "[niothing in the plain language of
the statute, its legislative history, or the structure of the Bankruptcy Code indicates that Congress intended to exclude taxes on
the liquidation process from those taxes the States may impose on
the bankruptcy estate."6 27
620 Id. at 550 n.1 (noting that Congress rejected an amendment that would have allowed avoidance only if the foreclosure sale was collusive); id. at 553-55 (elucidating the
development of fraudulent transfer law in the context of foreclosure sales; noting that the
Bankruptcy Code had been amended to ensure that such sales would be included; and arguing that if non-collusive sales were not covered, then the amendments were superfluous).
621 Id. at 560-61 (arguing that bankruptcy courts are capable of determining reasonably equivalent value on a case-by-case basis); id. at 562-63 (concluding that the plain
meaning requires a judicial determination of value, the courts can determine value, and
the policies underlying bankruptcy law fully support judicial valuation); id. at 563 (arguing
that setting aside non-collusive foreclosure sales for low prices is consistent with the policies of maximizing and equitably distributing assets to creditors, and providing a fresh
start to debtors, and that these policies apply without regard to the fact that state law does
not allow a sale to be set aside for price inadequacy); id. at 563 n.15 (criticizing the majority
for failing to discuss bankruptcy policy).
622 Id. at 562 (accusing the majority of finding the text to be ambiguous and open to
policy-based construction; noting that Justice Scalia had complained in his dissent in Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992), that the Court had supplied different meanings to the
same terms, and accusing Justice Scalia of doing the same, and worse, in BFP).
623 Id. at 567 n.19 (arguing that, where the Bankruptcy Code truly is silent or ambiguous, the Court should not read it to depart from prior practice, but that the Court has never
required Congress to provide clearer evidence of its intent when the text is already clear);
id. at 565-69 (noting that Midlantic's deference to important state interests was over a
vigorous dissent).
624 See supra notes 431-40 and accompanying text.
625 California State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc., 490 U.S. 844 (1989).
626
627

Id. at 854.
Id. at 853.
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The dissent did not challenge the majority's reasoning. Instead, it argued that the bankruptcy court's order prohibiting the
state from collecting certain taxes was res judicata because the
state had allowed the order to become final and had then attempted to collect the taxes and attack the order collaterally. 2
4.

The interpretive dispute cases

The final two major split decisions return to the pattern of
cases in which the Justices disagreed among themselves over interpretive method.
In United States v. Ron PairEnterprises, Inc.,63 9 the Court
held that Bankruptcy Code section 506(b) entitles non-consensual,
oversecured creditors to receive post-petition interest.
The Court viewed the case as one involving a "narrow statutory issue."63 0 Often cited, frequently with derision, as the case
establishing a rigid, grammatical, plain meaning rule for Bankruptcy Code interpretation, the Ron Pair decision ultimately
turned on the placement of a comma.
Section 506(b) provides that "there shall be allowed to the
holder of such claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable
fees, costs, or charges provided for under the agreement under
which such claim arose." 63 1 Under this provision, only creditors
who hold consensual liens are entitled to receive fees, costs, and
charges because only those creditors are parties to "agreements."
Because a comma appears after the phrase "interest on such
claim," the Court concluded that interest was allowable without
regard to whether the creditor held a consensual lien under
an
63 2
agreement, or a non-consensual lien without an agreement.
The Court argued that this analysis of the Bankruptcy Code's
grammatical structure 63 1 was the "natural reading,"' "plain language, "1635"3and "natural interpretation"636 of the statute. The Court
based its analysis on a plain meaning canon, which provides that:
[tihe plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in
the "rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will
produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its
628 See Sierra Summit, 490 U.S. at 854-57 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ.).
629 United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
63o Id. at 237.
631 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1994).
632 See Ron Pair,489 U.S. at 241-42.

63
634
635
636

Id.
Id. at 241.
Id. at 242.
Id. at 245.
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drafters.".. . In such cases, the intention of the drafters, rather
than the strict language, controls. 63 7
Ron Pairoffered a restrictive statement of the plain-meaning rule
and a sweeping rejection of both legislative history and pre-Code
practice.
The task of resolving the dispute over the meaning of § 506(b)
begins where all such inquiries must begin: with the language of
the statute itself.... In this case it is also where the inquiry

should end, for where, as here, the statute's language is plain,
"the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its
terms." . . . The language before us expresses Congress' intent
...
with sufficient precision so that reference to legislative his-

tory and to pre-Code practice is hardly necessary.'
Applying these interpretive directives, the Court concluded that
its plain meaning, grammatical analysis did "not conflict with any
other section of the Code, or with any important state or federal
interest; nor is a contrary view suggested by the legislative history."639 Again, note the Court's nod to competing state and federal interests.
The Court foreclosed any discussion of pre-Code practice with
the comment that:
Congress worked on the formulation of the Code for nearly a
decade. It was intended to modernize the bankruptcy laws,...
and as a result made significant changes in both the substantive
and procedural laws of bankruptcy ....

In such a substantial

overhaul of the system, it is not appropriate or realistic to expect Congress to have explained with particularity each step it
took. Rather, as long as the statutory scheme is coherent and
consistent, there generally is no need for a court to inquire beyond the plain language of the statute. 64
In an attempt to reconcile this interpretive approach with the
interpretive approach of recent cases, the Court argued that both
Midlantic64 1 and Kelly"42 had looked to pre-Code practice only because the language in those cases had been open to interpretation;
the literal application of the statute in those cases would have produced a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of the
drafters; the proposed plain meaning interpretations in those
cases would have placed bankruptcy law in clear conflict with
state or federal laws of great importance; and the pre-Code practice in those cases "reflected policy considerations of great longev637

Id. at 242-43.

638 Id. at 241 (citations omitted).
639

Id. at 243.

64o Id. at 240-41 (citations omitted).
641 Midlantic Natl Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
642

Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
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ity and importance." 64 3 In Ron Pair, in contrast, the majority
reasoned that the language was clear, the result was not at odds
with the drafters' intentions, and there were no important, conflicting state or federal laws. 6 "
Even though Ron Pairrejected pre-Code practice, the Court's
explanation confirms the trend seen in earlier cases of deference
to important, competing federal or state interests. The major
cases in which the Court has deferred to such interests have been
widely split decisions in which the Justices disagreed over the results and the reasoning.6 5
Four dissenting Justices argued that the language was not
clear, and that the majority had improperly abandoned the pre64 6
Code practice that the Court had established in Midlantic.
First, the dissenters castigated the majority's reliance on the
comma. They quoted Justice Frankfurter's classic statement that:
"[tihe notion that because the words of a statute are plain, its
meaning is also plain, is merely pernicious oversimplification. " "
Second, the dissenters argued that "Midlantic counsels
against inferring congressional intent to change pre-Code bankruptcy law."6 " According to the dissenters, even though the statutory language allowing abandonment was "unequivocal," "[tihe
rule of Midlantic is that bankruptcy statutes will not be deemed to
have changed pre-Code law unless there is some indication that
Congress thought that it was effecting such a change."6 "9 This excerpt suggests that these Justices expect Congress to indicate in
the legislative history that it is changing pre-Code law.
The proper application of the pre-Code canon, according to the
dissent, is for the Court to determine whether there was a preCode practice,6 5 ° then "look for some indicia that Congress knew it
was changing pre-Code law."65 ' Because the dissent found no evidence that Congress knew it was changing the pre-Code practice
of prohibiting interest on non-consensual claims, the dissent
See Ron Pair,489 U.S. at 245, 243-46.
Id. at 242; see also id. 246-49 (arguing that pre-Code practice was of little assistance anyway).
645 See, e.g., BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994); Midlantic, 474 U.S.
494 (1986).,
646 See Ron Pair,489 U.S. at 249 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall, & Stevens, JJ.).
647 Id. at 249 (quoting United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 431 (1943) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting)); see also id. at 249-51 (citing other Supreme Court cases that rejected simplistic, punctuation-based interpretations).
643
644

648
649
650

Id. at 251.
Id. at 252.
Id. at 253.

651 Id. at 254.
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would not have allowed a silent abrogation of this pre-Code
practice. 52
The dissenters, in essence, took a neutral view of the pre-Code
canon. They deemed it appropriate regardless of the nature of the
underlying bankruptcy issue. The majority, in contrast, viewed
the pre-Code canon as a device for allowing the Court to defer to
important non-bankruptcy interests. The majority distinguished
Ron Pair from Midlantic almost exclusively on the basis that
Midlantic involved a clash between bankruptcy law and an important state or federal law interest, whereas Ron Pairpresented no
such clash. 53 In Midlantic, the Court justified its deference to important non-bankruptcy interests by reasoning that pre-Code
practice had embodied such deference."s The Court followed this
same approach in the Kelly majority655 and the Davenport
dissent. 56
Justice Blackmun wrote the Ron Pairmajority, the Kelly majority, and the Davenport dissent. In the Ron Pair majority, he
suggested that deference to pre-Code practice would be appropriate not only when the Bankruptcy Code clashed with other state
or federal laws of great importance, but also when the Bankruptcy
Code's language was not clear. In practice, however, he embraced
the plain language when no conflicting laws were at stake (Ron
Pair), but rejected apparently plain language in favor of pre-Code
practice when important, conflicting laws were at stake and preCode practice justified deference to those conflicting laws (Kelly,
Davenport dissent). Similarly, the two textualist Justices who
joined Justice Blackmun's Ron Pairmajority opinion have virtually never found ambiguity except when the Bankruptcy Code
clashed with other law.657
Finally, in PioneerInvestment Services Co. v. Brunswick Asso658 the Court was asked to determine the
ciates Ltd. Partnership,
scope of the Bankruptcy Rule phrase "excusable neglect," for purposes of allowing the late filing of a claim. 5 9 Once again, the Justices disagreed over interpretive method.
652
653
654
655

Id.
See supra notes 643-44 and accompanying text.
See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 251-52 (1989).
See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986); supra notes 643-44 and accompanying

text.
656 See Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 564 (1990)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); supra notes 448-49 and accompanying text.
657 Compare Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 119 S. Ct. 1411, 1424 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Scalia, J.) (finding no
ambiguity in the complicated cramdown provisions that have led to multiple circuit splits
and three Supreme Court grants of certiorari); with BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511
U.S. 531 (1994) (per Scalia, J.) (deferring to state foreclosure law).
658 Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380 (1993).
659 Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(3) provides, in part, that "the court shall fix and for cause
shown may extend that time within which proofs of claim or interest may be filed." FED. R.
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With the assistance of a collegiate dictionary, the majority defined the "ordinary meaning" of the term "neglect" to include both
careless omissions caused by negligence within the party's control
and blameless omissions caused by intervening circumstances beyond the party's control.6 The Court supported this "flexible"
reading by reference to the policies underlying chapter 11, the
bankruptcy courts' broad equitable powers,66 ' the history of the
relevant bankruptcy rules,6 2 and a review of the parallel federal
rules.m
The Court then identified a list of equitable factors the Court
would consider to determine whether a party's neglect was "excusable." These factors encompassed not only the party's conduct,
but also the consequences of the delay in filing, such as prejudice
to the debtor and disruption of efficient judicial administration.'
The dissent argued that the majority had "replace[d] the
straightforward analysis commended by the language of Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1) with a balancing test."6 5 Bankruptcy Rule
9006 provides that a court "may" permit late filing if there is "excusable neglect."6 According to the dissent, this provision requires that the party first satisfy the threshold standard of
"excusable neglect." If this threshold has been satisfied, then the
67
court might or might not, in its discretion, allow the late filing. 6
Judicial discretion might include factors such as the consequences
of the delay." If, however, the threshold of excusable neglect has
not been satisfied, then the court has no basis for allowing the
filing, and the consequences of the delay are not relevant.
The dissent defined the phrase "excusable neglect" as a legal
term of art. It referred to a law dictionary, rather than a collegiate dictionary, to determine the accepted meaning of excusable
neglect. 91 It concluded that excusable neglect required that the
BANKR.P. 3003(c)(3). Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1) provides that "the court for cause shown

may at any time in its discretion ... on motion made after the expiration of the specified
period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect." FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(b)(1).
66o See Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 388 (citing WEBsTER's NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 791
(9th ed. 1983)).
661
662

Id. at 389.
Id. at 389-92.

663 Id. at 392-95.
6r4 Id. at 395, 397-98.
665 See Pioneer, 501 U.S. at 399 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, Souter, and
Thomas, JJ.); id. at 409 (arguing that the majority's conclusion was inconsistent with plain
language and judicial economy); id. at 399 (applying a "straightforward analysis," of the
.plain language," to discern "plain meaning"); id. at 403 (arguing that any other reading is
unnatural); id. at 404, 408 (applying plain language).
666 See FED. R. BANkeR. P. 9006(b)(1).
667 See Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 399 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
668

669

Id. at 399-402.
Id. at 402-03 (citing BLAcK's

LAW DICTIONARY

566 (6th ed. 1990)).
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party's actions be blameless. 7 ° Using reasoning parallel to the
pre-Code canon, the dissent adopted this meaning because Congress did not indicate its intent to depart from this established
meaning.6 7 '
Ron Pairand Pioneerare consistent with the pattern of cases
in which the Justices disagree over interpretive method. In each
case, the majority and dissent disagreed on what it means for statutory language to be plain, and on where to look for guidance concerning the meaning of the language. Because both of these cases
were decided by a deeply divided Court, interpreters should be
wary of relying too heavily on either case as a predictor of the
Court's interpretive method in bankruptcy cases. The Justices
clearly were not in accord on either the results or the interpretive
methods in these two cases. In Ron Pair, only five Justices accepted the majority's grammatical interpretation. Moreover,
although the Ron Pairmajority applied a "plain meaning" rule, it
based its holding on presumed legislative intent, not linguistic
meaning. Although the majority opinion did not rely upon preCode practice, its author, Justice Blackmun, has frequently relied
upon pre-Code practice to discern congressional intent, in appropriate cases. Consequently, Ron Pair can hardly be considered a
shining beacon of textualism.
The Pioneer majority also searched for congressional intent.
It found intent, however, by examining statutory language, policy,
equitable powers, and history. Although it is difficult to reconcile
Pioneer's flexible method with Ron Pair'srestrictive method, four
Justices (Rehnquist, White, Kennedy, and Blackmun) joined both
majority opinions. Justice O'Connor wrote both the pre-Code
practice oriented dissent in Ron Pair and the arguably more textual dissent in Pioneer. From an interpretive method perspective,
perhaps the most principled Justices in these cases were Justice
Stevens, who joined the more flexible opinion in each case, as we
would expect, and Justice Scalia, who joined the more textual
opinion in each case, as we would expect.
5.

Summary of the major split decisions

The interpretive approaches the Court applied in the major
split decisions should be discounted, to some degree, because the
Justices disagreed so strongly over interpretive method. These
cases, however, are extraordinarily important because they reveal
the parameters of the Justices' internecine disputes over interpretive method.
670
671

Id.
Id. at 403.
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The major split decisions reflect three distinct interpretive
patterns. First, the Justices split widely on constitutional questions. Secondly, the Justices split widely in cases in which the
Bankruptcy Code came into conflict with other federal or state
laws, particularly when those laws protect important governmental interests. In these cases, the Justices disagree among themselves concerning the interaction among three fundamental
interpretive guides: the plain meaning canon, the pre-Code practice canon, and the emerging "canon" of deference to important
federal or state laws or governmental interests.
Third, the major split cases that did not involve constitutional
questions or clashes with other law (i.e., Ron Pair and Pioneer)
continued the strong trend of cases in which the Justices disagreed over interpretive method, particularly concerning the
scope and application of the plain meaning rule.
Part IV examines each of these trends in greater detail.
IV.

INTERPRETIVE METHOD AND THE BANiRuPTcY CODE

Does the Court apply the same interpretive method in every
Bankruptcy Code case? The answer is "no." Nevertheless, the
Court's Bankruptcy Code decisions reveal several strong interpretive patterns. Part IV.A summarizes these patterns. Part JV.B
considers what these patterns suggest for interpreters, bankruptcy practitioners, bankruptcy judges, and scholars of interpretive theory.
A.

Patterns That Emerge From the Supreme Court's
Bankruptcy Code Decisions

Scholars of the Court's bankruptcy jurisprudence generally
agree that the Court has not demonstrated any particular bankruptcy ideology, nor much of a sense that it even understands or
cares about the Bankruptcy Code.6"2 Some have argued that the
Court's decisions are driven by results; 7 3 others have argued that
the decisions are driven by interpretive method, albeit an incoher67 4
ent method.
Scholars who have examined the Supreme Court's interpretive methods in bankruptcy cases have concluded either that the
See, e.g., Lawless, supra note 7, at 6; Tabb & Lawless, supra note 7, at 825, 827.
See, e.g., Lawless, supra note 7, at 6, 111; Tabb & Lawless, supra note 7, at 826;
Tabb, supra note 7, at 550-52, 556-58, 570-75.
674 See, e.g., BottreU, supra note 55, at 201 (arguing that the Court consistently uses
textualism); Cuevas, supra note 55, at 438; Weinsch, supra note 7, at 1832, 1839-51 (arguing that the Court applied textualism, retreated to pre-Code practice, then returned to
textualism)
672
673
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Court has shifted towards textualism, 675 has pulled away from textualism, 7 7 has employed no consistent, coherent interpretive
method, 7 or has employed whatever method allows the Court to
7
reach its desired result."
Critics have castigated the Court for
6
7
9
employing textualism; for failing to employ textualism;6s0 for ignoring congressional intent;68 1 and for failing to develop a coherent bankruptcy ideology.68 2
Although these studies may seem to be inconsistent, most are
accurate, as far as they go. They are limited, however, by two factors. First, they examine only limited groups of the Court's opinions.'
During any several-year period, the Court may, indeed,
have seemed to move toward or away from textualism or to apply
an incoherent interpretive method. Second, they focus only on the
interpretive methods the Court employed in its majority opinions.
In this comprehensive study of all of the Court's Bankruptcy
Code decisions, I have sought to determine the extent to which
interpretive method has been a driving force in the Supreme
Court's bankruptcy jurisprudence. This study was rooted in the
hypothesis that interpreters could learn at least as much, if not
675 See, e.g., Bottrell, supra note 55, at 201 (arguing that the Court consistently uses
textualism); Carroll, supra note 8, at 144-45, 212-15; Cuevas, supra note 55, at 438; Lawless, supra note 7, at 6; Tabb & Lawless, supra note 7, at 879-81; Rasmussen, supra note
50; Weinsch, supra note 7, at 1832, 1839-51 (arguing that the Court applied textualism,
retreated to pre-Code practice, then returned to textualism).
676 See, e.g., Lawless, supra note 7, at 110; Weinsch, supra note 7, at 1839-51.
677 See, e.g., Kelch, supra note 7, at 291, 293-300 ("[T]he discomfort felt concerning the
direction of bankruptcy jurisprudence in the Supreme Court results not from any one theory [of interpretation] propounded by the Court, but, rather, results from the lack of any
universal theory, plain-meaning or otherwise."); Klee & Merola, supra note 7, at 2; Lawless, supra note 7, at 91-95, 107-08; Rasmussen, supra note 50, at 553-64; Tabb, supra note
7, at 570-75.
678 See, e.g., Tabb, supra note 7, at 550-52 (describing the Court's bankruptcy opinions
as a microcosm of the justices' political leanings; arguing that the Court follows a hierarchy
of values, which are sometimes obscured by uneven rules of construction).
679 See, e.g., Cuevas, supra note 55, at 473-87; Cuevas, supra note 8; Kee & Merola,
supra note 7; Lam, supra note 8; Lawless, supra note 7, at 100-06; Tabb & Lawless, supra
note 7, at 827; Tabb, supra note 7, at 570-75.
680 See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 8, at 212-15; Kelch, supra note 7, at 291-92, 301-38;
Rasmussen, supra note 50. See also Botrell, supra note 55, at 201 (predicting that the
Court will construe all bankruptcy cases using textualism); Cuevas, supra note 55, at 44873, 487-93 (explaining when to use textualism); Weinsch, supranote 7, at 1854-62 (explaining why the Court uses textualism in bankruptcy cases).
681 See, e.g., Klee & Merola, supra note 7.
682 See, e.g., Klee & Merola, supra note 7, at 1; Lawless, supra note 7; Tabb & Lawless,
supra note 7, at 827, 881-85.
683 See, e.g., Botrell, supra note 55 (reviewing cases decided in 1991 and 1992); Carroll,
supra note 8 (reviewing cases decided between 1989 and 1992); Cuevas, supra note 55 (reviewing cases decided by the Rehnquist Court up to 1992); Klee & Merola, supra note 7
(reviewing cases decided between 1981 and 1987); Lawless, supra note 7 (reviewing cases
decided in the 1991 through 1995 Terms); Markell, supranote 7 (reviewing cases decided in
the 1990 through 1993 Terms); Tabb, supra note 7 (reviewing cases decided in the 1981
through 1986 Terms); Tabb & Lawless, supra note 7 (reviewing cases decided in the 1986
through 1990 Terms); Weinsch, supra note 7 (reviewing cases decided prior to 1992).
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more, about the Court's interpretive method by considering the
types of issues that caused the Justices to agree and disagree
among themselves, as they could learn by examining only the
Court's majority opinions. To test this hypothesis, this study focused not simply on the Court's majority opinions, but rather on
the extent to which disputes over interpretive method caused Justices to diverge from the majority and write separate concurring
or dissenting opinions.
This study has revealed several strong patterns woven
throughout the Court's bankruptcy decisions. These patterns
emerge when we examine the (i) varied interpretive tools and canons the majority, concurring, and dissenting Justices have employed in the Court's unanimous and split decisions (Part IV.A.1),
and (ii) patterns of disputes among the Justices (Part IV.A.2).
1.

Patterns that emerge from the Supreme Court's split
and non-split Bankruptcy Code decisions

The Court has decided forty-eight Bankruptcy Code cases.6 4
Seven presented constitutional or quasi-constitutional questions
(subpart L.a.). Of the remaining forty-one cases, fourteen were
unanimous (subpart 1.b.). In twenty of the twenty-seven nonunanimous cases, Justices wrote separately because they disagreed with the majority's interpretive method (subpart 1.c.).
Two of the seven remaining cases involved tensions between the
Bankruptcy Code and other law (subpart L.d.). Three involved
governmental claims or enforcement proceedings (subpart i.e.).
The final two cases presented disputes concerning the application
of the law to the facts (subpart 1.f.)
a.

The constitutional and quasi-constitutional question
cases

Seven of these cases involved constitutional or quasi-constitutional questions.6 5 These cases reveal nothing about 6the Court's
methods for interpreting the Bankruptcy Code, itself. 6
Interestingly, however, these cases represent an inordinately
large percentage of the Court's major split decisions. 6 7 Three of
the seven constitutional questions (43%) caused major splits
684 See Appendix I, post.
685 See Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300 (1995); Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S.
42 (1990); Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989); Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of
Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96 (1989); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982); United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992);
United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982). See also Appendices III, VI, post.
686 Whether one might discern in these opinions any insights concerning the Court's
views of the role of bankruptcy law in the constitutional scheme is beyond the scope of this
article.
687 See Appendix III, post.
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among the Justices. Five (71%) caused either minor or major
splits among the Justices. Six (86%) caused Justices to diverge
from the majority opinion (in dissenting or concurring opinions).
Only one of the seven cases resulted in a completely unanimous
opinion (14%) and only two resulted in opinions in which the Justices all agreed on the result (29%).
In contrast, of the forty-one non-constitutional cases, only six
(15%) caused major splits among the Justices. Only nineteen
(46%) caused either minor or major splits among the Justices.
Twenty-seven (66%) caused Justices to diverge from the majority
opinion. Fourteen of the forty-one non-constitutional cases resulted in unanimous opinions (34%), and twenty-two resulted in
6
opinions in which all of the Justices agreed on the result (54%).
In other words, the Justices disagreed among themselves
more widely when they considered bankruptcy-related constitutional questions than when they interpreted the Bankruptcy
Code.
b.

The unanimous cases

Of the forty-one non-constitutional cases, fourteen were unanimous. 89 The unanimous opinions appear to have employed three
distinct interpretive methods.
6 9°
All
Four of these cases relied only on the text of the statute.
four of these cases were decided after Justice Scalia joined the
Court, and three of these cases were written by the Court's leading textualists, Justices Scalia and Thomas. 9' In two of these four
cases, however, the Court primarily interpreted a statute other
than the Bankruptcy Code. 9 2 If these cases were excluded, only
two, unanimous, textualist Bankruptcy Code opinions would remain (one3 written by Justice Scalia, one written by Justice
69
Thomas).
688 See Appendix III, post.

Viewed another way, of the Court's fifteen unanimous Bankruptcy Code decisions, only
one presented a constitutional question (6.66%). Similarly, of the Court's nine unanimous
with concurrence cases, only one presented a constitutional question (11.11%). Thus, constitutional questions resulted in an aggregate of only two of the twenty-four non-split decisions (8.33%). Two of the fifteen minor splits presented constitutional questions (13.33%).
Three of the nine major splits presented constitutional questions (33.33%). Thus, constitutional questions resulted in an aggregate of five of the twenty-four split decisions (20.83%).
"g See Appendix III, post. Of the fifteen unanimous cases, one raised a constitutional
question. The other fourteen involved Bankruptcy Code interpretation questions.
690 See Citizens Bank v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16 (1995); Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464
(1993); Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 503 U.S. 47 (1992); Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32 (1991); see also supra Part III.B.3.b.
691 Justice Thomas wrote Rake and Holywell; Justice Scalia wrote Strumpf.
692 These are MCorp and Holywell.
693 These are Rake (per Thomas, J.) and Strumpf (per Scalia, J.).
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Ten of the fourteen unanimous opinions relied upon more
than the text. Five of these opinions relied upon the text, structure, and history.69 4 The Court decided one of these cases before
Justice Scalia joined the Court, and four after he joined the
Court.69 5 The other five cases deferred to pre-Code practice.6 96
The Court decided one of these cases before Justice Scalia joined
the Court, and four after he joined the Court.69 7
Even if one argued that some of these ten cases were "primarily" textual, and that analysis of "structure" is a holistic way of
considering the text, references to history (whether legislative history or broad pre-Code history) remove these cases from the textual fold. Moreover, many of these cases considered structure in a
substantive way, which included the broad design, object, and policy of the statute. These cannot be categorized together with the
narrow, linguistic, holistic analysis favored by textualists.
Viewed from the perspective of the Court's unanimous cases,
the much-discussed trend toward textualism is weak, at best.
Although Justices Scalia and Thomas clearly favor textualism,6 9 8
textualism rarely draws unanimous support among the Justices.
Instead, the unanimous opinions identify three basic elements of Bankruptcy Code interpretation - the text, structure
(linguistic and substantive), and history (including legislative history, broad history, and pre-Code practice). None of these fourteen unanimous cases, however, applied a canon of deference to
important federal, state, or governmental interests. Cases involving such interests tend to create rifts among the Justices.
Because the unanimous cases provide little guidance concerning when the Court will chose one interpretive method over another, we next consider whether disputes among the Justices
provide any insight into this question.

694 See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998); Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Fink, 522
U.S. 211 (1998); Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991); Grogan v. Garner, 498
U.S. 279 (1991); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985);
see supra Parts III.B.3.c, III.B.2.
695 The Court decided Weintraub before Justice Scalia joined the Court, and
Kawaauhau, Fink, Johnson, and Grogan after Justice Scalia joined the Court.
696 See Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213 (1998); United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535
(1996); Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988); United Sav. Ass'n v.
Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988); United States v. Whiting
Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983); see supra Parts III.B.2, III.B.3.d.
697 The Court decided Whiting Pools before Justice Scalia joined the Court, and Cohen,
Noland, Ahlers and Timbers after Justice Scalia joined the Court.
698 See Appendix VI, post; Appendix VII, post; infra Part IV.Al.c.2, IV.A.2.
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The interpretive dispute cases

In the twenty-seven remaining non-constitutional, non-unanimous cases, one or more Justices wrote a separate opinion.699 Disagreements among the Justices over interpretive method caused
the separate opinions in at least twenty of these twenty-seven
cases, that is, seventy-four percent of the cases in which one or
more Justices wrote a separate opinion. 7 00 The conclusion that interpretive method lies at the heart of disputes among the Justices
in Bankruptcy Code cases is inescapable.
Interestingly, before Justice Scalia joined the Court, only two
Bankruptcy Code cases were decided in which a Justice wrote separately to criticize the majority's interpretive method. 70 1 After
Justice Scalia joined the Court, Justices wrote separately to criticize the majority's interpretive methods in at least eighteen of the
Court's forty bankruptcy cases.70 2
What do these cases tell us, if anything, about the Court's interpretive method?
699 In eight of these cases, one or more justices concurred; in nineteen, one of more
justices dissented. See Appendix III, post.
700 See Bank of America Natl Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership,
119 S. Ct. 1411 (1999); Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997); Things
Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124 (1995); BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511
U.S. 531 (1994); Nobelman v. American Say. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993); Pioneer Inv. Servs.
Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380 (1993); Barnhill v. Johnson, 503
U.S. 393 (1992); Connecticut Natl Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992); Dewsnup v.
Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992); Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992); Taylor v. Freeland
& Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992); Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305 (1991); Toibb v. Radloff, 501
U.S. 157 (1991); Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151 (1991); Begier v. Internal Revenue
Serv., 496 U.S. 53 (1990); Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552
(1990); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989); Kelly v. Robinson, 479
U.S. 36 (1986); Midlantic Natl Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494
(1986); Central Trust Co. v. Official Creditors' Comm. of Geiger Enters., Inc., 454 U.S. 354
(1982).
The separate opinions in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 456 U.S. 513 (1984) also arguably apply different interpretive methods; however, the foregoing list is limited to those
cases in which the separate opinions clearly reflect interpretive disputes.
701 See Midlantic Natl Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494
(1986); Central Trust Co. v. Official Creditors' Comm. of Geiger Enters., Inc., 454 U.S. 354
(1982).
702 The pre-Justice Scalia interpretive disputes represent 25% of the cases decided
before Justice Scalia joined the Court. The interpretive dispute cases decided after Justice
Scalia joined the Court represent 45% of the cases decided after Justice Scalia joined the
Court. If we exclude the constitutional cases from this calculation, we discover that justices wrote separately because of disputes over interpretative method in six of the eight
non-constitutional concurrences (75%), and six of the seven non-constitutional concurrences after Justice Scalia joined the Court (85.7%). Similarly, justices wrote separately
because of interpretive disputes in fourteen of the nineteen aggregate non-constitutional
dissents (74.7%), and twelve of the sixteen non-constitutional dissents after Justice Scalia
joined the Court (75%), and two of the three non-constitutional dissents before Justice
Scalia joined the Court (66.7%). See Appendix III, post.
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1. The Justices care about method
First, the Court's Bankruptcy Code cases reveal that the Justices care about interpretive method. This observation is clear
from the large numbers of separate opinions in which the Justices
criticize the majority's interpretive methods. It is highlighted
when individual Justices struggle to define a coherent interpretive
method for the Bankruptcy Code, °3 and lament that other Justices' opinions impair interpretive coherence.704 Justices Blackmun, Scalia, Stevens, Thomas, and O'Connor have more actively
sought to define a desirable Bankruptcy Code interpretive method
than have the other Justices. °5
The problem is not that the Justices have no interest in employing a consistent interpretive method. They likely would prefer nothing more. The Justices are not bankruptcy experts and
show little desire to become bankruptcy experts. They are forced
to review bankruptcy cases because there is no other forum for
resolving splits among the circuit courts of appeal. These splits,
which are the single largest source of Supreme Court bankruptcy
cases, often arise from the circuit courts' use of conflicting interpretive methods." 6 Although bankruptcy experts might prefer
that the Court take a substantive, policy-oriented view of the
Bankruptcy Code, the Court likely would prefer simply to view the
Bankruptcy Code as a statute subject to accepted interpretive
rules. Many of the Justices are striving to achieve just this goal.
The analysis in Part III of this article reveals that most of the
Justices decide bankruptcy cases based upon principles of statutory interpretation, rather than substantive bankruptcy policy.
The problem is that the Justices disagree among themselves concerning what those interpretive rules should be.
703 See, e.g., Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 119 S. Ct. 1411, 1424 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Scalia, J.) (quoted
supra text accompanying note 542); Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 419-20 (1992) (per
Blackmun, J.) (quoted supra text accompanying notes 487-88); Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417,
433-34 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoted supra text accompanying note 504); Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 565 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by O'Connor, J.) (quoted supra text accompanying note 448); United States
v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-43 (1989) (per Blackmun, J.) (quoted supra text
accompanying notes 637-40); Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 249-54 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(quoted supra text accompanying notes 647-51).
704 See, e.g., LaSalle, 119 S. Ct. at 1424 (Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Scalia, J.)
(quoted supra text accompanying note 542; criticizing the majority's interpretive method);
Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 422-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoted supratext accompanying notes
498-99; castigating the Court for applying a "one-subsection-at-a-time" approach); Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 766 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoted supra text accompanying note 322; castigating the Court for applying divergent interpretive methods);
Davenport,495 U.S. at 565 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by O'Connor, J.) (quoted supra
text accompanying note 448, criticizing the Court's interpretive method).
705 See supra notes 703, 704.
706 See Appendix II, post; see, e.g., Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992).
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The Justices have been unable to convince each other of the
wisdom of their varied interpretive approaches. Let us consider
the status of the Justices' efforts to define the parameters of the
three interpretive elements identified in the unanimous opinions:
text, structure, and history.
2. The statutory text
All of the Justices agree that, in some cases, the text alone
answers the interpretive question. Different Justices, however,
hold different views concerning when the text alone is
determinative. °7
As previously noted, the Court issued four unanimous textual
opinions. 0 8 Appendix VI reveals that, in eleven other cases, the
Court issued a primarily textual majority opinion, but one or more
Justices responded with a separate, non-textual concurrence or
dissent. 0 9 In other words, the Court decided fifteen of its fortyone non-constitutional cases by textual opinions (37%) and
twenty-six by non-textual opinions (63%). In eight of the fifteen
textual opinions, either Justice Scalia or Justice Thomas wrote
the majority opinion.71 ° Justice Blackmun wrote two of the seven
remaining textual majority opinions. 711 No other Justice wrote

more than one textual majority opinion.712
In eight of the twenty-six cases decided by non-textual majority opinions (31%), one or more Justices wrote a textual concurrence or dissent.713 Justice Scalia wrote four of these separate,
See Appendix VI, post; Appendix VII, post.
See supra note 690.
See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997); Things
Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124 (1995); Nobelman v. American Sav. Bank, 508
U.S. 324 (1993); Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393 (1992); Connecticut Natl Bank v.
Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992); Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992); Owen v.
Owen, 500 U.S. 305 (1991); Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991); Pennsylvania Dep't of
Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc.,
489 U.S. 235 (1989); Central Trust Co. v. Official Creditors' Comm. of Geiger Enters., Inc.,
454 U.S. 354 (1982); see also Appendix VI, post; Appendix VII, post.
710 See Citizens Bank v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16 (1995) (per Scalia, J.); Things
Remembered, 516 U.S. 124 (per Thomas, J.); Nobelman, 508 U.S. 324 (per Thomas, J.);
Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464 (1993) (per Thomas, J.); Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (per Thomas,
J.); Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 503 U.S. 47 (1992) (per Thomas, J.); Taylor, 503 U.S. 638 (per
Thomas, J.); Owen, 500 U.S. 305 (per Scalia, J.).
711 See Toibb, 501 U.S. 157; Ron Pair,489 U.S. 235.
712 See Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (per Ginsburg, J.); Barnhill, 503 U.S. 393 (per Rehnquist,
C.J.); Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32 (1991) (per
Stevens, J.); Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (per Marshall, J.); Geiger,454 U.S. 354 (per curiam).
713 See Bank of America Natl Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership,
119 S. Ct. 1411 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring joined by Scalia, J.); United States v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 215 n.t, 229 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part; Scalia, J., declining to join part of the opinion);
Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 399 (1993)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, Souter, & Thomas, JJ.); Dewsnup v. Timm, 502
U.S. 410, 420 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Souter, J.); Patterson v. Shumate, 504
707
708
709
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textual opinions (one of which Justice Souter joined), Justice
Thomas wrote two (one of which Justice Scalia joined), Justice
O'Connor wrote one (which Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Souter
joined), and Justice Marshall wrote one (which Justice Stevens
joined).1
These cases reflect a substantial number of textual majority
opinions and separate opinions, despite the very limited numbers
of bankruptcy cases in which the Justices have unanimously applied textual interpretation. These cases also confirm that Justices Scalia and Thomas have written most of the textual opinions,
and that textual interpretation has significantly impaired the
Court's ability to reach accord in bankruptcy cases.
Three issues drive the Justices' disputes concerning the application of textual interpretation. First, what degree of inexactitude
is required to trigger consultation of sources other than the text?
Will the Court limit its inquiry to the text if the language is clear,
unambiguous, plain, free of a scrivener's error, or consistent with
the drafters' intent? Second, how does the Court determine
whether the language is, in fact, plain (or unambiguous, et
cetera)? Third, if the language meets whatever clarity test the
Court applies, is the interpreter prohibited from looking beyond
the text, discouraged from looking beyond the text, or encouraged
to look beyond the text but cautioned that little weight will be
given to sources that contradict the text?
Let us consider how the interpretive guidelines advocated by
different Justices answer these three questions.
First, the formalists search for the meaning of the text rather
than the intentions of the drafters. Consistent with this narrow
focus, they employ interpretive rules that are designed to squeeze
as much meaning as possible from the words, in order to obviate
any need to look beyond the words. They prohibit interpreters
from considering sources other than the text unless the text is ambiguous, they require a high level of ambiguity, and they rarely
find ambiguity. More specifically, Justice Thomas employs a prohibitive test. He will not look beyond the language if the language
is "clear" or "unambiguous."715 Justice Scalia also employs a proU.S. 753, 766 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring); Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 163 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring); Begier v. Internal Revenue Serv., 496 U.S. 53, 67 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 53 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by
Stevens, J.)
BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994), is excluded because, although both
the majority and dissent claim to have applied plain meaning, each considered sources
other than the text. See supra notes 606-23.
714 See supra note 713.
715 See, e.g., Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464, 471 (1993) (per Thomas, J.) (reasoning that, if
the language is clear, the courts' sole function is to enforce the text); Connecticut Nat'l
Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992) (reasoning that, if the language is unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete). See also Central Trust Co. v. Official Creditors' Comm. of
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hibitive test. He will not look beyond the language unless there is
a "scrivener's error" that produces "an absurd result."7 1 Justice
Scalia's test, on its face, appears to be more restrictive than Justice Thomas's test. 717 Justices Thomas and Scalia are far less willing to find ambiguity than are the other Justices.718
Second, at the other end of the spectrum, Justice Stevens
searches for congressional intent or statutory purpose. To ensure
that the apparent meaning of the text accurately conveys such intents or purposes, he encourages the Court to consider sources
719
other than the text if the statute contains "some uncertainty."
He will find "sufficient ambiguity" to consult sources other than
the text 720 far more readily than will Justices Thomas and Scalia.
Moreover, Justice Stevens seems to advocate a permissive test
under which the Court may consult non-textual sources even
when the language is "plain." In those cases, however, the party
encouraging the Court to adopt a meaning contrary to the plain
text will carry an "exceptionally heavy" burden.72 '

The other Justice's views lay somewhere between these two
extremes. Like Justice Stevens, they generally claim to be searching for congressional intent or statutory purpose. They are more
willing than Justice Stevens, however, to apply a plain meaning
rule. Such a rule presumes that the plain text accurately conveys
Congress's intent and prohibits examination of other sources if the
language is plain. Nevertheless, they are more reluctant than
Justices Thomas and Scalia to find (or force) a "plain" meaning
when the language is the subject of serious dispute (among the
Justices, the advocates, or the lower courts). Some of the Justices
are particularly reluctant to find plain meaning to be determinative if the text conflicts with established judicial practices. ConseGeiger Enters., Inc., 454 U.S. 354, 359-60 (1982) (per curiam) (reasoning that, if the language is plain, the courts' sole function is to enforce the text).
716 See Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 163 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
717 This test seems to require more than mere ambiguity. It clearly requires more than
merely "some uncertainty." Cf infra note 719.
718 See, e.g., Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 119 S. Ct. 1411, 1426 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Scalia, J.) (finding the
language to be plain even though the new value question has caused wide splits among the
circuit courts, the Court has granted certiorari in three new value cases, and the Court has
never definitively resolved the new value question).
719 See Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 255 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) (urging the Court to consider legislative history whenever there is "some uncertainty" about the meaning).
720 See Nobelman v. American Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 332 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring) (consulting legislative history to resolve a textual anomaly); Toibb v. Radloff, 501
U.S. 157, 167 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the use of the word "only" introduced "sufficient ambiguity" to look beyond the text); Central Trust Co. v. Official Creditors' Comm. of Geiger Enters., Inc., 454 U.S. 354, 360 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
721 See Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 155-56 (1991); see also Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 760-65 (1992) (per Blackmun, J.) (applying the Wolas "heavy burden"
test).
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quently, the Court's opinions that rely solely upon the Bankruptcy
Code's text typically are the product of a voting block comprising
the two textualist Justices, who rarely look beyond the text, and
several legal process Justices, who embrace a plain meaning rule
in their search for intent or purpose. For example, three of the
sitting Justices (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Kennedy) joined the textual opinion in United States v. Ron Pair
Enterprises, Inc.72 2 The late Justice Blackmun wrote Ron Pair.
Justice White, who also joined the Ron Pairmajority, is no longer
on the Court. Arguably, the three remaining Ron Pair majority
Justices together with Justice Thomas (who later joined the
Court) create a textualist block that would prohibit the Court from
looking beyond the text except in the "rare" case in which "literal"
application of the language will produce a result "demonstrably at
odds with the intentions of its drafters."723 Justice Blackmun,
however, also wrote decidedly non-textual opinions, including two
of the Court's strongest pre-Code practice opinions,2 one of which
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy also joined.72 5
These opinions urge the Court to be chary of finding the text to be
plain if the text seems to be inconsistent with established prior
practices or policies. Notice that Justice Blackmun's "demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters" test in Ron Pair is
not a textualist interpretive device; rather, it is device for discerning congressional intent. Cases such as this reflect that, although
all of the Justices have joined or written a "textual" opinion, the
non-textualist Justices (i.e., all of the sitting Justices except Justices Scalia and Thomas) typically have done so only when they
are convinced that the plain meaning accurately embodies Congress's intent.
Similar incongruous results appear when we consider which
Justices joined textual and non-textual opinions in other cases.
For example, five Justices joined both the heavily pre-Code majority in Kelly v. Robinson, in which the Court deferred to state criminal restitution proceedings, and the anti-pre-Code majority in
PennsylvaniaDepartmentof Public Welfare v. Davenport,in which
the Court declined to defer to such proceedings. 2 6
United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
Id. at 240-45.
724 See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992) (per Blackmun, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J., & Kennedy, O'Connor, Stevens, & White, JJ.); Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v.
Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 564-74 (1990) (Blackmun, J. dissenting, joined by O'Connor, J.);
see also Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 760-65 (1992) (per Blackmun, J.) (applying the
Wolas "heavy burden" test).
725 See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. 410.
726 See Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990); Kelly v.
Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Brennan, Scalia, and
White joined the majority opinions in both Kelly and Davenport. See supra note 447.
722
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The import of these cases is unclear. Perhaps the incongruity
arises simply because cases that implicate pre-Code law or tensions between the Bankruptcy Code and other law present more
difficult interpretive issues. The Justices' comments on interpretive method often address the relationship between the plain
meaning canon and the pre-Code canon.72 7 Perhaps a solid core of
Justices (i.e., Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Stevens, and, perhaps
to a lesser extent, Blackmun and O'Connor) care more about interpretive method than do the other Justices. Perhaps the other Justices are more willing to join an opinion if they agree with the
result, even if they do not agree with the method. If this latter
supposition is true, however, it is not clear what criteria those
Justices use to determine that the result is correct, if the criteria
is not that the Court applied the proper interpretive method.
Although many of the Court's textual bankruptcy opinions
embrace the prohibitive test of the standard plain meaning rule,
other opinions shy from this rule in favor of two alternatives. The
first allows the Court to consult other sources, but subjects the
parties to a heavy burden to demonstrate that Congress intended
a result other than the result the language suggests. The second,
which presents the greatest area of discord, urges the Court to be
wary of finding the language to be plain if the language conflicts
with prior practice. Parts IV.A.1.c.4 and IV.A.I.d examine the relationship between the plain meaning rule and the pre-Code
canon.
3.

Structure and policy

The Court's holistic (or structural) canons contain both linguistic and substantive components. Both components urge interpreters to examine the entire statute to determine the meaning of
a particular phrase. Structural analysis presents an intriguing
challenge for textualists because it considers only internal sources
of meaning - i.e., the words of the statute. Its broad examination
of the text, however, raises questions concerning how internal,
textual "meaning" should be defined. Textualists argue that interpreters should not consult sources external to the statute (such as
legislative history) to discern congressional intent or statutory
purpose because only the enacted text is law. External sources,
therefore, are not democratically legitimate sources of meaning.
Because structural analysis consults only internal sources of
meaning, it obviates this concern. Structural analysis is a critical
aspect of interpretation that holds great promise for reconciling
727 See, e.g., Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417-20 (1992) (per Blackmun, J.); Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 565 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-43 (1989) (per
Blackmun, J.).
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the tension between "text" and "policy," particularly in the context
of a comprehensive statute such as the Bankruptcy Code. To date,
however, structural analysis has received inadequate attention in
the modern interpretative debate.
The linguistic component urges the Court to read words to
mean the same thing throughout the Bankruptcy Code. 72" When
Justice Thomas engages in holistic analysis, he focuses primarily
on this aspect of holistic interpretation.7 " This is consistent with
a formalist search for textual meaning.
The substantive component contains two elements. The narrower element encourages the Court to consider the substantive
effect, rather than just the language, of related Bankruptcy Code
provisions.730 Justice Scalia has employed this aspect of holistic
interpretation as well as the linguistic aspect of holistic
interpretation.7 3 '
Second, the broader element of the substantive holistic canon
encourages the Court to interpret the language in light of the
Bankruptcy Code's broader design, object, and policy.7 32 These
two components of the substantive holistic canon suggest that different levels of generality (i.e., the meaning or purpose of the section, the related group of sections, and the Bankruptcy Code as a
whole) are important and should be harmonized.
The broader aspect of the substantive holistic canon also suggests that "policy" or "purpose" is an integral part of the statute
and that the contraposition of "text" and "policy" is a false dichotomy. The question is not whether to consider policy, but rather,
where to find it. The canon suggests that the structure of the statute will reveal its purposes and policies, even if the text does not
expressly state those policies. Consequently, interpreters need
not consult "external" sources, such as legislative history, to identify a statute's policies. Justices Thomas and Scalia have not advocated
this type of holistic analysis. Justice Stevens, however,
733
has.
For example, consider the effect of a rule that instructs interpreters to apply the Bankruptcy Code's text but prohibits them
from applying unexpressed "policies." One might argue that such
a rule prohibits the Court from considering the Bankruptcy Code's
728 See, e.g., Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 220 (1998); Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464,
474-75 (1993); Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 420-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Patterson v. Shumate,
504 U.S. 753, 758 (1992).
729 See, e.g., Rake, 508 U.S. at 474-75.
730 See, e.g., Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 288 n.13 (1991); United Say. Ass'n v.
Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988).
731 See, e.g., Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 420 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Patterson,504 U.S. at
766 (Scalia, J., concurring); Timbers, 484 U.S. 365.
732 See Grogan, 498 U.S. at 287 n.13.
733 Id.
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policies of rehabilitation or equitable distribution. These policies,
however, reveal themselves throughout the language, structure,
and design of the Bankruptcy Code, although they are never expressly stated.
When an interpreter considers the discharge provisions or the
very existence of chapter 11, how can she help but see the fresh
start policy at work? The difference between saying that (i) the
text grants certain debtors a discharge, (ii) the text reveals a congressional intent to grant certain debtors a discharge or fresh
start, (iii) the purpose of the discharge is to grant certain debtors a
discharge or fresh start, and (iv) the Bankruptcy Code embodies a
fresh start "policy," is semantic. The same reasoning applies to
the "policy" of rehabilitating business debtors (expressed in the
structure of chapter 11), the "policy" of equitable distribution (expressed in the automatic stay, avoidance powers, distribution provisions, et cetera), and the "policy" of maximizing value (expressed
in avoidance powers, executory contract powers, turnover provisions, et cetera). Of course each of these "policies" is subject to
limitations; but those limitations are also found in the Bankruptcy
Code's text and structure, such as the provisions prohibiting the
discharge of the
debtor and of various debts in specified
34
circumstances.
Consequently, to argue that interpreters may only consult the
text and may not consider policy is incongruous. The Bankruptcy
Code's policies reveal themselves to anyone who reads the Bankruptcy Code's text and listens closely enough to hear its music.
Although bankruptcy experts intrinsically understand how the
complicated provisions of the Bankruptcy Code interact, the
Supreme Court understands this interaction only when bankruptcy experts clearly explain it to the Court in each case. Absent
such an explanation, the Court may be able to locate the use of
similar terms throughout the Bankruptcy Code, but bankruptcy
experts cannot expect the Court to employ thoughtful, substantive, structural analysis.
734 For example, the existence of chapter 11 signifies a policy of promoting reorganization. Preference avoidance maximizes the estate and fosters equitable distribution. The
assumption and rejection of executory contracts fosters reorganization; assumption and assignment preserve value. Provisions on obtaining credit foster reorganization. The automatic stay fosters the fresh start and reorganization, gives the debtor a breathing spell,
and prevents a race to the courthouse. Discharge fosters the fresh start, but the exceptions
to discharge limit the fresh start to the debtors Congress has deemed unworthy of a fresh
start, for policy reasons. Indeed, the overarching bankruptcy policies are so integrated
throughout the Bankruptcy Code that it is virtually impossible to identify a single section
of the Bankruptcy Code that does not "implement" one or more of these policies. The Bankruptcy Code reflects numerous other, more specific policies, as well. For example, the priority provisions reflect congressional policy determinations to favor certain debts (such as
child support) over others.
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History, including legislative history and preCode practice

The Court's Bankruptcy Code opinions refer to two distinct
aspects of the statute's history: legislative history, and broader
Bankruptcy Code history. This broader history includes "preCode practice" and the development of bankruptcy doctrine over
time.
(a)

Legislative history

A large number of the Court's decisions have referred to legislative history, at least in passing.7 35 Very few opinions, however,
have engaged in a lengthy and pivotal analysis of legislative history. 3 6 In bankruptcy cases, the Court generally prefers to engage
in a tracing of the historical development of bankruptcy doctrines
(through broad history and pre-Code practice) rather than to rely
upon isolated statements in the legislative history.73 7
Not surprisingly, Justice Scalia has written concurring opinions objecting to the use of legislative history in Bankruptcy Code
interpretation. These opinions, however, found no joiners.73 s Justice Stevens tends to consult legislative history to confirm textual
meaning even when other Justices find no need to consult sources
other than the text. He wrote one concurring opinion objecting to
the Court's failure to examine legislative history, but this concurrence went without joiners.7 39
Disputes over legislative history have not created the level of
histrionics typically seen in other fields of law. In the bankruptcy
context, at least, the tension between text and pre-Code practice
735 See, e.g., United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 539 (1996); Patterson v. Shumate,
504 U.S. 753, 760-62 & n.4 (1992); Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991); Johnson v.
Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 85-87 (1991); Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 156-60
(1991); Begier v. Internal Revenue Serv., 496 U.S. 53, 57, 59 n.3, 61, 63-67 (1990); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 350-52 (1985); Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 279 n.3, 280 & nn.6-8 (1985); NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513,
522 n.6 (1984); United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 204-05, 207-09 (1983);
Central Trust Co. v. Official Creditors' Comm. of Geiger Enters., Inc., 454 U.S. 354, 355-56
(1982). In several other cases, the Court considered but rejected appeals to legislative history because the history did not support the parties' arguments, or was inconsistent with
the text and broader history. See, e.g., Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N.
LaSalle St. Partnership, 119 S. Ct. 1411,1421 n.25 (1999); Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Fink,
522 U.S. 211, 218-21 (1998); Noland, 517 U.S. 542; United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood
Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 380 (1988); cf United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc.,
489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (stating that consultation of legislative history was "hardly
necessary").
736 But see Begier, 496 U.S. 53 (consulting the legislative history of the Bankruptcy
Code and Internal Revenue Code).
737 See, e.g., supra Part Ill.B.3.c, d; infra Part IV.A.4.b.
738 See, e.g., Wolas, 502 U.S. at 163 (Scalia, J., concurring); Begier, 496 U.S. at 67
(Scalia, J, concurring).
739 See, e.g., Nobleman v. American Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 332 (1993) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
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has apparently surpassed the tension between text and legislative
history as a flash point for interpretive disputes among the
Justices.
(b)

Broad history and pre-Code practice

Broad history and pre-Code practice play a significant role in
Bankruptcy Code interpretation.
In a significant number of the Court's non-constitutional
bankruptcy opinions, the Court considered the broad history of the
Bankruptcy Code provisions in issue, but did not expressly refer
or defer to pre-Code practice.7 4 ° In these cases, the Court typically
examined prior law, amendments, and judicial interpretations,
and considered how the relevant bankruptcy doctrine had developed over time.
In approximately one-fourth of the Court's non-constitutional
Bankruptcy Code cases, the Court expressly considered pre-Code
practice as part of its review of the Bankruptcy Code's history.74 1
Five of these were unanimous decisions.7 4 In addition, in two
cases in which the Court did not defer to pre-Code practice, dissenters argued that Court should have deferred to pre-Code
practice.743
Broad history and pre-Code practice appear to exist on a continuum of the same line of interpretive inquiry. An interpreter
examines both as part of a progression that considers the provisions of prior law (either the Bankruptcy Act or prior versions of
the Bankruptcy Code), judicial interpretations of those provisions,
judicial doctrines created to fill gaps in prior law, prior congressional action (including enactment of the Bankruptcy Code and of
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code), and judicial interpretations of the Bankruptcy Code.
740 See, e.g., Fidelity Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Fink, 522 U.S. 211 (1998); Field v. Mans, 516
U.S. 59 (1995); Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992); Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279
(1991); Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991).
741 See Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership,
119 S. Ct. 1411, 1417-19 (1999) (dictum); Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 221 (1998);
United States v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 221 (1996);
United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 539 (1996); Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417-20
(1992); Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 202-05 (1988); United Sav.
Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988); Kelly v. Robinson, 479
U.S. 36, 44-49 (1986); Midlantic Natl Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474
U.S. 494, 501 (1986); United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 208 (1983).
742 See Cohen, 523 U.S. 213; Noland, 517 U.S. 535; Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197; Timbers, 484
U.S. 365; Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. 198.
743 See Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 565 (1990)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 249-55
(1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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The Justices disagree, however, concerning whether and
when the Court should consult broad history or pre-Code law. 7 "
These disputes are particularly evident in tensions between the
plain meaning canon and pre-Code practice. Some Justices discount the text if the text seems to be inconsistent with pre-Code
practice and Congress has not expressly stated in the legislative
history that it intended to alter pre-Code practice.7 45 Others consider pre-Code practice only if the text contains a gap or
ambiguity.7 4 6
For example, in Kelly v. Robinson,74 7 the Court relied upon
pre-Code practice to defer to state criminal processes.7 48 In contrast, in Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v. Davenport749 the Court embraced the same pre-Code canon that it had
applied in Kelly, but concluded that Congress had, indeed, evinced
in the language an intent to alter the pre-Code practice of deference to state criminal processes. 750 Both cases were decided over
strident dissents.75 1
Similarly, in Dewsnup v. Timm,7 52 the majority rejected a
seemingly "plain" textual meaning because that meaning conflicted with pre-Code practice, and Congress had not clearly
evinced an intent to change pre-Code practice.7 53 The Dewsnup
dissent castigated the Court for deferring to pre-Code practice
when the text was clear.5
These disputes have left the lower courts without adequate
guidance concerning the Court's perspective on pre-Code practice.
A striking demonstration of this confusion occurred in 1991 in the
Fifth Circuit case of Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Company v.
Greystone III Joint Venture (In re Greystone III Joint Venture). 5 5
In Greystone, the court was asked to consider whether the socalled "new value exception" to the "absolute priority rule" had
survived the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code.7 56 When Con744 A comprehensive analysis of the Court's approach to pre-Code practice is beyond
the scope of this article.
745 See, e.g., Dewsnup, 502 U.S. 410 (per Blackmun, J.); Davenport, 495 U.S. at 565
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); Ron Pair,489 U.S. at 249-55 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
746 See, e.g., LaSalle, 119 S. Ct. at 1424 (Thomas, J., concurring); Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at
420 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
747 Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
748 Id.
749 Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990).
750 Id.
751 See Davenport, 495 U.S. at 564 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Kelly, 479 U.S. at 53
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
752 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992).
753 Id.
754 Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 420 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
755 Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone III Joint Venture (In re Greystone III
Joint Venture), 995 F.2d 1274 (1991), modified on reh'g, 995 F.2d 1284 (5th Cir. 1992).
756 For a discussion of absolute priority and the new value exception, see supra notes
236-48, 520-34 and accompanying text.
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gress enacted the Bankruptcy Code, it modified the absolute priority rule, but made no express mention of the exception. In an
opinion that relied on a perceived trend toward textualism in the
Supreme Court,75 7 the Fifth Circuit held that "[n]either in the
Code's language, nor in the context of a previous, different reorganization law, nor in legislative history, nor in policy is there
to the absolute priority rule now
room for a 'new value exception'
"75
defined by § 1129(b)(2)(B). 8
Less than two months later, however, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Dewsnup,7 5 9 which relied heavily on pre-Code
practice. Within forty-three days after the Court issued Dewsnup,
the Fifth Circuit had received a petition for rehearing, granted it,
and issued a terse withdrawal of the portion of its Greystone opinion that had resolved the absolute priority question. 7v " Although
the Fifth Circuit did not expressly state the reason for withdrawing the opinion, Judge Jones, the author of the original opinion,
identified Dewsnup as the culprit in her dissent from the rehearing. 761 She noted that:
[hiow one should approach issues of a statutory construction
arising from the Bankruptcy Code has been clouded, in my view,
by Dewsnup v. Timm [citation omitted]. Nevertheless, in reaffirming what I wrote about the "new value exception" in Part IV
of the original opinion, and therefore in voting against a rehearing, I would hope to stand with Galileo, who, rebuffed by a
under his breath, "Eppur
higher temporal authority, muttered
76 2
si muove." ("And yet it moves.").
Eight years later, Justices Scalia and Thomas commented on
Greystone in their concurrence in Bank of America National Trust
& Savings Ass'n v. 203 North LaSalle Street Partnership.71 They
noted that the interpretive confusion created by Dewsnup apparently had prompted the Fifth Circuit to withdraw its decision on
interpretive
the new value issue, and argued that the 7majority's
64
method in LaSalle "only thickens the fog."
757 See Greystone, 948 F.2d at 1281-84 (original opinion prior to modification on rehearing) (issued November 19, 1991).
758 Id. at 1284.
759 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992) (issued January 15, 1992).
76o Greystone, 995 F.2d 1274, modified on reh'g, 995 F.2d at 1284 ("In withdrawing this
portion of the panel opinion we emphasize that the bankruptcy court's opinion on the 'new
value exception' to the absolute priority rule has been vacated and we express no view
whatsoever on that part of the bankruptcy court's opinion.").
761 Id. at 1285 (Jones, J., dissenting) (voting against rehearing, reaffirming the original
opinion, which she had written, and arguing that Dewsnup had clouded the approach to
statutory construction of the Bankruptcy Code).
762 Id. at 1285 (Jones, J., dissenting).
763 Bank of America Natl Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, 119 S.
Ct. 1411, 1424 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Scalia, J.).
764 Id. at 1426.
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The relationship between plain meaning and pre-Code practice is complicated by the fact that many of the clashes between
these two canons have arisen when Bankruptcy Code was in tension with other state or federal law.76 5 Part IV.A. 1.d considers the
Court's use of the pre-Code practice canon to defer to important
state or federal laws or governmental interests.
(c)

The interaction with other law cases

Finally, there are seven remaining non-constitutional, nonunanimous cases. 766 Two of these cases involved a clash between
the Bankruptcy Code and other law. 76 7 Three involved governmental tax claims or enforcement proceedings. 76 Two involved
disputes concerning the application of the law to the facts.7 6
In addition to the two bankruptcy/other law cases that did not
lead to interpretive disputes, at least four of the Court's interpretive dispute split decisions also involved tensions between the
bankruptcy and other law. 7 Similarly, in addition to the three
governmental interest cases that did not lead to interpretive disputes, several of the cases that did give rise to interpretive disputes also involved governmental tax claims and enforcement
proceedings. 7 71 This Part will compare all of these interaction
with other law and governmental interest cases.
First, in the six cases in which the Bankruptcy Code came
into tension with other state or federal law, the Court resolved
these tensions as follows:
Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Departmentof Environmental Protection772 presented a tension between the bankruptcy abandonment power and environmental law. The Court
765 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990);
Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986); Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl.
Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
766 See United States v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213
(1996); Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59 (1995); Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291 (1991); United
States v. Energy Resources Co., 495 U.S. 545 (1990); California State Bd. of Equalization v.
Sierra Summit, Inc., 490 U.S. 844 (1989); Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985); NLRB v.
Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
767 See Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (involving bankruptcy law versus environmental law);
Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (involving bankruptcy law versus labor law).
766 See Reorganized CF & I, 518 U.S. 213 (involving the definition of excise tax and
subordination of a tax penalty); Energy Resources, 495 U.S. 545 (involving trust fund
taxes); Sierra Summit, 490 U.S. 844 (involving state taxation of liquidation sales).
769 See Field, 516 U.S. 59; Farrey, 500 U.S. 291; Part LV.A.1.e.
770 See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994); Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub.
Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990); Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986); Midlantic
Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
771 See United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535 (1996); Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 503 U.S.
47 (1992); Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32 (1991);
Begier v. Internal Revenue Serv., 496 U.S. 53 (1990); United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc.,
462 U.S. 198 (1983).
772 Midlantic, 474 U.S. 494.
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identified a pre-Code canon that limited the abandonment
power,
and used the pre-Code canon to defer to environmental
7 73
law.

Ohio v. Kovacs77 4 presented a tension between bankruptcy law
and environmental law. The Court declined to defer to environmental law, and did not use a pre-Code canon.7"'
Kelly v. Robinson7 6 presented a tension between bankruptcy
and criminal restitution law. The Court identified a pre-Code
practice of deference to criminal processes, and applied
the pre777
Code canon to defer to state criminal restitution law.
778

Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v. Davenport
presented a tension between bankruptcy and criminal restitution law. The Court declined to defer to criminal restitution
law. The Court cited the pre-Code canon, but concluded that
Congress had evinced in the Bankruptcy Code's language its intent to alter the pre-Code practice of deference to state criminal
processes.7 79
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco 7 0 presented a tension between
bankruptcy and labor law. The Court declined to defer to labor
law, and did not identify any pre-Code practice of deference to
labor law.78 1
BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp.v8 2 presented a tension between
bankruptcy avoidance powers and state foreclosure law. The
Court, using reasoning analogous to the pre-Code canon, found
that the two bodies of law had coexisted for centuries. Therefore, the Court found that bankruptcy fraudulent conveyance
law could not be used to set aside a regularly conducted state
foreclosure sale.7"
These cases reveal a three-to-three split. Three common factors characterize the three cases in which non-bankruptcy law
trumped bankruptcy law. First, in each of these cases, the Court
relied heavily on a pre-Code practice of bankruptcy law deference
to the other law.7 M In other words, the Court essentially assumed
that Congress knew of this deferential practice and intended to
continue this practice. This type of finding was critical because
each case presented a tension between bankruptcy law and state
773
774
775
776

Id.
Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
Id.
Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986).

777
778

Id.

Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990).
Id.
78o NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
779
781
782

Id.

BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994).
Id.
See BFP, 511 U.S. 531; Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986); Midlantic Nat'l Bank
v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
783
784
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law. The Supremacy Clause 78 5 makes federal law superior to state
law. The Court, therefore, could only defer to state law if the federal law, itself, embodied a policy or practice of deference. Each
case preserved state law, despite the Bankruptcy Code. Second, in
each of these cases, the Court employed non-bankruptcy-centric
reasoning. Third, in each of these cases, the Court's holding favored a governmental entity. In Kelly, the Court permitted the
state to force a restitution order.1 6 In Midlantic, the Court prohibited the trustee from abandoning polluted property. Two state
environmental agencies, that night otherwise have incurred the
costs of cleanup, had opposed abandonment.7 87 In BFP, the
Court's refusal to set aside the foreclosure sale favored both the
buyer (a private party) and the federal governmental successor to
the saving and loan association that had conducted the foreclosure
sale (the Resolution Trust Corporation). 8
In contrast, in the three cases in which the Court held that
bankruptcy law trumped non-bankruptcy law, the Court employed
bankruptcy-centric reasoning and found no pre-Code practice of
deference. 9 In all three cases, the Court ruled against a governmental entity.
For example, compare Bildisco and Midlantic. In Bildisco,
bankruptcy policy, supported by an arguably plain reading of the
Bankruptcy Code, overcame labor law policy. In Midlantic, environmental policy, incorporated through a pre-Code canon, overcame an arguably plain reading of the Bankruptcy Code. Bildisco
allowed a debtor to modify a union contract without complying
with labor law. Midlantic allowed a debtor to abandon property
only if it first complied with environmental law. The Bankruptcy
Code allowed rejection of contracts without an express exception
for union contracts,7 90 just as the Bankruptcy Code allowed abandonment of property without an express exception for polluted
property. 79' The only significant distinction between these cases is
785

See U.S.

CONST.

art. VI.

Kelly, 479 U.S. 531.
Midlantic, 474 U.S. 494.
788 BFP, 511 U.S. 531.
789 See Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990); Ohio v.
Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985); NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
Similarly, in those cases that implicated state law, but in which the Court found no
direct conflict between the Bankruptcy Code and state law and no important state interest,
the Court uniformly subordinated the state law to the Bankruptcy Code. See Fidelity Fin.
Servs., Inc. v. Fink, 522 U.S. 211 (1998) (state law grace period for perfection of security
interests versus Bankruptcy Code grace period for avoiding preferential perfection); Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992) (state spendthrift trust law implicated in legislative
history of exclusion from debtors' estate of beneficial interests in certain trusts); Owen v.
Owen, 500 U.S. 305 (1991) (state law definition of exempt property versus Bankruptcy
Code lien avoidance provision). None of these cases involved governmental entities.
790 See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1994); cf id. § 1113 (enacted after Bildisco).
786
787

791

Id. § 554.
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that, in Midlantic, the Court identified a pre-Code practice of deference to environmental law. In other words, according to the
Court, deference to environmental law was codified as a limitation
on the abandonment power. In contrast, the concept of rejecting
v2
contracts was codified without a policy of deference to labor law. 1
Unfortunately, no easy formula exists by which interpreters
can determine whether the Court will discover a pre-Code practice
of deference to other laws. Following the Court's approach in
Kelly and Midlantic, one might search pre-Code bankruptcy cases
for judicial expressions of a policy of deference. This approach
would not, however, have enabled an interpreter to predict the result in BFP, in which the Court deferred to state foreclosure law
simply because such law had co-existed for centuries with fraudulent transfer law. Bankruptcy law and labor law have also co-existed, yet the Court in Bildisco declined to defer to labor law.
These interpretive problems arise because the Justices hold conflicting views concerning the role of pre-Code practices in Bankruptcy Code interpretation and concerning how to reconcile the
Bankruptcy Code with other state or federal law. The challenge of
discerning the Justices' views on these interpretive issues is further complicated by the fact that some Justices who generally reject appeals to pre-Code practice (notably Justices Scalia and
794
Thomas), 9 3 will go to interpretive extremes to defer to state law.
This deference apparently is rooted in some ill-defined, unarticulated, and doctrinally suspect notion of federalism.
The cases in which the Court considered a governmental tax
claim or enforcement proceeding arguably show more consistent
interpretive patterns. Although some commentators have suggested that the Court defers unreasonably to governmental
claims, the cases suggest a coherent jurisprudence.
The government won all three of the cases in which the debtor
argued that bankruptcy law exempted the estate from compliance
with governmental enforcement proceedings, and the one case in
which the debtor sought to recover trust fund tax payments that
the debtor could not have recovered out of bankruptcy. 795 The government also won the two cases in which the debtor sought to
792 After Bildisco, however, Congress promptly amended the Bankruptcy Code to add
special rules for the rejection of collective bargaining agreements. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113
(1994).
793 See, e.g., Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership, Ltd., 119 S. Ct. 1411 (1999).
794 See, e.g., BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994).
795 See Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 503 U.S. 47 (1992) (holding that bankruptcy did not
exempt the trustee of a reorganization trust from filing returns and paying taxes); Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32 (1991) (holding that the stay
did not bar a Federal Reserve Board enforcement proceeding against debtor bank holding
company); Begier v. Internal Revenue Serv., 496 U.S. 53 (1990) (holding that the debtor
could not recover as preferential transfers tax payments that had been made from trust
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subordinate governmental tax claims.7 9 The government was not,
however, exempt from the Bankruptcy Code's turnover provision.7 97 Similarly, in one case, the Court held that the government's interest in designating payments as non-trust-fund taxes
did not overcome the debtor's interest in designating payments as
trust fund taxes.79 These cases suggest that the Bankruptcy Code
does not exempt the estate from complying with governmental enforcement proceedings, and that the government's status as tax
collector neither exempts it from Bankruptcy Code rules (such as
turnover) nor subjects it to special burdens (such as equitable
subordination).
(d)

The application of the law cases

Only two of the cases in which Justices wrote separate opinions involved neither constitutional questions, nor conflicts with
non-bankruptcy law, nor interpretive disputes.79 In both of these
cases, Justices wrote separately because they questioned the application of the law to the facts. °°
In summary, the Court's Bankruptcy Code cases reveal that
interpretive disputes drive most of the Court's separate opinions.
Interpretive disputes among the Justices in these cases have generally followed predictable patterns. Part 2 summarizes these
patterns.
2.

Patterns of disputes among the Justices

First, although no single Justice has consistently applied the
same interpretive method in each case, certain Justices favor textual interpretation while other Justices favor more flexible interpretive methods. Second, particular Justices disagree regularly
with the other Justices over interpretive method.
First, Appendix VI records the interpretive method used in
each decision that each Justice joined.8 0 ' Appendix VII, which
summarizes the data from Appendix VI, reveals each Justice's
rates of
joining textual, non-textual, and pre-Code practice
02
cases.

funds); California State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc., 490 U.S. 844 (1989)
(holding that bankruptcy did not exempt the estate from state taxes on liquidation sales).
796 See United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535 (1996); United States v. Reorganized CF
& I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213 (1996).
797 See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983).
798 See United States v. Energy Resources Co., 495 U.S. 545 (1990).
799 See Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59 (1995); Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291 (1991).
8oo See Farrey, 500 U.S. at 301-04 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Farrey, 500 U.S. at 300
n.4 (Scalia, J., declining to join a portion of the opinion); Field, 516 U.S. at 78 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring); Field, 516 U.S. at 79 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
sOl See Appendix VI, post.
802 See Appendix VII, post.
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Not surprisingly, Appendix VII shows that Justices Thomas
and Scalia joined textual opinions at a higher rate (60%), than any
other Justice. Justice Souter (at 50%) was not far behind.0 3
At the other end of the spectrum, Justices Stevens (15%) and
Brennan (14%) joined textual opinions far less frequently than the
other Justices. Former Chief Justice Burger and Justices Ginsburg, Marshall, and Powell joined textual opinions in 17-21% of
the cases in which they participated. 0 '
In the center, leaning toward textualism, we find Justices
Kennedy (42%) and White (37%), and Chief Justice Rehnquist
(37%). Justices O'Connor (32%), Breyer (30%) and Blackmun
8 0
(29%) lean slightly further away from textualism.
The Justices' rates of joining opinions that defer to pre-Code
practice reflect a similar, but slightly less regular, pattern.
At the textualist end, Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Souter
joined pre-Code practice opinions in only 14-15% of the cases in
which they participated. Justice White joined pre-Code practice
opinions in 17% of his cases. Former Chief Justice Burger did not
join any pre-Code practice opinions."0 6
Justices Powell, Ginsburg, Brennan, and Breyer joined preCode practice opinions in 40-50% of the cases in which they
participated. s 7
The six remaining Justices, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens
joined pre-Code practice
opinions in 20-29% of the cases in which
8
they participated. 8
In summary, Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Souter have generally joined textual, anti-pre-Code practice opinions. Justices Ginsburg, Powell, and Brennan have generally joined non-textual, preCode practice opinions. Justice Stevens is strongly non-textual,
but less strongly pre-Code practice oriented. The remaining Justices fall in the center of this spectrum. 09
Although these data reveal individual Justices' interpretive
proclivities, they also reflect that none of the Justices have joined
exclusively textual or exclusively non-textual opinions. We can
either accuse the Justices of interpretive dishonesty, or we can
surmise that even the textualists occasionally find enough ambiguity to consult sources other than the text, and that even the
non-textualists occasionally find the text to be so plain that no ref803
8o4
8o5
806
807
808
809

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
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erence to other sources is appropriate. Some Justices clearly lean
toward textualism while others lean away from textualism. The
Justices' varied interpretive preferences clearly cause many of the
Court's split decisions in bankruptcy cases and contribute to the
sense that the Court has no coherent interpretive strategy.
Second, Appendix IV records whether each Justice joined a
majority, concurring, or dissenting opinion in each case."'0 Appendix V, which summarizes the data from Appendix IV, shows each
Justice's rate of dissent and divergence (i.e., joining a non-majority opinion) in the Court's Bankruptcy Code cases."1 '
Not surprisingly, Appendix V reveals that Justices Stevens
and Scalia diverged from the majority frequently. Justice Scalia
joined non-majority opinions in 25% of the cases in which he participated. Justice Stevens joined non-majority opinions 33% of his
cases. Justice Ginsburg is the only other sitting Justice who diverged from the majority opinion in more than 25% of the cases in
which she participated. The retired Justices who joined non-majority opinions in more than 25% of the cases in which they participated are Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall."1 '
At the other end of the spectrum, Former Chief Justice Burger, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Powell, Kennedy, and
Thomas diverged from the majority
in fewer than 10% of the cases
13
in which they participated.
Filling in the center were Justices Souter, White, and
O'Connor, who diverged from the majority in 13-18% of their
8 14
cases.
A review of the Court's separate opinions demonstrates that
Justices Scalia and Stevens not only joined separate opinions
more frequently than most of the other Justices, but that they also
typically authored those separate opinions. Consider the cases in
which only one Justice wrote a separate opinion (concurrence or
dissent).
After Justice Scalia joined the Court, 5 ' the Court issued ten
cases in which a single Justice diverged from the majority's opin81o See Appendix IV: Distribution of Justices' Opinions in Supreme Court Bankruptcy
Code Cases [hereinafter, "Appendix IV"], post. The form of this Appendix is borrowed, with
gratitude, and with alterations, from Professors Tabb and Lawless. See Tabb, supra note 7,
at 583; Tabb & Lawless, supra note 7, at 892.
811 See Appendix V: Supreme Court Justices' Dissent and Divergence Rates in Bankruptcy Code Cases [hereinafter, "Appendix V"], post.
812 Id.
813 Id.
814 Id.
815 Before Justice Scalia joined the Court, there was only one case in which a single
justice wrote a separate opinion. See Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985) (Justice O'Connor
joined the majority but also wrote a separate concurrence).
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ion. 16 In eight of these cases, the lone Justice was Justice Scalia
or Stevens.8 1 7 In the other two cases, Justice Thomas dissented, in
part, from a Justice Souter opinion and Justice Blackmun dissented from a Justice White opinion.81 8
A similar pattern emerges from the cases in which two Justices wrote or joined separate opinions.
Before Justice Scalia joined the Court, the Court issued only
one seven-to-two decision.8 19 Justice Stevens wrote the dissent,
which Justice Marshall joined.8 20
After Justice Scalia joined the Court, the Court issued seven
seven-to-two decisions.8 2 ' In four of these, either Justice Scalia or
Justice Stevens wrote the dissent.8 22 In two, either Justice Stevens or Justice Scalia joined a dissent that another Justice
wrote. 23 In the seventh case, Justice Blackmun wrote a dissent,
which Justice O'Connor joined.8 24 In an eighth case, Justice Stevens dissented and Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred.8 2 5
The cases in which three or four Justices diverged from the
majority, which often involved constitutional questions or tensions
between the Bankruptcy Code and other law rather than pure in816 See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997) (per Ginsburg, J.,
with Stevens, J., dissenting); United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc.,
518 U.S. 213 (1996) (per Souter, J., with Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Nobelman v. American Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993) (per Thomas, J., with Stevens, J., concurring); Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992) (per Blackmun, J., with
Scalia, J., concurring); Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992) (per Thomas, J.,
with Stevens, J., dissenting); Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305 (1991) (per Scalia, J., with Stevens, J., dissenting); Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991) (per Blackmun, J., with Stevens,
J., dissenting); Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151 (1991) (per Stevens, J., with Scalia, J.,
concurring); Begier v. Internal Revenue Serv., 496 U.S. 53 (1990) (per Marshall, J., with
Scalia, J. concurring); United States v. Energy Resources Co., 495 U.S. 545 (1990) (per
White, J., with Blackmun, J., dissenting).
817 See supra note 816 (Rash, Nobelman, Patterson, Taylor, Owen, Toibb, Wolas,
Begier).
818 See supra note 816 (Reorganized CF&I, Energy Resources).
819 See Central Trust Co. v. Official Creditors' Comm. of Geiger Enters., Inc., 454 U.S.
354 (1982) (per curiam).
820 See Geiger, 454 U.S. at 360 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.).
821 See Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 313 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting,
joined by Ginsburg, J.); Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 79 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined
by Scalia, J.); Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 403 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined
by Blackmun, J.); Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 420 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined
by Souter, J.); United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 39 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting, joined by Blackmun, J.); Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495
U.S. 552, 564 (1990) (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by O'Connor, J.); Kelly v. Robinson,
479 U.S. 36, 53 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J.)
822 See supra note 821 (Celotex, Barnhill,Dewsnup, Nordic Village).
823 See supra note 821 (Field,Kelly).
824 See supra note 821 (Davenport).
825 See Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. 203 N. LaSalle St. Partnership,
Ltd., 119 S. Ct. 1411, 1424, 1426 (1999).
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terpretive disputes, do not reflect such a clear pattern of
divergence. 26
In summary, the Justices disagree among themselves concerning what interpretive method is proper for the Bankruptcy
Code. Most apparently, Justice Stevens favors more flexible interpretation, while Justices Scalia and Thomas favor textual interpretation. The other Justices tend to be less textual than Justices
Thomas and Scalia but also less flexible than Justice Stevens.
The Justices struggle not only to determine when textual interpretation resolves a case, but also when the Court should consult and
defer to pre-Code laws or practices. As a result of these interpretive disputes among the Justices, the Court does not act as a body
when it interprets Bankruptcy Code cases. Consequently, it often
appears to be shifting between competing interpretive methods.
B.

Advice for Courts, Advocates, and Interpreters

How can this study help interpreters achieve greater certainty during this time of upheaval in interpretive theory?
First, an understanding of the Court's interpretive methods
should help interpreters predict the Court's rulings in future
cases. Predictability is important not only for advocates who argue before the Court but also for lower courts, advocates who argue before the lower courts, and attorneys who counsel clients
concerning how to proceed in the face of open bankruptcy law
questions. The Court's opinions provide these players not only
with substantive rules of law, but also with guidance concerning
how the Court will interpret the Bankruptcy Code. The interpre826 See Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 131 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring, joined by Stevens, J.); Things Remembered, 516 U.S. at 129 (Kennedy, J., concurring, joined by Ginsburg, J.) (presenting a jurisdictional question); Connecticut Nat'l
Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 255 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring), Germain, 503 U.S. at
256 (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by White & Blackmun, JJ.) (presenting a jurisdictional question); Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291, 301 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring,
joined by Souter, J.) (presenting a dispute over application of the law); Granfinanciera v.
Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 65 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); Granfinanciera,492 U.S. at 71
(White, J., dissenting), Granfinanciera,492 U.S. at 91 (Blackmun, J, dissenting, joined by
O'Connor, J.) (presenting a constitutional question); Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96, 105 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Hoffman, 492 U.S.
at 105 (Scalia, J., concurring), Hoffman, 492 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by
Brennan, Blackmun & Stevens, JJ.); Hoffman, 492 U.S. at 111 (Stevens, J., dissenting,
joined by Blackmun, J.) (presenting a constitutional question); Northern Pipeline Constr.
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 89 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring, joined by
O'Connor, J.); Marathon, 458 U.S. at 92 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Marathon, 458 U.S. at
92 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J. & Powell, J.) (presenting a constitutional
question); United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 82 (1982) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ.) (presenting a constitutional question); but
see Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 399 (1993)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, Souter & Thomas, JJ.) (presenting an interpretive dispute); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 249 (1989) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall & Stevens, JJ.) (presenting an interpretive
dispute).
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tive methods the Court employs are inextricable from the Court's
rationale. Consequently, when lower courts reach conflicting rulings by applying different interpretive methods (such as text versus legislative history), an examination of the Court's interpretive
approach in bankruptcy cases may help predict which of the lower
court decisions will be overruled. Of course, the lower courts cannot always follow the interpretive approach that the Court's bankruptcy decisions seem to suggest. For example, even if a
bankruptcy judge concludes that the Court would not rely heavily
upon legislative history, the judge may be bound by a circuit precedent that relies heavily on legislative history.
Second, this study should allow interpreters to determine
whether deficiencies in the Court's interpretive approach have resulted in either "bad" decisions or split decisions. Whether an interpreter sees deficiencies will depend upon her perspective. For
example, a bankruptcy expert may argue that the Court has issued "bad" decisions or split decisions because some Justices failed
to appreciate the unique characteristics and structure of the
Bankruptcy Code. An interpretive theory expert may argue that
the Court has issued "bad" decisions or split decisions because
some Justices employed interpretive methods that violate basic
precepts of interpretive theory. However one might define errors
in the Court's Bankruptcy Code decisions, this study invites critics
to open a two-way dialogue with the Court. One aspect of this
dialogue, obviously, lies in the Court's guidance to lower courts
and interpreters concerning how to interpret the Bankruptcy
Code. The other aspect lies in critics' response. If interpreters understand how the Court interprets bankruptcy cases, and see
flaws in the Court's approach, those interpreters have an opportunity to improve the Court's bankruptcy jurisprudence by communicating their concerns to the Court. For example, critics can
write law review articles that comment on the Court's interpretive
deficiencies. Critics can also attempt to obviate bad decisions in
future cases by writing amicus briefs that explain to the Court (for
example) how the Bankruptcy Code's substantive structure mandates a certain result or how interpretive theory mandates a certain result.
This study has revealed that text, structure, and history are
relevant to Bankruptcy Code interpretation.
First, the Justices disagree concerning when to look beyond
the text. Cases in which one or more Justices insist that the
meaning is plain and that no other sources should be examined
usually split the Court. In contrast, cases in which the Court confirms apparent textual meaning through an analysis of the Bankruptcy Code's structure and the development of bankruptcy
doctrine over time, more often result in unanimous or near-unani-
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mous opinions. Consequently, interpreters are well-advised to
consider the text in the context of the Bankruptcy Code's structure
and the development of bankruptcy doctrine.
Second, as for structure, the Court's jurisprudence is not yet
adequately developed. The Court's bankruptcy opinions show an
interest in structural analysis, but do have always display a sophisticated understanding of the substantive interactions among
different provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Even the textualist
Justices are willing to consider the Bankruptcy Code's structure,
as part of their holistic interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code,
although Justice Thomas tends to focus almost exclusively on linguistic structure. The Justices will consider the Bankruptcy
Code's design, if they perceive that design within the Bankruptcy
Code's language. They are less willing to consider unsupported
appeals to "good policy." Consequently, interpreters should locate
bankruptcy "policy" not in external pronouncements, but rather,
in the substantive structure of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court's
most thoughtful decisions understand the substantive structure,
or music, of the Bankruptcy Code. Some of these opinions have
benefited from the guidance of briefs submitted by leading bankruptcy luminaries,"' Several of the opinions in which the Court
failed to engage in a thoughtful analysis of the substantive structure of the Bankruptcy Code were decided without the benefit of
such input. 2
Third, as for history, the Court's Bankruptcy Code opinions
(particularly those decided after Justice Scalia joined the Court)
generally disfavor a detailed parsing of legislative history. They
do, however, often engage in a thoughtful analysis of how the
Bankruptcy Code's current text and structure are consistent with
the development of bankruptcy doctrine over time.
As for the pre-Code canon, its future is unclear. Many cases
consider pre-Code practice as a part of the Bankruptcy Code's
broad history. It is clear from the Court's Bankruptcy Code opinions that pre-Code practices are most relevant when the Bankruptcy Code's text is ambiguous, the pre-Code practices were wellestablished, and the Bankruptcy Code has not obviously and significantly altered those practices. The complicated relationship
between the plain meaning rule, pre-Code practice, and "policies"
827 See, for example, the Court's unanimous opinions in United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of
Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988) (some of the bankruptcy experts on the
briefs or otherwise involved were A. Bruce Schimberg, J. Ronald Trost, Shalom L. Kohn,
Frank R. Kennedy, Thomas H. Jackson, Harvey R. Miller, Martin Bienenstock, Richard
Levin, Kenneth N. Klee, and Raymond T. Nimmer), and Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985) (some of the bankruptcy experts on the briefs
were David A. Epstein and David F. Heroy).
828 See, e.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989) (no nationally
recognized bankruptcy experts on the briefs).
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of deference to state and federal law or important governmental
interests, however, seriously cloud attempts to define a coherent
pattern in the Court's pre-Code jurisprudence. The Court's seemingly inconsistent decisions in this area may also have been affected by federalism concerns and state's interests philosophy of
some of the more conservative Justices.
In summary, interpreters seeking to understand the Court's
likely ruling in future cases would be well-advised to engage in a
thoughtful analysis of the text and structure of the Bankruptcy
Code. They should also examine the development of bankruptcy
doctrine, including pre-Code practices, but they should be cautious about relying heavily on pre-Code practices if those practices
were not well-established or the Bankruptcy Code seems to have
altered those practices. In those situations, interpreters must examine the substantive structure of the Bankruptcy Code to determine how the Bankruptcy Code modified pre-Code practices.
Interpreters should consult legislative history to enhance their
understanding of the development of bankruptcy doctrine; however, they should be chary of relying heavily on detailed analyses
of specific statements in the legislative history. Finally, although
the Court frequently refers to bankruptcy policy, its recent Bankruptcy Code opinions generally mention policy only in a supporting role, usually refer only to bankruptcy's two over-arching
policies (fresh starttrehabilitation and equitable distribution), and
often ground those policies in the Bankruptcy Code's structure.
Advocates, lower court judges, and bankruptcy scholars can,
and should, help the Court better understand the music of the
Bankruptcy Code. They can accomplish this through thoughtfully
written briefs, opinions, and law review articles that place the text
of disputed Bankruptcy Code provisions in the context of the linguistic and substantive structure of the Bankruptcy Code. They
should also place the text in the context of the development of
bankruptcy doctrine over time. When bankruptcy judges write
bankruptcy opinions, particularly concerning controversial bankruptcy issues, they are encouraged to elaborate each of these elements (text, context, development of bankruptcy doctrine).
Bankruptcy judges have a profound depth of understanding of the
Bankruptcy Code. Even if they believe that the text answers a
question, they can educate the higher courts, which lack such expertise, by explaining why the text is consistent with the Bankruptcy Code's linguistic and substantive structure and with the
development of bankruptcy doctrine over time.
Finally, the bankruptcy bar (which includes several official organizations of diverse groups of bankruptcy attorneys) should consider becoming more involved in Supreme Court bankruptcy cases
(for example, by submitting amicus briefs).
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study has demonstrated that the Court does not apply a
single interpretive method in its Bankruptcy Code cases. Nevertheless, this study reveals several strong interpretive patterns
that should guide interpreters. Interpreters should study these
patterns to enhance their understanding of the Court's interpretive methods. Advocates, judges, and scholars who study these
patterns and address the varied elements of bankruptcy interpretation in their briefs, opinions, and scholarly works can help the
Court better understand the music of the Bankruptcy Code.
Having identified the Court's current interpretive practices,
we must next consider whether the Court's somewhat inconsistent
group of interpretive practices provides a desirable method of
Bankruptcy Code interpretation. This can be done by considering
what interpretive methods seem well-suited to a complex statute
with the unique characteristics of the Bankruptcy Code, and by
determining whether either the Court's current practices or practically desirable practices satisfy the complicated requirements of
interpretive theory.
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THE SuPREME COURT'S BANKRUPTcY CODE DECISIONS

(LISTED

By TERM 1981- 1998)

1981 Term
Central Trust Co. v. Official Creditors' Committee of Geiger Enterprises, Inc., 454 U.S. 354 (1982).
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50 (1982).
1982 Term
United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982).
United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983).
1983 Term
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
1984 Term
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub, 471 U.S.
343 (1985).
Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
1985 Term
Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
1986 Term
Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
1987 Term
Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988).
United Savings Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood ForestAssociates, Ltd.,
484 U.S. 365 (1988).
1988 Term
CaliforniaState Board of Equalizationv. SierraSummit, Inc., 490
U.S. 844 (1989).
Granfinancierav. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
Hoffman v. Connecticut Department of Income Maintenance, 492
U.S. 96 (1989).
United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises,Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
1989 Term
Begier v. Internal Revenue Service, 496 U.S. 53 (1990).
PennsylvaniaDepartment of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S.
522 (1990).
United States v. Energy Resources Co., 495 U.S. 545 (1990).
1990 Term
Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291 (1991).
Grogan v. Garner,498 U.S. 279 (1991).
Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78 (1991).
Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42 (1990).

300

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 3:173

Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305 (1991).
Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991).
1991 Term
Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393 (1992).
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve v. MCorp Financial,
Inc., 502 U.S. 32 (1991).
Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992).
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992).
Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 503 U.S. 47 (1992).
Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992).
Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638 (1992).
United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992).
Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151 (1991).
1992 Term
PioneerInvestment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380 (1993).
Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993).
Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464 (1993).
1993 Term
BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994).
1994 Term
Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300 (1995).
1995 Term
Citizens Bank v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16 (1995).
Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59 (1995).
Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca,516 U.S. 124 (1995).
United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535 (1996).
United States v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricatorsof Utah, Inc., 518
U.S. 213 (1996).
1996 Term
Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997).
1997 Term
Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213 (1998).
Fidelity FinancialServices, Inc. v. Fink, 522 U.S. 211 (1998).
Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57 (1998).
1998 Term
Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n v. 203 North
LaSalle Street Partnership,526 U.S. 434 (1999).
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II

BANKRUPTCY CODE CIRCUIT COURT SPLITS RESOLVED BY THE
SUPREME COURT

Second Minor

Majority

Minority

Cases

Circuits

Court's Ruling

Associates Commercial (Rash)
Bank of America (LaSalle)
Barnhill
Beiger
BFP
Board of Governors (MCorp)
CA State Board (Sierra)
Celotex
Central Trust
Citizens Bank (Strumpf)
Cohen
Commodity Futures
CT National Bank (Germain)
Dewsnup v. Timm
Farrey
Fidelity Financial Services
Field
Granfinaciera
Grogan
Hoffman
Holywell
Johnson
Kawaauhau
Kelly
Langenkamp
Midlantic Nat. Bank
NLRB (Bildisco)
Nobelman
Northern Pipeline (Marathon)
Norwest Bank (Ahlers)
Ohio v. Kovacs
Owen
Patterson
PA Dept. Pub. Welf. Davenport)
Pioneer Investment
Rake
Taylor
Things Remembered
Toibb
Union Bank v. Wolas
United Savings (Timbers)
US v. Energy Resources
US v. Noland
US v. Nordic Village
US v. Reorganized CF & I
US v. Ron Pair
US v. Security Industrial
US v. Whiting Pools

1,8,9
7,9
4,6,7,9
NS
6,9
NS
2,5
4*
NS
NS
3,11
2,8
NS
10
7,9,10
5,9
5,7,8
NS*
6,7,8,9,10,11
3,7*
NS
9,11
6,10
NS
NS*
NS
3
2,3,9,10
NS*
NS
NS
2,4,8,10
5,8,9,11
NS
4,7,8,1113,7
3,4,9,11
5,6,8
NS
5,6,8
9
4,8,9
1
NS
NS*
4,10
1,4
NS*
2

Circuits Circuits
5
2,7
2,4
3,10,11

2,4
3,10,11

5

6,9

9
5

4

9
7

3,11
2,8

3
8
10,11,8
1,10

10
8
8
5,7,8

3,4
2

3,4
2

10
8

9,11
8

2
5

3
5

5,6,11
3,4,6,10

2,4,8,10
3,4,6,10

6,10/2,9
6,10
3

6,10/3,7
6,10
3

1,8,9

11
6
5
3
6
6
4

2

N.S.: Splits are listed only where the Court, itself, ide ntified the split as a basis for
certiorari.
*: Constitutional or Quasi-Constitutional Question.
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APPENDIX III
SPLITS IN SUPREME COURT BANRuPrcy CASES
1981-1985 TERMS
UNANIMOUS

CONCURRENCE

MINOR SPLIT

Weintraub
Whiting Pools

Kovacs
Security

Geiger

TOTAL = 8
MAJOR SPLIT

2 (25%)
2 (25%)
TOTAL WITHOUT SPLIT = 4 (50%)

Bildisco
Marathon
Midlantic
1 (12.5%)
3 (37.5%)
TOTAL WITH SPLIT = 4 (50%)

1986-1998 TERMS
UNANIMOUS

CONCURRENCE

MINOR SPLIT

Begier
Farrey
Germain
Nobleman
Patterson
Things Remembered
Wolas

Barnhill
BFP
Celotex
Granfinanciera
Davenport
Hoffman
Dewsnup
Pioneer
Energy Resources
Ron Pair
Field
Sierra Summit
Kelly
LaSalle
Nordic Village
Owen
Rash
Reorg. CF&I
Taylor
Toibb
14 (35%)
6 (15%)
TOTAL WITH SPLIT = 20 (50%)

Ahlers
Cohen
Fidelity
Grogan
Holywell
Johnson
Kawaauhau
Langenkamp
MCorp
Noland
Rake
Strumpf
Timbers

TOTAL = 40

13 (32.5%)
7 (15.75%)
TOTAL WITHOUT SPLIT = 20 (50%)
TOTAL
15 (31.25%)
9 (18.75%)
TOTAL WITHOUT SPLIT = 24 (50%)
Italics
1 of
1 of
2 of
3 of

MAJOR SPLIT

15 (31.25%)
9 (18.75%)
TOTAL WITH SPLIT = 24 (50%)
indicate cases presenting constitutional questions
15 unanimous = 6.67%
9 concurrence = 11.11%
15 minor splits = 13.33%
9 major splits = 33.33%

TOTAL = 48

2000]

303

Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code

0

0U

w

0

0.

,-

'o .

o
o

.

-

0
z
.= .SI.~ " ,

0
H

0

U

Co

C.

.

..

2. o

E-4

O2

C~

0

[Vol. 3:173

Chapman Law Review

304

0

o

0

PA

r

r

v8

.

0
z0
Za)

z

P4

o.2

0
M

SCC

O

0

z
0
-4

E-4

2*

'.

.0 -

305

Interpretingthe Bankruptcy Code

2000]

APPENDIX V
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES' DISSENT AND DIVERGENCE RATES IN
BAKRuPrcy CODE CASES
1978-85
justice

# of
a

P

Powell

8
8

8ee

19M-1998
%
dissent
0/8
0%
0/7

%
diverge

%
dissent

12.5%
217

..

..

..

..

7

0%

28.5%

8

1/8
2.5%

2/8
25.0%

Kennedy

--

--

ene .. .

Thomas
Bee
..

.

Souter

40
37
22
1
II

29

White
Wht

88

3/8
37.5%

3/8
37.5%

0,C..o

8

1/8
12.5%

3/8
37.5%

Scalia

--

--

--

40

Brennan

8

1/8
12.5%

10

Blackmun

8

1/8
12.55

2/8
25%
218
25%

Ginsburg

-

Sten

8

Ma5s3al5
____

8 ___25%

-

..
..
1/8
12.5%
2/8

%
4iverg

#of
cases

1/8

Rni
Rehnquist

..

TOTAL

#of
cams

--

..
1/8
12.5%
3/8
37.5%

28

29
12

12

40

16
____31.25%

0/40
0%
0/37
0%
2/22
9.09%
1/11
9.09%
3/29
10.3%
1/28
3.5%
4/40
10.0%
3/40
7.5%
3/10
30%
8/29
27.6%
2/12
16%
12/40
30%
5/16

..

8

0/40
0%
2/37
5.4%
2/22
9.09%
1/11
9.09%
4/29
13.7%
2/28
7.1%
6/40
15.0%

48

10/40

40

25%
3/10
30%
9/29
31%
4/12
33%
15/40
37.5%
5/16
31.25%

22

11
29
29
36
48

18
37

48

24

____29.1%

%
dissent
0/8
0%
0

%
diverge

1/8
12.5%
2/7

0%

28.5%

1/48

2/48
4.0
2/37
5.4%
2122
9.09%
1/11,
9.09%
4/29
13.7%
5/36
13.8%
9/48
18.7

0/37
0%
2/22
9.09%
1/11
9.09%
3/29
10.3%
4/36
11.1%
5/48
10.4%

3/40

7.5%
4/18
22%
9/37
24.3%
2/12
16%
13/48
27.08%
7/24

10/40

25%
5/18
27.7%
11/37
29.7%
4/12
33%
16/48
33.3%
8/24
33.3%

,
,
_

_
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APPENDIX VII
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES' RATES OF JOINING TEXTUAL AND NONTEXTUAL OPINIONS IN BANKRupTcy CODE CASES
Justice

Total Cases*

Textual

Percentage

Scalia
35
21
60%
Thomas
20
12
60%
Souter
28
14
50%
Kennedy
33
14
42%
White
30
11
37%
Rehnquist
41
15
37%
O'Connor
41
13
32%
Breyer
10
3
30%
Blackmun
31
9
29%
Marshall
19
4
21%
Burger
5
1
20%
Ginsburg
11
2
18%
Powell
6
1
17%
Stevens
41
6
15%
Brennan
14
2
14%
Legend:
* = Non-Constitutional Question Cases Only
Data Compiled From Appendix VI

Non-Textual

Percentage

Pre-Code

Percentage

14
8
14
19
19
26
28
7
22
15
4
9
5
35
12

40%
40%
50%
58%
63%
63%
68%
70%
71%
79%
80%
82%
83%
85%
86%

5
3
4
7
5
10
12
4
7
5
0
5
3
11
6

14%
15%
14%
21%
17%
24%
29%
40%
23%
26%
0%
45%
50%
27%
43%

